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ABSTRACT 
     This thesis investigates the operating performance of companies following secondary 
management buyouts (SMBOs) and the factors which determine that performance. First, we 
find strong evidence that SMBOs underperform in the long run in terms of profitability, 
productivity, employment growth, and sales growth. This underperformance can be 
explained by the high level of leverage used in the buyout model, according to the 
regression results of the significant and negative relationship between leverage and post-
SMBO operating performance in profitability and productivity. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that another traditional buyout performance determinant, managerial ownership, 
does not affect post-SMBO operating performance. Moreover, further analysis of the 
determinants of the post-SMBO performance from the perspective of the board of directors 
reveals that having more private equity (PE)-related directors on the board and appointing 
skilled inside directors will both significantly improve post-SMBO operating performance, 
especially growth ratios. Replacing the top managers and having independent outside 
directors has little influence on post-SMBO operating performance. Finally, we turned to 
the impact of PE firms and funds on post-SMBO operating performance. We demonstrate 
that selling pressure is associated with better profitability, indicating that PE funds under 
selling pressure tend to exit good companies. Meanwhile there is little evidence to show 
that PE funds under buying pressure tend to invest in bad companies. Likewise, there is 
little evidence to support the hypothesis that previous industry experience, number of 
investments per executive, and buyout/acquisition stage specialization of buying PE firms 
enhance post-SMBO operating performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
           A leveraged buyout (LBO) involves a form of takeover in which private equity (PE) 
investors, and often a company’s management team, buy shares of that company from its 
current owners to create a new independent entity with a new (typically) highly leveraged 
financing structure (Gilligan and Wright, 2012). Prior to the buyout, the company may have 
been listed on a stock market, a division of a larger corporate or a privately held/family firm.  
           A secondary management buyout (SMBO) is a buyout of a buyout in which the 
initial (primary) buyout is acquired by a new set of PE financiers and/or management, 
together with new borrowings.
1
 Global SMBO transactions, as a fraction of all global 
buyout transactions, increased from 2% in the 1980s to 26% in 2007 (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009). By 2011, one in four PE deals in Europe was an SMBO (Smit and 
Volosovych, 2013). Consistent with this global trend, the number of UK SMBOs also 
increased until 2007. After a slow down during the recent financial crisis, the number of 
SMBOs has continued to increase since 2009. Recent years have also seen an increase in 
the average value of SMBOs. The above trends resulted in an increase in SMBOs’ share of 
the total value of UK deals from 4.6 per cent (in 2000) to 45 per cent (in 2010) (Zhou et al., 
2014). The popularity of SMBOs thus raises the opportunity to examine important 
questions regarding the life-cycle, longevity, and the sustainability of gains on PE 
investments/buyout transactions. 
           The UK buyout market is the second largest market after the US. For instance, the 
enterprise value of UK LBO transactions accounted for 15% of the enterprise value of 
global LBO transactions during the period from 1970 to 2007 (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
                                                        
1
 Our definition of SMBO is different from the definitions of some previous studies, where SBO is used to 
define the deals in which both sellers and buyers are PE firms (e.g. Wang, 2012; Achleitner et al., 2012a).  
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2009). During the period 2001-2007, the total number of UK LBOs accounted for 28.7% of 
the total number of world LBOs (Strömberg, 2008). Unlike in the US, both private and 
public UK companies have to submit an annual report to Company House. This allows us 
to collect and examine company level data on buyouts. 
           The evidence on the SMBO performance is not conclusive. For example, some 
authors suggest an absence of operating performance improvement during post-SMBO 
period (e.g. Wang, 2012; Bonini, 2013). One the other hand, there is some evidence that PE 
firms could exit from the primary round early, thus leaving some room for further 
improvement (e.g. Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014). Some of the improvements could also be 
related to PE firms and/or managers novel strategies and expertise (e.g. Wang, 2012; Arcot 
et al., 2014). The above studies tend, however, to focus on short term performance of up to 
3 years. 
           Furthermore, the majority of previous studies on post-SMBO operating performance 
are grounded in Jensen’s (1989) agency theory which is more likely to support the 
efficiency (mainly profitability) improvement of public to private (PTP) buyouts. 
Nevertheless, SMBOs are different from PTP buyouts and entail fewer agency problems. 
An entrepreneurship strategic perspective which highlights the importance of using various 
resources to exploit growth opportunities could therefore provide insight into the 
performance of SMBOs.  
           In addition, there is a debate in the literature (e.g. Wright et al., 2009a; Cumming et 
al., 2007) on whether the traditional corporate governance mechanisms of buyouts, 
including high leverage, managerial ownership, and the board of directors, could still 
improve operating performance in SMBOs. Nevertheless, no studies have empirically 
examined the impact of these three corporate governance mechanisms on post-SMBO 
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performance, except from Smith and Volosovych (2013). However, Smith and Volosovych 
(2013) only focus on the impact of governance mechanisms on profitability of PE-backed 
SMBOs. Moreover, with regards to board of directors, they only investigate the proportion 
of PE-related directors, board size, and management change, which do not comprehensively 
explain SMBOs’ boards. Therefore, we investigate these relationships in this thesis more 
comprehensively. 
           Finally, there are no previous studies on the importance of the longevity of PE funds 
and PE firms’ characteristics (competitive advantages) on the post-SMBO operating 
performance improvement. Hence, we also examine the relationships between the longevity 
of PE funds and PE firms’ characteristics and post-SMBO operating performance.   
           We manually collected company level data and data on PE firms from various 
sources. The SMBOs deals and basic deal information were identified from the Center for 
Management Buyout Research (CMBOR), the most comprehensive database covering UK 
and European PE and buyouts. The accounting data and leverage data for the target 
companies of SMBOs and the controlled companies were retrieved from the FAME 
database from 3 years before to 5 years after SMBO transactions. Managerial ownership 
was manually calculated from the shareholder reports in the annual returns obtained from 
Keynote. The information on the directors in the board (from 3 years before to 5 years after 
SMBO transactions) was collected from a combination of sources including, for example, 
company websites, PE firm websites, and personal profiles. PE firms’ data and further 
SMBOs’ deal level data are available from Thomson One Banker.  
           Our initial SMBO list has 612 deals, which is the most comprehensive UK SMBO 
list to date. The sample sizes used in the empirical chapters, however, vary because of 
variations in the objectives of the individual empirical chapters. We mainly investigated 
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SMBO completed in the period from 2000 to 2007, which covers the period of the ‘hot’ 
credit market and ‘cold’ equity market, and allows us to examine post-SMBO performance 
over 5 years.    
           Chapter 1 reviews the extant theoretical and empirical literature on PE and buyouts. 
In order to draw a full picture of post-buyout operating performance, agency theory and 
empirical evidence in both the first and second buyout waves are reviewed, together with an 
overview of buyout and PE transactions. More importantly, an emerging theory of strategic 
entrepreneurship perspective is explored in this chapter to complement the drawback of 
agency theory. Chapter 1 also reviews the theory of corporate governance in buyout and 
relevant empirical studies. Finally, we review agency theory in PE firms and the influence 
of PE firms on buyouts’ performance. Based on the literature review, several critical 
research areas were identified and pursued in this thesis. 
           Chapter 2 is the first empirical study on post-SMBO operating performance. We use 
five operating performance measures, including profitability (ROA and ROS), productivity, 
employment growth, and sales growth, and employ different matching methods to estimate 
post-SMBO abnormal performance. We obtain strong evidence that SMBOs underperform 
after transactions, especially in terms of profitability and growth. Moreover, we firstly 
examine the impact of leverage and managerial ownership on post-SMBO operating 
performance with a panel dataset. It is found that, contrary to its positive impact on post-
buyout operating performance, leverage shows a negative impact on post-SMBO operating 
performance. Similarly, the results suggest that managerial ownership do not improve post-
SMBO operating performance. 
           Chapter 3 extends the analysis by taking account of the board of directors as a 
determinant of post-SMBO operating performance. We find that the fraction of PE 
5 
 
specialists on the board significantly improves post-SMBO operating performance. 
Meanwhile, the attendance of skilled insider directors leads to better post-SMBO 
performance with regard to growth in particular. However, we do not find solid evidence to 
support a relationship between post-SMBO performance and changing the top managers or 
having independent outside directors. Moreover, we find that these results are influenced by 
the reputation of PE firms and whether the SMBOs are exited early or late by primary 
investors. This chapter contributes to the small but important literature on private 
companies and buyouts in terms of board of directors, providing evidence of the importance 
of board structure on post-SMBO operating performance.  
           Chapter 4 contains the third empirical study. The SMBO literature survey shows that 
fund pressures from both the selling and buying sides motive PE firms to sell good deals 
and purchase bad deals. Also, the literature suggests that the different competitive 
advantages of PE firms could improve the performance of target companies at different 
business stages. However, there is gap in the literature on whether these factors really 
impact on the performance of target companies and result in good or bad deals. Hence, 
Chapter 4 aims to fill this gap by investigating whether the longevity of the fund (fund 
pressure) and the PE firms’ characteristics (competitive advantages), such as previous 
industry experience, number of investments per executives, and buyout/acquisition stage 
specialization can improve post-SMBO operating performance. The results show some 
evidence that when selling funds approaching to the end of their life, SMBOs outperform in 
profitability. However, we do not find strong evidence that SMBOs underperform their 
counterparts when the buying fund approaches the end of itself investing period. We also do 
not find strong evidence to support our hypothesis that the characteristics (competitive 
advantages) of the buying PE firms improve post-SMBO operating performance.        
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           The conclusion summarizes the key empirical findings in each of the chapters and 
their respective contributions to the literature. We conclude with suggestions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 1  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
           PE and buyout markets have attracted much attention in the literature since they 
emerged in the US in 1980s. Starting from agency theory, along with the rapid growth and 
momentum of the PE and buyout markets, new theories from other disciplines have been 
transferred to this area. As SMBO belongs to the buyout family, our arguments are mainly 
rooted in dominant and emerging buyout theories.  
           In this chapter, we first provide an overview of PE and buyouts which help us 
understand buyout theories and evidence. Moreover, we review the agency theory of 
buyouts, along with some important empirical evidence on post-buyout performance, 
which has dominated in the buyouts literature over the last two decades. Then, we provide 
a comprehensive review of all studies on SMBOs. Next, we discuss strategic 
entrepreneurship perspective in detail, which complements the agency theory as described. 
This is followed by a literature survey of three crucial corporate governance mechanisms 
in the buyout context, namely leverage, managerial ownership, and the board of directors. 
In addition, we review theories on PE firms and their influence on performance. Finally, 
we present our research objectives in this thesis.    
1.2 An overview of PE and buyouts  
1.2.1 PE  
           There is no consistently-applied definition of PE in the literature and industry. For 
instance, although the general forms of fundraising and investment are similar between 
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venture capital (VC) and PE, VC and PE differ with respect to the development stage of 
the companies in which they invest in the US. In the US, VC invests in young, earlier-
stage companies, while PE invests in broader stages which consist of mature, later-stage 
firms as well as buyouts and turnaround investments (Cumming and Johan, 2009). 
Sometimes, the concepts of PE and buyout are equivalent in the US literature (e.g. 
Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009). Nevertheless, VC has an ambiguous definition in the UK, 
as the distinction between PE and VC is not clear. In fact, in the literature, PE is a broader 
term which encompasses VC (Cumming and Johan, 2009; Jelic et al, 2005). Herein, we 
use the definition of Gilligan and Wright (2012), which states that the PE market provides 
funds to invest in private companies or de-listed public companies through purchasing 
shares from existing shareholders and control the companies. Similarly, Metrick and 
Yasuda (2011) define the PE fund as a financial intermediary who invests the investors’ 
capital directly in private companies and then actively monitors and assists the companies 
to improve performance, in order to maximize its investment return by exiting the target 
company via IPO and trade sales.  
           PE is part of the investment class, distinguished from traditional institutional 
investors. Within PE there are four main asset subclasses in terms of the investment stage: 
VC, mezzanine, buyouts, and distress (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). VC and buyouts 
account for the majority of investments. Unlike early stage VC investments that funds are 
usually invested in early stage companies, buyouts are usually invested in late stage 
companies. Meanwhile, VC transactions are accompanied by multiple investment rounds, 
while a particular feature of financing buyouts is that it is typically a one investment round 
deal. The mezzanine category is in between and overlaps with VC and buyouts, 
comprising ‘the later stage VC and the subordinate debt layer of buyouts’ (Gilligan and 
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Wright, 2012, p.28). The distress category targets mature and distressed companies. It also 
can be treated as a special buyout.  
           Most PE firms are typically viewed as limited partnerships in which limited 
partners invest most of these funds and the general partners manage these funds. Therefore, 
limited partners are investors of PE firms (general partners). Limited partners typically 
include pension funds, banks, life insurance companies, endowments, wealthy individuals, 
and other institutional investors (Wright et al., 2009a) while the funds’ managers (PE firms) 
are recognized as the general partners. Moreover, PE funds are different from the 
traditional investment assets of stocks and other assets such as hedge funds, according to 
the characteristics of Metrick and Yasuda’s (2011) definition. PE funds are financial 
intermediaries between sources of funds and entrepreneurial firms, with a limited life time 
of on average 10 years (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). As discussed, the PE funds mainly 
include pension funds and funds from other institutional investors such as sovereign 
wealth funds that require superior returns. Recently, however, new types of entrants, 
particularly hedge funds, have entered the PE market, bringing out new issues (Siegel et 
al., 2011). In addition, general partners will receive a management fee and carried interest 
for the raised fund. The management fee is a fixed fee, while carried interest is based on 
their investment performance consisting of about 20% of the realized return on investment 
(Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). 
           The PE investment can be divided into four processes: selecting, due diligence, 
monitoring, and exiting. After fundraising, PE firms will identify potential high quality 
target companies. This process involves PE firms’ ability and network to access deals, or 
generate deals, because there are limited deals in the market (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). 
Once PE firms and the selling shareholders of the target companies make a non-binding 
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offer agreement, PE firms will enter to due diligence process to scrutinize the inside 
information such as the financial report, strategic plan, and management team to minimize 
the investment failure risk. If after due diligence, PE firms are still confident in this deal, 
they will negotiate the price, management incentive scheme, and the final instruments etc. 
The monitoring process refers to PE firms’ actively monitoring the target companies and 
drawing on their expertise to create value for the target companies.
2
 Finally, because PE 
funds are characterized by the financial intermediaries with a limited contractual lifetime, 
special mechanisms are needed to return money to investors, which concerns with the exit 
strategy. Moreover, although PE investors as the shareholders can obtain dividends during 
the holding period, the main sources of the return will be the exit value which could be 
generated by PE firms (Wright et al., 2009b). The main exit ways include IPO, trade sales, 
SMBOs, recapitalization, and bankruptcy. In an IPO the portfolio companies sell shares to 
investors of the public. In trade sales the PE firms sell the portfolio companies to a third 
party which is referred to acquisition (Cumming and Maclntosh, 2003). Typically, the 
buyers are strategic acquirers. SMBOs are different from acquisitions in that the 
management and other investors will retain their investments. Recapitalization allows 
equity holders to realize a return by taking a sizable dividend through 
receivership/liquidation. Bankruptcy involves the failure of portfolio companies. 
1.2.2 Buyouts 
           Broadly, there are two types of buyouts: insider-driven and outsider-driven buyouts 
with different vendor sources (Wood and Wright, 2009; Wright et al., 2009a). Insider-
driven buyouts include management buyouts (MBOs) and management-led employee 
buyouts where usually the existing management team of the target company buy out and 
                                                        
2
 We will discuss details in the following sections. 
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control the company. Outsider-driven buyouts mainly comprise management buy-ins 
(MBI), where a new management team, whose leading members are outsiders, take control 
of the target company, and investor-led buyouts (IBOs) where typically PE firms take 
control of the target company. The various vendor sources are public-to-private (PTP) 
buyouts, divisional buyouts, SMBOs, buyouts of public sector, buyouts of family-owned 
companies, and buyouts of companies in companies in the receivership process.  
           The majority of buyouts are backed by PE firms. Typically, PE firms establish a 
new independent entity (‘Newco’) to buy a controlling stake or equity of an existing 
company, using their own funds together with high debt financing. This new company is 
specifically for the purposes of the buyout transaction and is usually just a shell company 
with nominal capital and temporary directors (Axelson et al., 2013). If the target company 
is public, the PE firms will pay 15%-50% over the current prices of the stock (Kaplan, 
1989a; Bargeron et al., 2008, cited in Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009, p124). Usually, the 
buyouts will be financed with 60%-90% debt (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
1.3 Buyouts – theory and empirical evidence based on agency theory 
1.3.1 Agency theory of buyouts  
           The agency problem arises when owners and managers are separated, ownership is 
dispersed, and the information asymmetry exists between shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In an imperfect market, the 
information asymmetry exists between the informed entrepreneurs and uninformed 
investors, resulting in the moral hazard that lowers investor earnings by investing in 
alternative projects (Chan, 1983). In other words, the separation of ownership and control 
tends to prevent stakeholders from being fully informed. Managers (agents) will not be 
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motivated to fulfill their obligations to the shareholders (principals), resulting in ‘agency 
costs’. 
           Agency theory views that the essential value creation resource of buyouts is 
achieved through eliminating the agency problems between investors and targeted 
companies.
 3
 With respect to adverse selection issues, when selecting investee companies 
for investors, PE firms as financial intermediaries between investors and targeted 
companies (Sahlman, 1990) help investors invest in the optimal project (screening ability) 
and improve their welfare. Cumming and Walz (2010) state that PE firms exist because of 
the information asymmetry and the agency problem between investors and targeted 
companies in financing activities, and the lack of time and skill for investor to choose 
suitable companies in which to invest. PE firms monitor the management to eliminate the 
agency costs. Compared to alternative information intermediaries such as banks, relevant 
research finds that PE firms have higher screening quality and better monitoring abilities 
(e.g. Campello and Da Matta, 2010; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). 
           With regards to the moral hazard problem, Jensen (1989) argues that a new 
organization backed by ‘active’ PE firms, usually with the management team as owners 
and high leverage, could eliminate the agency problem in public companies, without 
destroying the crucial functions of liquidity and risk diversification which only exist in 
public equity markets. According to Jensen (1989), the outbreak of the moral hazard 
problem occurs when managers reinvest free cash flow, which is the cash flow in excess of 
the necessary amount to fund projects with positive returns. In mature industries where the 
companies are rich in cash instead of having growth prospects, management teams have 
                                                        
3
 Some studies also argue that wealth might be transferred from other stakeholders, for instance tax (e.g. 
Lowenstein, 1985) and employments (e.g. Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), or generated through pricings of 
buyouts (e.g. Achleitner et.al. 2011). Because we only focus on operating performance perspectives, we do 
not discuss them in detail.  
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few incentives to distribute the free cash to shareholders. Rather, they are motivated to 
retain this cash to expand the company beyond its optimal size which maximizes 
shareholders’ wealth. In doing so, this money might be invested in unprofitable projects or 
projects with negative net present value. Jensen (1989) considers buyout as a superior 
form of organization with superior corporate governance, because that the high leverage, 
that management team participation in ownership, and the PE firms’ monitoring and/or 
intervening companies’ operations enhance the efficiency of corporate governance, and 
hence motivate managements to behave on the behalf of shareholders and maximize their 
value.
4
  
           Wright et al. (2009a) conclude that over-diversification is another aspect of the 
agency problem of buyout target companies. Over-diversification will lead to 
underperformance of a company. This situation is also a result of weak corporate 
governance which provides huge room for PE firms to improve. As a consequence, these 
companies will obtain the preference of PE firms.  
           In sum, through resolving the agency problems between shareholders and managers, 
the target companies of buyout would have efficient corporate governance and better 
operating performance.  
1.3.2 Empirical evidence on post-buyout performance  
1.3.2.1 First buyout wave 
           It is well documented by empirical evidence that buyout companies in the first 
buyout wave, which started in US in the 1980s, experience average improvements in 
operating performance after transactions or better performance than their industry peers 
(See Panel A in Table 1.1). For instance, Kaplan (1989a) finds that the ratio of operating 
                                                        
4
 We will discuss the superior corporate governance mechanisms in the following sections.  
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income to assets or sales is increased by 7.1% to 36.1% in the first three years after 
buyouts, using the data of 76 US PTP MBOs. The ratio of capital expenditure to assets and 
sales is reduced by 4.4% to 31.6%. As a consequence, the ratio of net cash flow to assets 
or sales is increased by 28.3% to 85.4. Similarly, after studying 58 US PTP MBOs over the 
period of 1977-1986, Smith (1990) finds a significant increase in both unadjusted and 
industry adjusted operating returns, measured by operating cash flows deflated by 
operating assets and the number of employees, after buyout transactions. The author 
highlights that the increases is attributed to the tightened working capital, but not layoffs 
and reductions in capital expenditures after buyouts. As noted in Singh (1990), US buyouts 
companies have higher sales growth than the average industry values before going public. 
With the data of US LBO in the late 1980s, Opler (1992) confirms the positive influence 
of buyouts on operating performance of target companies by finding a 11.6% rise in the 
industry adjusted ratio of operating profits to sales and a 40.3% rise in the industry 
adjusted ratio of operating profit to the number of employees in the first one to two years 
after buyouts.  
           In spite of the dominance of US evidence in the first wave, we can still find 
consistent evidence from countries other than the US, especially the UK. For example 
Wright et al. (1992) find 68% of their sample UK MBOs and MBIs show increases in 
profitability after transactions. By examining the long term effects of UK MBOs, Wright et 
al. (1996) document that MBOs completed in the mid-1980s generate a significantly 
higher return on assets than comparable non-buyout companies in the third to fifth post-
buyout years, following the first two years in which no significant differences are 
identified and followed by the sixth year in which the better performance disappears. The 
authors find a similar pattern when using the profit to the number of employees ratio. 
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Their results suggest that the superior performance of MBOs is a long term phenomenon.     
Insert Table 1.1 about here 
1.4.1.2 Second buyout wave 
          Along with buyouts spreading to Europe, empirical research gradually focuses on 
the buyouts in Europe from the 1990s to 2000s, the second wave of buyouts, as the 
financial data of private companies is available in some European countries. Unlike the 
evidence from the first wave, evidence on the strong and positive effect of buyouts on 
performance from 1990s and 2000s is less convincing (See Panel B in Table 1.1). For 
instance, comparing 122 UK buyouts companies between 1995 and 2002 with a control 
sample of non-buyout companies, Cressy et al. (2007) demonstrate that PE-backed 
buyouts companies have a 4.3% greater operating profitability and 6.97% greater turnover 
growth than those of the compared non-buyout companies during the first 3 years after 
buyouts. Amess and Wright (2007) also find that employment growth for UK MBO 
companies is 0.77 of a percentage point, against 0.26 of a percentage point for non-buyout 
companies, suggesting better performance. Similarly, in a sample of Sweden buyouts 
between 1999 and 2001, Bergström et al. (2007) find a significant increase of 3.07%, 
17.38%, and 3.45% in post-buyout operating profitability as measured by EBITDA margin, 
return on invested capital, and sales growth, respectively. As noted in Acharya et al. (2013), 
buyouts in Western Europe also evidence significantly positive abnormal operating 
performance after transactions, although the magnitude is much smaller than those in the 
1980s. Boucly et al. (2011) claim that French private companies are under credit 
constraints which prevent them from taking advantage of growth opportunities, while the 
PE firms help them to relax from the credit constraints after buyouts and improve the 
companies’ performance. After examining the data, they find that the sample buyout 
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companies have higher profitability and growth than the non-buyout control sample.   
           In contrast, by studying 192 PTP LBOs in the US between 1990 and 2006, Guo et 
al. (2011) find significantly smaller increases in post-buyout operating performance 
compared to those of Kaplan (1989a), and even, the significance of better performance 
depends on the measures of performance they adopt. For example, the best performance 
improvement in their study is a 14.3% significant increase in performance adjusted net 
cash flow (using industry, performance and M/B ration as adjusted benchmark). However, 
if using the industry adjusted benchmark, the significant increases in net cash flow 
disappear and the same holds for other operating performance measures. Likewise, 
through studying 110 French buyouts over the period from 1988 to 1994, Desbrières and 
Schatt (2002) find deteriorations in return on equity, return on investments and margin 
ratios (EBIT/Sales, Net profit/Sales, and Cash flow/Sales) of buyout target companies over 
the two years after the transactions compared to their industry peers.  
           In addition, not being restricted to a particular buyout period, Jelic and Wright 
(2011) collected 1,225 UK MBOs completed between 1980 and 2004, and examined their 
long term post-buyout and operating performance in terms of profitability, operating 
efficiency, output, dividend payments, employment, and leverage. Though abnormal 
performance in leverage and operating efficiency are not significant, the authors obtain 
strong results showing improvements in profitability, output, and employment. However, 
the improved performances of profitability and employment only last for three years while 
that of output continues over five years. Moreover, the authors find significant decreases in 
dividend payments, up to five years after buyout transactions. Consistent with these results, 
Weir et al. (2008) also find mixed evidence when investigating the UK MBOs from 1998 
to 2004. For example, the sample companies only significantly outperform their industry 
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counterparts in return on capital equity in the second post-buyout year. Even 
underperformance in return on capital equity is observed in the first post-buyout year. 
EBITDA figures also show underperformance in some post-buyout years. 
1.4 SMBOs: motivations and performance  
1.4.1 Motivations for SMBO transactions 
            Along with the boosting of SMBOs in this decade, the motivations of SMBOs 
attract a great deal of attentions from academics. In this section, we summarize the current 
motivation hypotheses raised and/or examined by different scholars. These hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive.    
1.4.1.1 The characteristics of company hypothesis 
           Wright et al. (2000b) argue that one explanation of SMBO or SMBI (secondary 
management buy-in) could be from the company itself. First, the authors propose that 
small or medium-sized buyouts may not be attractive to both going public and trade sales 
routes. With regards to going public, the entrance of small or medium-sized companies to 
the stock market is narrowed down. Though fast-growing companies are more likely to 
finance new capital in the stock market, it will be problematic when floating small or 
medium-sized buyouts because of the lack of liquidity of the companies’ stocks caused by 
the lost interest of institutional investors in small listed companies. In respect of trade sales, 
buyouts exiting through trade sales could also be a problem when the company is too 
small, because strategic buyers do not seem to buy very small businesses in view of 
preference for the scale economy. The costs of this transaction could not be made up by 
the gains of this small business. Also the marginal contribution of purchasing a small 
business might be too small to be attractive to the large acquirer, although the market 
position could be in conjunction with the strategy of the acquirer. Second, if the companies 
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are original private or family owned, they are more likely to maintain their independence. 
Third, companies with stable market shares in a niche market but with lower growth 
prospects, such as the companies in traditional manufacturing industrial sectors, may also 
tend to choose SMBO as a route to maintain their independent identity.  
            However, after studying 229 UK SMBOs/BIs from 1984 to 1997, Wright et al. 
(2000b) do not find that SMBOs/BIs tend to be small to medium-sized companies. 
Similarly, the originally subsidiaries or family owned companies do not have more chance 
to become the target companies of SMBOs/BIs, related to others. In contrast, the authors 
find that the industrial sector of the company is a crucial factor that determinates the 
SMBOs/BIs transactions. Likewise, Harford and Kolasinski (2010) studied 788 US large 
buyouts from 1993 to 2001, tracking exit status through 2009, and find that SMBOs tend 
to happen in concentrated industries.   
1.4.1.2 Incumbent management team hypothesis 
            In the same study, Wright et al. (2000b) also highlight the importance of the 
incumbent management team on SMBOs. They claim that some managers may have a 
long-term faith in a company. They think their objectives could be achieved in a long-term 
organization. Through maintaining the companies as independent, which eliminates the 
threat from hostile takeovers and scrutiny from the stock market, the managers are able to 
continue their control of the company. Hence, SMBO becomes their preferred choice when 
primary buyouts exiting. Second, managers may need SMBOs to finish their restructuring 
and entrepreneurial strategies which could not be completed during the primary buyouts 
period. By studying the cases of six companies, the authors find that managers in three 
companies among the six confirm that, to some extent, maintaining the continuity of the 
companies motivates them to seek a secondary buyout or buy-in. For instance, in order to 
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avoid a takeover, VC firms will seek outside managers to buy-in the companies when the 
lead buyout manager retires and no other managers in the company can provide the 
required expertise. Alternatively, the buyout managers depart from the companies while 
the remaining managers, taking the second tier managers as an example, substitute their 
positions through a new buyout. Also, three companies show that SMBOs/BIs occur as the 
companies required further financing to continue the strategies, providing evidence on the 
motivation of finishing the uncompleted restructuring and entrepreneurial strategies.  
1.4.1.3 Fund pressure hypothesis 
            Fund pressure could be considered from two aspects: the selling side and the 
buying side. In respect of the selling side, PE funds usually have a contractually limited 
life of 10 years and hence the holding period of one buyout is, on average, around five 
years (Strömberg, 2008). When the fund approaches the end of its lifetime, the primary PE 
firms will be forced to exit the buyouts (Achleitner and Figge, 2014). Delayed exit would 
be viewed as a lack of skills by the limited partners (Arcot et al., 2014). Moreover, PE 
firms usually raise new funds every three to five years (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009). 
In order to facilitate fund raising, PE firms may exit early to make a track record for 
reputation enhancement, because the length of the holding period and the return of the 
current fund is one of the key measurements for a limited partner to estimate the PE firms 
(Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014; Achleitner and Figge, 2014; Arcot et al., 2014).  In addition, 
PE firms will exit in a limited holding period in order to achieve a stable cash flow profile, 
even though the funds are still within the contractually fund lifetime (Strömberg, 2008; 
Achleitner and Figge, 2014). When PE firms are under pressure to exit from the primary 
buyouts, the target companies might not be ready to go public or be sold to other 
companies and hence SMBOs will be viewed as the best choice (Cumming and MacIntoch, 
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2003). Jenkinson and Sousa (2014) document a positive association between the likelihood 
of SMBOs and the length of the holding period. When going public is impossible in a 
short period, SMBO becomes an attractive exit choice to keep a good investment record 
for the PE firms. Harford and Kolasinski (2010) also find that when the sponsor has held 
the portfolio firm longer, suggesting an inability to exit in a timely manner, the primary PE 
firms will exit to a financial buyer through a SMBO. Arcot et al. (2014) create an index to 
proxy for the selling PE firms’ pressure related to the reasons we discussed above to 
investigate the motivation of SMBOs from selling pressure. They find that when selling 
PE firms under more selling pressure, a one unit increase in the index will increase the 
likelihood of SMBO exit choice by up to 12%.  
            From the buying side, Arcot et al. (2014) and Achleitner et al. (2012a) argue that 
the huge untapped capital in the hand of PE firms could be an important motivation of 
SMBOs. This is because letting the unspent capital expire will impact the perception of 
limited partners on the general partners. When approaching to the end of the investing 
period, after around four to six years, PE firms are keen to spend the huge unspent capital. 
SMBOs as easily reached and quick to complete deals become attractive. Furthermore, 
low-reputed or young PE firms usually have limited access to new or good deals, and 
hence SMBO is attractive to them due to its low costs and low risk, as primary PE firms 
have already done due diligence  (Arcot et al., 2014). Achleitner et al. (2012a) demonstrate 
that the amount of untapped committed capital impacts positively on the likelihood of 
SMBOs. Arcot et al. (2014) also create an index for the buying pressure related to these 
reasons and find that buying PE firms under more buying pressure tend to be involved in 
SMBO deals. A one unit increase in the buying pressure index leads to about an 18% 
increase in the probability of SMBO deals. Moreover, they find the selling and buying 
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pressures have an impact on SMBO pricing. More specifically, buying PE firms that are 
under pressures are likely to pay more for buying out deals, while selling pressure may 
make selling PE firms accept a lower price to sell the deals. In this respect, however, 
selling PE firms have more bargaining power over the buying ones. Although it is not their 
main interest, Jenkinson and Sousa (2013) find SMBO transactions are likely to cluster in 
the later part in the buying fund life compared to primary buyouts.  
1.4.1.4 Pecking order hypothesis 
             In the literature, SMBO is viewed as a last resort when considering the exit route. 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) propose that there is a pecking order of PE firms’ exit 
routes and suggest that PE firms exit companies depending on the companies’ quality. 
They state that a PE firm will exit once the marginal profit is negative, suggesting that the 
value creation competences are exhausted and there is no further value creation. The going 
public and trade sales would be the first choices for exiting, because they could enhance 
the reputation of PE firms and bring in more earnings. In particular, PE firms exit the best-
quality companies through going public. However, when the two best exist routes are 
unavailable, a SMBO may be adopted. Moving from the same theoretical argument, Bienz 
and Leite (2008) suggest that PE firms chose going public as an exit route for highly 
profitable companies and trade sales for companies with less profitability, while SMBOs 
are used as an exit route when going public is not available but companies are highly 
profitable. In addition, in conjunction with the development of the portfolio company, the 
effect of value added by PE firms will decline over the time (Simth, 2005). The closer to 
the funds maturity, the likelihood of SMBOs is higher and the prices of SMBOs are lower 
(Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014). The discount for buying a SMBO company indicates that 
SMBOs are the second best exit alternative for the exit strategy (Kitzmann and Schiereck, 
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2009), because second PE firms could not realize positive returns on their investment 
based on the former PE firms’ effects and primary PE firms will not achieve high returns 
of investments.  
             However, recent empirical results refute the pecking order of exit channels 
hypothesis. In an analysis of 759 European PE exits, Jenkinson and Sousa (2014) examine 
the motivations of SMBOs. They find a negative relationship between the probability of 
IPO as an exit routes and the companies’ profitability. By contrast, SMBO becomes more 
attractive due to the higher EBIT margin and lower ratio of capital expenditure to assets 
both of which suggest a high debt capacity. In an analysis of 1,112 LBOs from Europe and 
North America over the period of 1995 to 2008, Achleitner et al. (2012a) also confirm that 
an SMBO is not a last resort, as their results do not show significant and positive results 
for the relationship between the equity returns and both IPO and SMBO exits. Besides, 
Kitzmann and Schiereck (2009) investigate the worldwide exit transactions between 1999 
and 2004, and find the profitability of exiting through SMBO is not significant different 
from exiting through trade sales. Thus, they state that SMBOs cannot be seen as a second 
best alternative, compared with IPOs and trade sale. 
1.4.1.5 Value creation hypothesis (or Efficiency gains hypothesis/ Specializations 
hypothesis) 
             Some scholars argue that value creation potentials could be one motivation of 
SMBOs (Wang, 2012; Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014; Bonini, 2013; Arcot et al. 2014). The 
former PE firms cannot use all performance improvement potential of the target 
companies if they exit early and ultimately secondary PE firms and or management can 
benefit from the remaining potential (Wang, 2012; Achleitner and Figge, 2014). 
Alternatively, drawing on the theory of the strategic entrepreneurship perspective and the 
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heterogeneity of the competitive advantages of PE firms, the new PE firms may possess 
specific complementary knowledge and skills to those of primary PE firms (Wang, 2012; 
Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014; Bonini, 2013; Arcot et al., 2014). For instance, some focus on 
early-stage while others prefer expansion or late stage phases. Some first-time LBOs 
targets are smaller private companies, and such companies are invested by relatively small 
PE firms. When the targets mature and expand, the small PE firms are unable to manage 
them based on their limited experience and human resources. Therefore, it is more optimal 
to be sponsored by bigger PE firms with more personnel and experience. Also, if the target 
companies demand special skills or resources which the primary PE firms do not possess, 
the following PE firms with these special skills or resources might buyout these companies 
to create additional value (Arcot et al., 2014). 
            Nonetheless, the empirical evidence on this argument seems to reject it. Bonini 
(2013) investigates the operating performance of SMBOs’ target companies and compares 
the operating performance with primary buyouts. Through studying the operating 
performance of 163 European SMBOs over the period between 1998 and 2008, he finds 
though operating performance (measured as operating margins ration, turnover ratio, 
return on investments, return on equity, liquidity ratio, and capital structure ratio) of 
SMBOs are superior to the industry average performance, those of first-round buyouts 
(primary buyouts) have premiums to a much more extent. Moreover, the superior 
performance in secondary round declines over time and even reverts to the industry 
benchmark. He concludes that SMBOs, per se, do not improve the performance of target 
companies and rejects the value creation motivation hypothesis. Instead, SMBO investors 
tend to select better deals in which to invest. This result is further confirmed by Wang 
(2012) who does not find strong evidence on the performance improvement of target firms 
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after SMBOs based on a study of 485 UK SMBOs. She finds that both profit and 
profitability (unadjusted and industry adjusted) experience significant increases before 
SMBO transactions, whereas after the transaction profit continues to increase but 
profitability does not. In fact, profitability deceases significantly after transactions. In 
conjunction with the significant post-SMBO growth in fixed assets and sales, she 
concludes that SMBOs do not improve the target companies’ efficiency. Although 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2014) support the differences between PE firms motivating SMBO 
deals, the differences are only related to the PE firms’ competence on generating good 
primary buyouts whereas not the value creation potentials such as fast growing or 
performance improvement.  
1.4.1.6 Debt capacity hypothesis 
           Investors could be attracted by the high debt capacity of target companies and 
decide to invest in an SMBO (Achleitner et al, 2012a; Bonini, 2013). As a symbol of 
buyout, high debt plays an important governance role in buyout organization model 
(Jensen, 1989). Through the primary stage, the target companies are suitable for the high 
debt model, with robust and stable cash flow generation ability. As a consequence, target 
companies can sustain a high debt burden. Moreover, the management team is seasoned in 
tackling the constraints imposed by the highly leveraged capital structure and working 
with PE firms (Wang, 2012). In addition, the banks show a preference for SMBOs (Wang, 
2012), because they are familiar with the situations of the portfolio company and the 
information asymmetries between them are relatively low in comparison with primary 
buyouts (Achleitner and Figge, 2014). Achleitner et al. (2012a) use EBITDA margin and 
leverage at primary buyout exit as proxies for debt capacity to examine this hypothesis. 
They find that target companies with a high debt capacity are more likely to exit through 
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SMBO, compared to going public and sale trade.  
1.4.1.7 Collusion hypothesis 
           Wang (2012) suggests collusion between PE firms as one possible motivation of 
SMBOs, because the collusion between PE firms seems to be inevitable in a favorable 
environment caused by the settled PE firm players in the PE market and the opacity and 
lack of regulation in the PE industry. Collusion could be used by PE firms for trading bad 
portfolios and artificially boosting returns through exchanging the portfolios between each 
other at a higher than market price. When a PE firm cannot exit a portfolio through good 
exit routes such as going public and trade sales, or cannot obtain an expected return, it may 
seek help from another PE firm to acquire this portfolio. As a consequence, SMBOs could 
be a means of collusion at the expense of both ultimate investors (limited partners) and 
target companies. This is because if the portfolio performs badly, there is little chance for 
buyers to obtain a return; if the price is higher than the market price, the profit returns to 
the ultimate investors will be discounted. With respect to the target companies, no matter 
worse performance or higher buying prices, the target companies’ debt burden is likely to 
increase and could be beyond their competence. If there is not enough improvement in 
operating performance, which is considered to be limited or rare, the target companies are 
very likely to go bankrupt after several buyouts (e.g. going through SMBO, tertiary 
buyouts). However, after investigating the buyout pattern of PE firms in the SMBO market 
that shows the frequency of PE firms’ mutual transaction, Wang (2012) fails to provide 
evidence to support the collusion hypothesis. Consistent with Wang (2012), Bonini (2013) 
uses a sample of 163 European SMBOs to test the buyer-seller frequency of SMBO 
transactions, and does not find convincing evidence of collusion.  
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1.4.1.8 Market conditions hypothesis (or Mispricing hypothesis) 
            Wang (2012), Jenkinson and Sousa (2014), Bonini (2013), and Achleitner et al. 
(2012a) point out that the current SMBO wave is determined by current market conditions. 
They document that PE firms would arbitrage opportunities in accordance with the market 
conditions to achieve the optimal exit price. On the one hand, the equity market that drives 
both IPO and trade sales deals is especially crucial for PE buyouts due to the nature of exit 
routes. The existence of cycles in equity market suggests IPO and trade sales are not 
always at hand. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) state that when the equity market 
is ‘hot’, more IPOs are issued. Mulherin and Boone (2000) find there is a positive 
correlation between merger waves and the high stock valuation and economic expansion. 
When the equity market is ‘cold’, IPOs and trade sales are less available exit routes. As a 
consequence, primary PE firms will resort to alternative exit routes and hence, the access 
to SMBOs may be favored by primary PE firms.     
          On the other hand, buyout activities depend less on the equity market but more on 
the debt market (Wang, 2012). When companies issue securities, managers tend to use the 
mispricing in equity markets. It is possible to have the same phenomenon on the debt 
market (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The debt market periodically experiences boom and 
bust, so that the investors are unable to require the accuracy interest rate of their debt 
investments according to the fundamental risk of the borrowing firms. Especially, when 
the debt market is ‘overheated’, investors could endure losses due to the underestimation 
of the interest rate, while managers could take advantage of this imperfection and issue 
more debt (Axelson et al., 2013). In line with this view, Axelson et al. (2013) suggest that 
PE firms will mediate the conditions between equity and debt markets when the debt 
market is ‘overheated’, through increasing leverage of deals. They find that PE firms pay 
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higher prices for each deal due to the easy availability of credit. Hence, the SMBOs can 
achieve more returns for the primary investors compared with other exit routes when the 
credit market is ‘hot’ (Jenkins and Sousa, 2014).  
           In addition, Bonini (2013) and Wang (2012) claim that the secondary PE firms will 
expect to obtain profits from the increases in debt, so they tend to invest in portfolio 
companies with lower debt and higher capacity to generate earnings and cash flows. This 
is because companies with these characteristics have advantages of lower default risk and 
higher tax shield benefits. 
           The current empirical findings strongly support this hypothesis. For instance, 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2014) utilize the Fed tightening index and return on the local stock 
market index as proxies for the states of the credit market and the IPO market, individually. 
They find that the both indices regress positive and significant effects on the likelihood of 
an IPO in comparison with an SMBO, suggesting that loosening the credit market and the 
underperformance of the stock market increases the attractiveness of SMBOs. In line with 
these results, Wang (2012) finds that the ‘hot’ condition of the equity market has a 
significant negative relationship with the probability of SMBO exit, whereas a ‘hot’ debt 
market shows a positive association. In order to investigate the combined effect of the two 
markets, the author conducts a matrix analysis and finds that 77.6% of all SMBO exits 
happen under the conditions of a ‘cold’ equity market, while the debt market is ‘hot’. 
Bonini (2013) also demonstrates that the attractiveness of SMBOs is increased by cheap 
debt. However, he finds that high prices have a negative relationship with the likelihood of 
an SMBO exit. Using the annual amount of loans issued for LBOs at the penultimate exit 
year as a proxy for the debt market liquidity, Achleitner et al. (2012a) find that the increase 
in the annual amount of loans for LBO leads to the increase in the probability of exiting 
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via SMBOs, supporting the hypothesis of ‘hot’ debt market conditions driving SMBO 
deals.  
Insert Table 1.2 about here 
1.4.2 SMBOs’ performance and its determinants  
           Achleitner and Figge (2014) focus on the value creation of SMBOs in terms of 
three values creation drivers: pricing, operating performance, and leverage. First, they 
hypothesize the potentials of operating performance improvement in the secondary round. 
More specifically, the potentials are reflected in the similar EBITDA growth and the 
higher sales growth than those in primary buyouts but not in the EBITDA margin 
expansion. Through analyzing 2,456 realized buyouts (including 448 SMBOs) worldwide 
during the period from1990 to 2010, they find that none of the three operating 
performance measures is significantly related to financial buyouts (SMBOs as they 
defined), and hence financial buyouts should have similar value creation potentials to 
primary buyouts in terms of the three performance measures. On the leverage side, the 
authors argue that buying PE firms utilize higher leverage than primary buyouts to boost 
equity returns, which is theorized by the leverage-relevant theory we discussed above. 
Using two leverage ratios (debt/equity and debt/EBITDA), they confirm this hypothesis 
with the findings of significant and positive relationship between the two ratios and 
financial buyout dummy. Nevertheless, financial buyouts use 28 to30 per cent more 
leverage to finance the deals. As regards prices, the authors propose higher prices for 
financial buyouts in comparison to those of primary buyouts, as selling PE firms will time 
the markets and use their negotiation skill to raise the price. The results show 6-9 per cent 
higher prices for financial buyouts than primary buyouts and this premium is mainly 
attributed to the selling PE firms’ skills in market timing and negotiation. Finally, because 
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of the optimistic hypotheses on the three value creation drivers, the authors examine the 
return on equity as whole effect of financial buyouts and do not find a significant reduction 
in this ratio, lending support to the argument that an SMBO is not a last resort of exit.  
           Achleitner et al. (2012b) use the single case study of Brenntag invested by the same 
PE firm of BC partners in primary and secondary phases, to analyze value creation drivers 
in SMBOs in terms of operating performance, leverage, and multiple expansion. This 
method enables them to control for the PE firms’ skills in selecting and monitoring. In 
spite of this, Brenntag still exhibits room for operational improvement in the secondary 
round. Based on the nine interviews, the authors find that the potentials derive from the 
forced exit of primary PE firms and the enhanced incentive alignment of the management 
team which includes the participation of middle managers, increased money investment of 
existing owner-managers, and the acknowledgement of benefits from management 
investments. Moreover, as the lenders have been already familiar with the target 
companies, which causes lower information asymmetry, therefore, buying PE firms find it 
easy to access to higher leverage. The opportunities to increase multiple expansions, 
however, are limited due to the similarity of market timing and negotiation skills for both 
buyers and sellers.   
           Jenkinson and Sousa (2013) investigate the operating performance of SMBOs by 
comparing it with that of going public (IPO) deals, by using European data on 194 SMBOs 
and 114 IPO deals between 2000 and 2007. They find that although SMBOs underperform 
IPO deals in operating performance as measured by total sales and EBITDA, they 
outperform their counterparts in terms of net cash flow estimated as EBITDA less capital 
expenditure because of lower increases in capital expenditure of SMBOs over the same 
period. SMBOs cut the capital expenditure to pay out debt principals and interest. The 
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authors find the longer holding period in primary phase and the lack of experience of 
buying PE firms can partially explain this underperformance.      
            Smit and Volosovych (2013) have developed a model to reconcile the conflicting 
views (as discussed above) on SMBOs’ value creation potential, in conjunction with the 
empirical analysis of 101 UK SMBOs from 1999 to 2008. Both the model and the 
empirical analysis come to the conclusion that SMBOs are motivated by high leverage that 
is associated with a higher price. They document how the financial sponsors of SMBOs 
receive significantly large investment returns, thereby providing evidence of value creation. 
Nonetheless, these returns can be explained by both high leverage with reduced interest 
rates and a higher exit multiple than entry multiple rather than the operating performance 
improvement. Actually, the results exhibit no improvement in operating performance 
during SMBO periods after adopting various operating performance measures and 
methods. However, the authors dig out some factors that influence post-SMBO operating 
performance. For example, management replacement, PE firms’ monitoring, and pre-
SMBO performance can lead to better post-SMBO operating performance.    
             In contrast to previous studies that focus on the target company’s performance, 
Degeorge et al. (2013) examine the performance of SMBOs from the limited partner side, 
mainly with regard to investment returns. In the analysis of a unique dataset of 548 
SMBOs and 7,449 primary buyouts in the US from 1986 to 2007, they document that 
regardless of the performance measures (cash multiple, public market equivalent, and 
internal rate of return), SMBOs underperform the primary buyouts. Notably, SMBOs that 
happen at a late point in the fund investment period (late SMBOs) underperform others. 
This underperformance is not experienced by SMBOs made at an early point in the fund 
investment period or by primary buyouts made at a late point of fund investment period. 
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Moreover, they find the excess untapped capital can magnify the underperformance of 
these late SMBOs. These results suggest that PE firms’ engage in ‘go for broke’ behavior 
in the sense that when the fund approaches the end of investment period, PE firms tend to 
burn untapped capital. Another interesting finding of Degeorge et al. (2013) is that limited 
partners on the selling side have about a one in six probability to be on the buying side of 
the same target companies (LP overlap), with 41% of percentage portfolio rebalancing5 
against 100% for limited partners that are not on both buying and selling sides. These 
results suggest that LP overlap in SMBOs is not a rare phenomenon and an important 
consequence of it is the decreases in limited partners’ portfolio rebalancing.     
             Finally, Jelic and Wright (2011) also shed some light on the post-SMBO operating 
performance and obtain mixed evidence. In consistent with other studies, they observe 
dramatic reductions in profitability. However, they find gearing also experiences 
deterioration over secondary phases. In contrast, output, dividends, and operating 
efficiency improve significantly after SMBO transactions. 
1.5 Buyouts-strategic entrepreneurship perspective and performance 
           Traditional agency theory only emphasizes the buyouts’ reduction of costs caused 
by over-investment and over-diversification, as this theory stems from the buyout of public 
companies going private. Although PTP LBOs receive heightened attention from the 
media and research, the majority of buyouts are private-to-private transactions, for 
example, division buyouts, family buyouts, SMBOs (Strömberg, 2008). However, there is 
rare empirical research on private-to-private buyouts, and there is little theoretical work to 
systematically analysis the economic rationale of this type of buyout. Recently, Chung 
(2011) has claimed that the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1989) does not seem to 
                                                        
5
 Portfolio rebalancing is a measure of fund diversification.  
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explain the activities of private-to-private buyouts, because the foundation of un-
concentrated ownership for free cash flow does not exist in private companies. Therefore, 
it is desirable to introduce a new theory to the buyout area. Meuleman et al. (2009) thereby 
introduce the strategic entrepreneurship perspective, known as a resource-based view, into 
the buyout literature to complement to the limitations of agency theory. 
           Ireland et al. (2001) and Ireland et al. (2003) integrate strategic management and 
entrepreneurship and develop a strategic entrepreneurship perspective which highlights the 
importance of recognizing resources to identify growth opportunities and sustain or 
generate a competitive advantage for creating company wealth. More specifically, strategic 
management focuses on using sustainable competitive advantages to create wealth 
(advantage seeking) (Ireland et al., 2003). Entrepreneurship emphasizes the recognition of 
opportunities and creating or bundling resources to exploit these opportunities to create 
wealth (opportunity seeking) (Ireland et al., 2001; Ireland et al., 2003). Obviously, both of 
these lie at the core of wealth creation. In order to sustain wealth creation, companies have 
to identify opportunities from the uncertain external environment and develop competitive 
advantages to exploit them, as in Ireland et al. (2003). Ireland et al. (2003) point out that 
small or start-up companies possess skills in recognizing growth opportunities but are 
inferior at exploiting these opportunities in long run. By contrast, mature companies have 
superior skills in developing competitive advantages but are less effective at recognizing 
entrepreneurial opportunities. They argue that companies with a strategic entrepreneurship 
perspective are able to overcome their respective weakness.     
           In their theoretical paper, Ireland et al. (2001) suggest six domains of strategic and 
entrepreneurial actions. These are innovations (e.g. research and development), networks 
between companies and individuals and resources, internationalization, organizational 
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learning through information and knowledge absorption, corporate governance 
mechanisms (especially board of directors) and top management teams, and the growth of 
companies (e.g. mergers and acquisitions). Following Ireland et al. (2001), Ireland et al. 
(2003) develop a model of strategic entrepreneurship and state the vital position of 
resources. They argues that opportunity seeking and advantage seeking behaviors are 
grounded in the rare, valuable, inimitable, non-substitutable, non-transferable, and 
immobile resources of the companies, which are classified into three categories of 
strategic entrepreneurship, including financial capital, human capital, and social capital. 
Financial capital refers to the monetary resources available to companies. Human capital 
refers to the unique knowledge, skills, experience, and capabilities of the employees and 
managers. Social capital refers to the internal networks between individuals and the 
external networks between individuals and organizations.   
           Grounded in the strategic entrepreneurship perspective, Meuleman et al. (2009) 
argue that buyouts enable the exploitation and realization of growth opportunities. This is 
because resources and capabilities are not only related to the knowledge and skill of 
exiting management to identify the opportunities of value creation, but also associated 
with the specialist expertise of PE firms (Coff, 1999; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). 
Admittedly, both the knowledge and skills of the existing management and the expertise of 
PE firms vary between companies and firms. The heterogeneity of resources and capacities 
leads to various levels of competitive advantages. Some companies will sustain a 
competitive advantage, while others will enhance it. Building on these ideas, types of 
buyouts, PE firms experience, reputation, network configuration, and the number of 
portfolios per PE manager could all impact upon profitability, efficiency, and even the 
realized growth. Meuleman et al. (2009) argue that the managers and PE firms in 
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divisional buyouts in particular can improve more performance by using their resources, 
skills, knowledge, and experience to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities and make 
strategic decisions. They find that divisional buyouts and PE firm experience have 
significant and positive influence on performance improvement, especially in achieving 
growth.  
           Starting from the concepts of entrepreneurship and strategic growth, Wright et al. 
(2000a) and Wright et al. (2001) also suggest that buyouts could be a means of wealth 
creation through properly matching the mindsets of managers (managerial mindsets versus 
entrepreneur mindsets) with managerial incentives (towards efficiency gains versus 
towards strategic innovation).6 They argue that in buyouts where managers have high-
powered ownership (managerial incentives towards strategic innovation) and 
entrepreneurial mindsets (heuristic-based logic as they describe it), which is limited by the 
bureaucratic procedure before buyouts, upside growth might result from the 
entrepreneurship decisions of exploiting new opportunities and investing in strategic 
innovations. For instance, Zarah (1995) uses innovations and new ventures as proxies for 
corporate entrepreneurship and finds that the increases in innovations and new ventures of 
LBO companies boost their performance. Using patenting activities to measure 
innovations, Lerner et al. (2011) show that LBOs do not sacrifice their long-run growth to 
improve short-run performance. By contrast, the number of patents does not change after 
LBOs, but the cited patents increase and LBOs become to more concentrated on core 
                                                        
6
 According to Wright et al. (2000a) and Wright et al. (2001), the managerial mindset refers to more 
systematic decision making based on quantitative and rigorous analysis of historical data, while the 
entrepreneurial mindset refers to making decisions through unique insights and real world experience 
regarding the sensitivity of future trends. Managerial incentives towards efficiency gains are caused by high 
leverage and moderate incentives align between managers and shareholders. Under these circumstances, 
managers have limited power to invest free cash in high risk but promising projects or innovations. Thus, the 
efficiency gains are a short term outperformance of buyouts. By contrast, managerial incentives towards 
strategic innovation are a consequence of the moderate leverage and high-powered managerial ownership 
with which managers are more flexible to choose investments and prefer to relevant high risk but strategic 
innovations. 
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innovations. Furthermore, Wright et al. (2000) and Wright et al. (2001) claim that the 
mismatch between the mindsets and the managerial incentives could cause 
underperformance of buyouts. For instance, underperforming buyouts may happen when 
entrepreneurial managers encounter high leverage, and meanwhile, efficiency should be 
the main source of wealth creation instead of exploiting new innovations. 
Underperforming buyouts could also occur when buyouts demand strategic innovation to 
spur long-term growth while the incumbent managers only have managerial mindsets. As 
results, the investors might replace existing managers with more suitable managers, for 
instance, through SMBOs.   
1.6 Corporate governance of buyouts and performance 
           It is well documented that buyouts have superior corporate governance in terms of 
leverage, managerial ownership, and the board of directors to improve the performance. 
Herein, we review studies on the respective corporate governance mechanisms (Table 1.3). 
In particular, we review the theory of the board of directors because of its crucial and 
special role in SMBOs.   
Insert Table 1.3 about here 
1.6.1 Leverage 
           Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) propose a concept of financial engineering that refers 
to the disciplining effect brought by high leverage that is connected with the buyout 
transaction. According to Jensen’s (1989) free cash flow theory that we discussed above, 
the use of leverage can efficiently suppress the management teams’ behavior of wasting 
free cash and mitigate the conflicts between shareholders and management teams over the 
distribution of free cash flow, which is the central weakness and source of waste in public 
companies. With high leverage, the management must use free cash to pay interests and 
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principals rather than pursuing ‘empire building’. Nevertheless, if the leverage of debt and 
equity is so high that it exceeds the company’s debt capacity, the risk of financial distress 
will increase. Meanwhile, according to the entrepreneurship view (Wright et al. 2000a; 
Wright, et al. 2001), high leverage will limit managers’ entrepreneurial behaviors in terms 
of investing in new ventures to spur the growth of their companies, as high leverage 
pursues high efficiency to create more cash flows and does not encourage investments in 
risky innovations.    
           Mixed empirical support for the disciplining effect of high leverage has been 
documented. For instance, Guo et al. (2011) observe that increased leverage causes a better 
cash flow performance. Achleitner et al. (2010) find the leverage effect is more important 
for larger buyouts in terms of value creation, compared to smaller buyouts. Interestingly, 
the results of Cotter and Peck (2001) demonstrate that the positive effect of debt on 
operating performance only exists under the condition of an absence of buyout specialists 
involved in the governance. In contrast, Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) investigated 321 
exited UK buyouts during the period from 1995 to 2004 and do not find strong evidence to 
support the impact of leverage on financial performance. 
           In addition, the increased value effect of high leverage could also be attributed to 
the high tax deduction of interests in many countries. These interest deductions may 
account for an important source of added value in target companies, especially for those 
paying huge amounts of tax before buyouts. Lowenstein (1985) claims that tax saving is 
an important explanation of value creation in buyouts, as it can be the main source of cash 
flow. Using a sample of 76 PTP MBOs between 1980 and 1986, Kaplan (1989b) finds that 
tax benefits could explain the companies’ value. Depending on various assumed tax rates 
(15%, 30% and 46%) and the maturities of debt (permanent or 8 years), the tax deductions 
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can explain from about 5.7% to 56.2% on average. However, tax rates vary over years and 
countries, so it is very difficult to calculate the accurate value transferred from taxes 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
1.6.2 Managerial ownership  
           As discussed above, the virtual issue of agency theory is the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and the management. Incentive alignment, however, is recognized as 
an effective mechanism to solve conflicts of interests. This can be achieved by increased 
managerial ownership, as in this way, managers are likely to be motivated to make 
meaningful and long-run investments on the behalf of shareholders. In the buyout context, 
enhancing incentive alignment through increasing fractional ownership of the management 
team appears especially popular. Without saying MBOs where management team hold the 
majority of ownership and become manager-owners, in other types of buyout, the 
managers either increase their ownership percentage through given shares and options 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990) or are required by PE firms to invest money from their own 
pockets in the ownership to avoid their short-term investment (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). For instance, in his going private MBO sample, Kaplan (1989a) finds that the 
equity ownership of the management team increases from 5.88% to 22.63%. Recently, 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) document that the management team obtains 16 per cent of 
the equity after studying 43 US LBOs in the period from 1996 to 2004, consistent with the 
findings of Acharya et al. (2013).   
           Empirical studies provide strong evidence on the advantage of increased managerial 
ownership in terms of performance at company level. For instance, Kaplan (1989a) finds 
that management equity (improved incentive alignment) has a positive influence on post-
buyout operating performance. Denis (1994) compares the destruction in ownership 
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structure and board composition between the LBO of Safeway Store and the leveraged 
recapitalization transaction of Kroger Co.. He finds the percentage of the management 
ownership in Safeway Store increases from 0.7% before the buyout to 10.3% after the 
buyout, against the 1.6 % increase of Kroger Co. from 1.4% prior to recap. Under the 
same circumstances of high leverage, increased management ownership, together with the 
close monitoring from LBOs, motivates managers of Safeway Store to improve more 
operational performance. Similarly, by using 214 US LBOs between 1986 and 1989, Phan 
and Hill (1995) find a notable increase in management equity ownership after buyouts and, 
as leverage, this increase leads to efficiency gains for the company, suggesting the 
elimination of the agency problem in the target companies by incentive alignment. These 
results are consistent with the earlier study conducted by Thompson et al. (1992). Recently, 
Bruton et al. (2002) find that increased managerial ownership results in superior operating 
performance after buyouts. Renneboog et al. (2007) have investigated 181 UK going 
private buyouts in the second buyout wave starting from 1997 and find that incentive 
realignment is crucial on increasing shareholder gains. Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) 
find that management equity contributes to the enterprise value to some extent. However, 
they also suggest high management equity is associated with the negative performance. By 
contrast, Guo et al. (2011) do not find the contribution of higher management equity 
ownership to better operating performance.    
            Nevertheless, the literature also advances the critique that high levels of managerial 
ownership could cause entrenchment issues. Particularly in MBOs, the management team 
holds the majority ownership while PE firms become the minority shareholders. The 
incumbent management team may achieve their benefits at the expense of company’s 
performance and other shareholders’ benefits. In their theoretical study, Elitzur et al. (1998) 
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argue that managers who already hold large equity ownership before buyouts could 
increase their ownership fraction while reducing the money investment after buyouts. The 
results of their study suggest that increased monitoring from non-manager shareholders 
such as PE firms and increased money investment in the MBO from the incumbent 
management team will impact upon the effort that managers take on behalf of the company, 
and therefore, benefits the company’s performance. Kaplan and Stein (1993) also support 
this conjecture by finding a negative relationship between the amount of the money 
invested by the management team in the MBOs and the probability of the financial distress 
of the target company. 
1.6.3 Board of directors  
           It is recognized that corporate governance is about both monitoring managers to 
minimize downside risks to shareholders and enabling managers to use their expertise to 
achieve the benefits of upside potential of companies for shareholders (Uhlaner et al., 
2007; Filatochev and Wright, 2005; Zahra et al., 2009). Correspondingly, the corporate 
governance literature advocates monitoring and advising as two most important functions 
of the board of directors (e.g. Guest, 2009; Raheja, 2005). The monitoring function stems 
from agency theory that suggests that companies and shareholders endow directors, 
especially outsiders, with the right and responsibility to monitor, discipline, and remove 
ineffective managers, to assure the wealth maximization of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). The advisory function (or enterprising and service function 
as discussed in Uhlaner et al. (2007)) involves the directors (both inside directors and 
outside directors) bringing in valuable expertise and resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Guest, 2009).   
           However, in the previous corporate governance literature, the discussion on the 
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quality of board functions narrowly emphasizes the monitoring function from outsider 
shareholders because of the manifest agency issues between principal and agent in public 
companies.7 Due to data limitations, there are much fewer studies on private companies. 
Indeed, on the one hand, while private companies may have agency issues, the focus of the 
boards should be shifted to its advisory function. In their theoretical discussion paper, 
Uhlaner et al. (2007) argue that the scope of corporate governance in privately held 
companies should go beyond the traditional agency theory focusing on large publicly 
listed companies. Rather, other theoretical perspectives (e.g. the knowledge-based view) 
that are relevant to the advisory function are more in demand to explain the more dynamic 
governance mechanisms in private companies. In their literature review work, Daily et al. 
(2002) also suggest the significant importance of the boards in entrepreneurial companies 
providing their companies with information, resources, or networks to promote the 
entrepreneurial companies’ growth. One the other hand, private companies may have 
distinctive issues, such as principal-principal problem, relative to public companies and 
hence may have unique monitoring function. For instance, Garg (2013) argues that venture 
boards should have a distinctive monitoring function. In his theoretical framework, he 
argues that the monitoring function of venture boards depends on the characteristics of the 
ventures (e.g. the venture development stage) and the characteristics of directors (e.g. 
having founder as directors). As per the framework, especially, the personal characteristics 
of venture capitalist directors, such as professional obligation and personal 
ability/experience, executive considerable influence the board’s monitoring function.   
           The literature usually treats the board of directors as a whole by measuring the 
board of directors as, for example, inside directors / outside directors ratio or board size. 
                                                        
7
 There is a huge literature discussing the board of directors in public companies, due to the focus of this 
thesis, we do not review these studies in detail.  
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Although there is one drawback of these measures, in that they encompass the quality of 
both monitoring and advisory functions, we still use these common measures in this thesis, 
not only because it is very difficult to collect data on directors’ behavior, but also because 
the quality of the monitoring and advisory functions could be reflected in various elements 
of company’s effectiveness (Uhlaner et al., 2007) in the forms of different performance 
measures.       
1.6.3.1 Board size  
           Board size attracts much attention when investigating the efficiency of the board of 
directors. Although more outsiders can improve the monitoring and advisory functions of 
the boards, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that small boards could 
be more effective than large boards. They argue that large boards could cause agency 
problems such as director free-riding within the board and the board becoming more 
symbolic and less a part of the management processes. Consistent with this view, the 
existing empirical evidence demonstrates a negative relationship between board size and 
companies’ performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; O’Connell and Cramer, 
2010). Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) even suggest an optimal board size of 
seven to nine directors. However, O’Connell and Cramer (2010) find that the negative 
relationship between board size and company performance is significantly less for smaller 
companies. Although buyouts tend to have smaller boards both when firms go private 
(Cotter and Peck, 2001; Cornelli and Karakas, 2013) or when they revert to public 
(Gertner and Kaplan, 1996), consistent with a move towards better corporate governance, 
the decreases are at the expense of replacing outsiders with insiders or reducing them to 
zero, especially in MBOs (Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). As a consequence, the monitoring 
and advisory functions may be weakened, due to the positive relationship between 
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company performance and percentage of outsiders (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; O’Connell and 
Cramer, 2010). 
1.6.3.2 PE specialists on board 
           PE firms taking seats on the board is always viewed as a typical and high efficient 
mechanism of buyout organization to create value for both ultimate investors and target 
companies. Studies of boards in PE-backed buyouts have indicated that PE firms would 
appoint specialists to sit on the board (PE directors) (Rosenstein, 1988; Lerner, 1995; Fried 
et al, 1998; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005; Cotter and Peck, 2001; Acharya et al., 2013; 
Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). The presence of PE specialists on the board may effectively 
monitor the company’s executives to focus their efforts (e.g. Fried et al, 1998; Jenter and 
Kanaan, 2011) or provide valuable resources from their previous experience and network to 
complement the lack of inside managers (e.g. Politis and Landstrom, 2002). When the 
target companies have greater need for their expertise, the number of PE specialists on 
board will increase (Lerner, 1995; Rauch and Umber, 2012; Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). 
Via the impact of PE specialists, the board is more efficient and the company’s performance 
can obtain improvement (Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). 
           Empirical evidence supports the importance of PE specialists as directors. For 
instance, Cotter and Peck (2001) analyzed a sample of 64 LBOs from 1984 to 1989 and 
found that buyout specialists (PE specialists) take more seats on the boards than other 
outside investors, suggesting the active monitoring of buyout specialists. Cornelli and 
Karakas (2013) find an increase in the fraction of PE specialists on the board when 
companies go private, by investigating 88 UK LBOs between 1998 and 2003. In addition, 
they find that PE specialists taking seats on the board can improve operating performance. 
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1.6.3.3 Independent outside directors 
            According to corporate governance recommendations and regulations, the 
independence of the board is essential for the effectiveness of the monitoring function of 
the board of directors. Independence should be measured by the fraction of independent 
outside directors, as suggested by Baysinger and Butler (1985). Empirical research 
provides support for the notion that boards dominated by independent outside directors are 
more effective than others (Byrd and Hickman, 1992).   
            Nevertheless, outside directors still could add more value to the enterprises by 
using their knowledge and wisdom from their previous experience (Keasey and Wright, 
1993). 8  The function of outside directors, who offer advice to help decision-making 
strategy and ultimately improve performance, is more important in private companies than 
the monitoring function (e.g. Zarah et al. 2007; Lynall et al. 2003; Filatotchev and Wright, 
2005). As Lerner (1995) states, independent outside directors are typically experts in the 
industry, academics, or entrepreneurs. The reason why they can take seats on the board in 
private companies is that their unique knowledge, expertise, and network resources are 
necessary for the companies. Furthermore, independent outside directors, per se, are 
motivated to offer advice in the area of their expertise to CEOs who will help enhance 
their status and reputation (Garg, 2013). 
1.6.3.4 Inside directors’ skills9  
           Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that because of their valuable internal information on 
the companies, inside directors are the most significant and irreplaceable directors on 
boards. This view is supported by recent theoretical and empirical studies (e.g. Raheja, 
2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Adam and Ferreira, 2007; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). They 
                                                        
8
 Obviously, PE-related directors are also one special component of outside directors. 
9
 Inside directors are defined as full time employees of the company. 
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suggest or demonstrate that inside directors are valuable in improving the quality of boards’ 
monitoring and advisory functions. In particular, high-quality or skilled inside directors are 
equipped with advanced board knowledge and skills, operational expertise, or broader 
resources and networks. Meanwhile, they are motivated to reveal internal information to 
the board and use their influential expertise to improve the boards’ decision making.     
           Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011), we use inside directors’ independent outside 
directorships as a proxy for skilled inside directors for two reasons. First, recent research 
finds evidence that supports the importance of the labor market for directors in identifying 
highly skilled managers (Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999; Fich, 2005; Fish and 
Shivdasani, 2007; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). To retain their competitive advantage on the 
labor market, directors with outside appointments must continue to demonstrate their 
strong decision management skills, thereby increasing their attractiveness to their own 
board (Fama, 1980; Yermack, 2004; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). The effort will result in 
company performance improvement. For instance, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that 
boards with inside directors that have outside directorships are more effective, resulting in 
better firm operating performance. Second, the outside directorship of these inside 
directors enhances their experience of the operating company and enables them to access 
more resources via expanding their network (Walsh, 1995). Outside directorship provides 
inside directors with a vehicle for learning both from their experience and from other 
directors (Useem, 1982; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Their enhanced skills help to 
enhance the effectiveness of boards’ monitoring and advisory functions. As a consequence, 
it is more likely to increase the company’s performance and the possibility of exploiting 
growth opportunity of their home companies. 
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1.6.3.5 The effect of top management (CEO/CFO) 
            One of the most important tasks of the board is to monitor and choose an 
appropriate CEO (e.g., Mace, 1986). This is because the CEO’s ability, preferences, and 
decisions impact company performance (Bertrand, 2009; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). If a 
CEO performs poorly, for instance by entrenching himself in his positions, the company 
would underperform (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Studies find companies with poor 
performance tend to replace their CEO (Hermalin and Weisback, 2001). After changing 
CEO, performance generally improves because of the strategic changes and right decisions 
(e.g. Weisbach, 1995; Denis and Denis, 1995).   
           The buyout literature also highlights the importance of replacing the top 
management (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Acharya et al., 2013; Gong and Wu, 2011; 
Cornelli and Karakas, 2013).  For instance, Acharya et al. (2011) find that over one third of 
deals change CEOs/CFOs within 100 days after the transactions, and PE firms have 
intensive interaction with CEOs/ CFOs through formal and informal channels. These 
intensive engagements of PE firms are associated with performance improvement. Gong 
and Wu (2011) use 126 US LBO deals from 1990 to 2006 to investigate CEO turnover in 
PE-backed LBOs. Their findings demonstrate that 51 per cent CEOs are replaced within 
two years of buyout announcements. CEO replacement is positively related to high agency 
costs, measured as high level of undistributed free cash flow and low leverage, and low 
pre-buyout operating performance, measured as return on assets. Cornelli and Karakas 
(2013) find that the board representation of PE specialists reduces the probability of CEO 
replacement and the relationship between CEO turnover and pre-buyout performance is 
weak. These two findings suggest the rationality of PE sponsors when they make a 
decision to change a CEO. They also find that CEO turnover can improve operating 
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performance, in accordance with the hypothesis that buyouts have superior corporate 
governance. In their working paper, Rauch and Umber (2012) use 211 German PE 
investments from 1997 to 2009 to investigate the variety of activism of PE firms. They 
classify PE holding control shares and/or taking seats on the boards and/or changing 
CEO/CFO as active behavior, and other forms of behaviors as passive behavior. They find 
50% of buyout deals are active; equal to the number of passive buyouts. Notably, the 
buyouts backed by active PE firms have better operating and financial performance that 
those backed by passive PE firms. Although they do not mainly focus on the impact of 
corporate governance on operating performance, Guo et al. (2011) provide evidence that 
operating performance is higher for buyouts where the CEO was replaced. 
1.7 PE firms and performance 
1.7.1 The impact of PE backing on performance  
           Theoretically, in order to maximize their own value and maintain the reputation of 
the PE firms, PE specialists have motivations to execute influence on the operating 
performance of the investee companies. As a consequence, PE-backed companies would 
have better performance than non-PE-backed companies. 10  However, the empirical 
evidence is mixed. For instance, rather than the evidence discussed in section 1.3.2, Jain 
and Kini (1995) investigate the post-IPO operating performance of VC-backed IPOs, with 
a sample of 136 VC-backed IPOs. Their results demonstrate that VC-backed IPOs show 
better operating performance after IPO, relative to a control sample of non-VC-backed 
IPOs. Moreover, this superior performance continues to exist when control for other 
operating performance factors. Using a sample of 934 VC-backed IPOs in the US from 
1972 to 1992, Brav and Gompers (1997) show that VC-backed IPOs have higher equal-
                                                        
10
 Some studies on buyouts treat PE-backed deals and buyouts as the same thing (e.g. Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 
1990; Cressy et al., 2007; Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Thus, we do not repeat to review these studies. 
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weighted returns than non-VC-backed IPOs. Jelic et al. (2005) examine the role of VC in 
the financial performance of PTP MBOs by using 167 UK MBOs exiting through IPOs. 
They find that VC-backed MBOs have superior financial performance to that of their non-
VC-backed MBO peers. But this outperformance disappears in the long run. Levis (2011) 
compares the performance between PE-backed IPOs and non-PE-backed IPOs from 1992 
to 2005, and find that PE-backed IPOs perform better in both market and operating 
performance in the three years after IPOs. By contrast, after investigating VC-backed IPOs 
in Germany, the UK, and France, Rindermann (2004) concludes that VC-backed IPOs do 
not generally generate superior market performance compared to non-VC-backed buyouts. 
But they find that internationally operating venture capitalists do boost the market 
performance of their backing companies, suggesting the importance of the heterogeneity 
of VC. Jelic et al. (2012) only demonstrate PE-backed MBOs outperform their 
counterparts in employment performance in the long run. They do not find convincing 
results of superior performance of PE-backed MBOs with other operating performance 
measures. 
1.7.2 Agency problem between limited partners and general partners 
           Nevertheless, just as with public companies, the organizational structure of PE 
firms might create a new form of principal-agent problem whereby the agent (the general 
partner) can make investment decision on his own behalf instead of maximizing 
principal’s (the limited partner) benefit. 
           According to the argument of Arcot et al. (2014), there are two factors which induce 
a conflict of interests between general partners and limited partners. First, in order to show 
his deal activity, the general partner has an incentive to engage in more deals even though 
these deals might not be the best investments. This is because the principal (the limited 
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partners) cannot distinguish ‘actively doing nothing’ from ‘simply doing nothing’ (Dow 
and Gorton, 1997). If the general partner chooses to hold the committed capital when he 
cannot diligently identify an optimal investment opportunity, he would be treated as 
incompetent agent and loses the limited partner’s investment in the subsequent fund. 
Second, the general partner is tempted to overinvest, as the fixed fees of the general 
partner are positively correlated to net invested capital (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). For 
instance, some funds may calculate the fixed fees as a constant rate on a changing basis 
from committed capital to net invested capital. Hence, PE fund managers may be under 
pressure to invest more deals without considering the optimal investment strategy. 
           Axelson et al. (2009) and Axelson et al. (2013) also state that the agency conflicts 
between general partners and limited partners will lead to general partners increasing the 
leverage when they invest in buyouts and misjudging the quality of the investments. In 
particular, because of the limited liability and the profit-based carry interests, general 
partners have motivation to overinvest and/or invest in bad deals. First, if the general 
partners raise funds on a deal-by-deal base, general partners will increase the leverage and 
invest as many as possible when the debt is cheap, as in Axelson et al. (2009). They will 
overpay for the deal at the expense of limited partners, as this high leverage will cause 
lower fund returns (Axelson et al. 2013). Second, if general partners can raise funds for a 
number of future deals, they might ‘go for broke’ and invest in bad deals (Axelson et al., 
2009). This argument is consistent with the first argument of Arcot et al. (2014) that when 
the fund is approaching to the end of its life and there are not enough good deals available, 
general partners are prone to choose bad deals.   
1.7.3 Competitive advantages of PE firms and performance 
           PE firms apply their competitive advantages (the heterogeneity of PE firms’ 
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characteristics) to achieve successful transactions and assist the operational improvement 
of target companies to create value. In order to accommodate the growing completion in 
PE industry, PE firms have to pursue their competitive advantages. The competitive 
advantages of PE firms are built upon abundant previous investment experience, the 
number of investments per executive, the investment strategies of PE firms, and their 
industry and operating expertise. Herein, we summarize some selected studies in Table 1.4. 
Insert Table 1.4 about here 
           With respect to previous experience, Meuleman et al. (2009) conclude that first, the 
depth and breadth of previous investment experience enable PE firms to reduce the 
adverse selection problem caused by information asymmetry when selecting the deals. 
First, more experienced PE firms are more likely to be able to identify deals with better 
performance or better value creation potentials. Second, PE firms with abundant 
experience can be more efficient at eliminating the moral hazard problem caused by the 
incumbent’s management of target companies and help to create value, because they can 
provide better monitoring to improve management efficiency. Third, more experience 
equips PE firms with expertise and competencies relevant to strategy making, operational 
management, human capital resources (e.g. sophisticated managers), extensive network 
(e.g. suppliers, customers, investors), merger and acquisition skills, etcetera. These kinds 
of expertise and competencies might supplement the knowledge and skills possessed by 
the incumbent management team, leading to a better operational system and more growth 
opportunities. For instance, using a sample of 238 PE-backed UK buyouts in the period of 
1993 to 2003, Meuleman et al. (2009) investigate the determinants of profitability, 
efficiency and growth from a strategic entrepreneurship view. They find more PE firms 
experience is related to higher growth performance at the target company while not related 
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to better performance in profitability and efficiency. This suggests that PE firms with more 
experience can exploit more growth opportunities to improve performance. In their paper 
examining the investment performance effect of the knowledge derived from previous 
investment experience, De Clercq and Dimov (2008) measure the investment performance 
as the exit outcomes of VC firms. They classify knowledge into internal knowledge, which 
is from investments in a particular industry, and external knowledge that is associated with 
the number of syndicate partners in one investment and the number of prior interactions 
with the partners in a particular investment. They find that greater industry knowledge for 
relevant investments, more syndicate partners or more VC firms co-investing, and more 
previous interactions with the syndicate partners for a certain investment generate better 
investments’ performance, for example, with going public and acquisitions. In particular, 
the performance effect of external knowledge could be moderated by the effect of internal 
knowledge when considering their joint effect. Their findings suggest that VC firms can 
obtain a competitive advantage from both internal and external knowledge to gain better 
investment performance. Despite not studying the operating performance of target 
companies, Gomper et al. (2008) also confirm that industry experience is more important 
than general experience in leading to successful deals measured by the probability of 
profitable exits such as going public and merger or acquisition, on the basis of a dataset of 
13,785 companies in which 1,084 VC firms invested from 1975 to 1998. This finding 
suggests the importance of industry-specific knowledge to identify good deals and know-
how to manage and create value for these deals. 
           With regards to the number of investments per executive, studies (e.g. Elango et al., 
1995; Meuleman et al., 2009) also argue that the number of investments managed by one 
executive, which indicates the intensity of monitoring, affects the value creation of PE 
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firms. This is because increasing the number of investments per executive will cause 
decreases in the allocation of time and the advice that the executive can provide to one 
investment, which is more likely to lead to the failure of investment. For instance, 
Meuleman et al. (2009) find that the number of investments per executive has a significant 
and negative relationship with profitability and growth performance. As a control variable, 
Cumming and Johan (2007) find that VC managers with a large number of investments 
under management tend to make less effort (for instance, less support and less advice) in 
the development of their investments. 
           Indeed, PE firms tend to organize their investments around specific industries and 
stages of development to aggregate the industry and stage experience and expertise (e.g. 
Elango et al., 1995; Cressy et al., 2007; Manigart et al., 2002). The heterogeneity in 
industries and stages of development means the heterogeneity in operational strategies in 
business. Similar to previous experience, the specialization investment strategies also 
enable PE firms to reduce the information asymmetry and uncertainty, as they learn more 
and acquire deeper knowledge on that industry or stage and understand the best way of 
value creation for their investments (Cressy et al., 2007). Cressy et al. (2007) constructed a 
sample of 122 UK buyouts from 1995 to 2002 to examine the influence of industry and 
buyout/acquisition stage specializations on post-buyout operating performance. They 
adopt dummy variables to proxy for industry and buyout/acquisition stage specializations 
based on the fraction of investments by PE firms in a particular industry and stage. They 
find that industry specialization contributes between 6% and 8.5% to the operating 
profitability of target companies over the first three years after buyouts, suggesting that PE 
firms specialized in certain industries do improve the target company. However, they do 
not find convincing evidence on the positive effect of buyout/ acquisition stage 
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specialization on post-buyout operating performance, but it improves growth performance 
to some extent. In their literature review study, Siegel et al. (2011) argue that the effects of 
PE funds on the post-investment performance of their portfolio companies are closely 
related to the prior experience and specialist sector expertise of funds’ managers. 
           In addition, unlike PE firms in the 1980s and early 1990s that are characterized by 
employing professionals from an investment banking background, PE firms nowadays are 
more likely to hire professionals with operating and industry skills and experience (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009). The industry and operating expertise of these professionals assists 
their investment strategies and plays a core role in their competitive advantages. Thus, PE 
specialists use their aggregated operating and industry/stage experience, knowledge, and 
skills to identify attractive deals, develop strategies and operational and financial 
management for the target companies, and improve their operating performance (ibid). 
Although analyzing the PE fund performance, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) conjecture that 
the skills and quality of GPs (human capital as they described) could be crucial drivers of 
fund performance. Cumming et al. (2007) also highlight the necessity of understanding the 
human capital, especially the product and operations expertise of PE firms. Inspired by 
them, Acharya et al. (2013) provide evidence on the importance of the deal partners’ 
professional background on target companies’ performance on the basis of interview data. 
They find that deal partners with previous operational and industrial experience are 
associated with high level of governance intervention. In the subsample of ‘organic’ deals 
that improve performance internally, deal partners with strong operational and industrial 
background generate more performance than others through active governance 
intervention. In contrast, deals partners with a financial background are more likely to 
achieve success by using merger and acquisition to generate value. In line with these 
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results, Bottazzi et al. (2008) investigate the influence of human capital of VC firms on the 
investments’ success via using 119 European VC deals. Their results show that VC 
specialists with previous business experience appear to be more active in the companies in 
which they invest than those who have more venture investment experience. They will 
actively engage in recruiting senior managers and outside directors, helping target 
companies to get additional financing, and high frequency of interaction with the target 
companies. As a consequence, this active involvement is more likely to lead to successful 
exits defined as IPO and acquisitions.   
1.8 Conclusion  
            The literature review on SMBOs shows that researchers have mainly concentrated 
on the motivations for SMBO. Some studies (please see Panel B of Table 1.2) consider the 
post-SMBO operating performance, but there has been no conclusive empirical evidence. 
Table 1.2 (Panel B) also shows that the analysis of the determinants of post-SMBO 
operating performance is scant. In terms of theory and empirical evidence, the post-SMBO 
operating performance still puzzles academic researchers. We extended the literature by 
exploring post-SMBO operating performance more comprehensively, more specifically, by 
relating post-SMBO operating performance to agency theory and strategic entrepreneurship 
perspective, corporate governance, and PE firms.    
          With regard to the operating performance of SMBOs, our literature review reveals 
the following gaps. First, traditional theoretical literature suggests that buyouts improve 
companies’ performance by eliminating agency problems (Jensen, 1989), but the empirical 
results on this are mixed. Studies listed in Table 1.1 show that, although US and UK 
evidence in the first wave of buyouts supports Jensen’s agency theory, recent studies on the 
second buyout wave and in different European countries fail to draw a conclusion on the 
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outperformance of buyout organizations. This suggests that the traditional agency theory 
cannot effectively explain buyouts’ performance in a broader environment. Hence, the 
strategic entrepreneurship perspective is introduced to buyout literature to supplement 
Jensen’s (1989) agency theory. However, current SMBO studies tend to examine efficiency 
gains through the lens of agency theory and ignore the growth performance explained by 
the strategic entrepreneurship perspective. Moreover, although these studies cover the 
recent SMBO wave, the sample size of UK SMBOs is quite small, with the largest sample 
being  195 UK SMBOs from 2000 to 2007 (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2013), due to the data 
limitations of the databases they adopt. In fact, according to the SMBO coverage in 
CMBOR, which is the most comprehensive database on UK buyouts, there were 612 UK 
SMBOs between2000 and 2007. Thus, the sample size of UK SMBOs in the extant studies 
only accounts for 31.9% of total UK SMBOs. In addition, the definition of SMBO in all 
these studies, except for Jelic and Wright (2011), is PE firm to PE firm transaction.
11
 
However, as not all buyouts are PE-backed deals, the analysis of SMBOs should also 
include other types of deals such as management team to PE firm deals,
12
 management 
team to management team deals, and PE firm to management team deals. We attempt to fill 
these gaps by investigating long term post-SMBO performance in terms of profitability, 
productivity, employment growth, and sales growth. More comprehensive data is provided 
in chapter 2.  
           Sections 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 of the literature review conclude that, despite some mixed 
evidence, the two main mechanisms for value creation in buyouts are high leverage and the 
alignment of management incentive with management ownership. They effectively reduce 
agency problem and enhance the management efficiency, thereby improving the target 
                                                        
11
 Both sellers and buyers are PE firms. 
12
 Sellers are managers while buyers are PE firms. The other two types have similar patterns.   
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companies’ performance. On the other hand, excessive leverage and managerial ownership 
can also reduce company performance. Given that SMBOs involve higher leverage and 
managerial ownership than primary buyouts, skeptics about SMBOs suggest that the effect 
of superior value creation mechanisms of buyouts would reduce in the secondary round and 
ultimately have no potential to improve performance. However, apart from Smit and 
Volosovych (2013), none of these studies empirically support the skeptics’ view by directly 
examining the relationship between the two typical value creation mechanisms and post-
SMBO operating performance. Hence, chapter 2 also examines the impact of leverage and 
managerial ownership on post-SMBO operating performance.  
           The literature on the board of directors reviewed in section 1.6.3 suggests that PE 
firms tend to actively interact with the board of directors, such as taking seats on board or 
replacing the top managers (CEO/CFO), in order to more closely monitor managers and 
enhance the management efficiency. Some studies provide evidence that these active 
interactions between PE firms and boards can reduce agency problems and bring better 
operating performance to buyouts. However, research about whether these mechanisms will 
still exercise influence at the secondary round is scarce. Furthermore, the general literature 
about company boards argues that the effect of the board of directors on the operational 
process should not be restricted to its monitoring function to improve the downside 
efficiency, but rather, its advisory function to boost the upside growth should be more 
important in private companies. Nevertheless, due to data limitations concerning private 
companies, none of these studies empirically investigate whether the advisory function of 
the board of directors can improve the upside growth in buyouts, not to speak of SMBOs. 
We fill this gap in literature in chapter 3 by examining the changes in board rooms after 
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SMBO transactions and whether these changes influence post-SMBO operating 
performance in terms of downside efficiency and upside growth.  
         The review of literature in section 1.7 reveals the importance of PE firms in relation to 
the performance of buyouts. Firstly, PE firms might chase their own benefits while ignoring 
those of the limited partners. It is possible that, under the fund pressures, selling PE firms 
exit good deals and the buying PE firms purchase bad deals. Secondly, the different 
competitive advantages of PE firms which bring in various resources and experience can 
determinate the operating performance improvement in the secondary round. The results of 
more recent studies testify that PE firm’s competitive advantages (or the characteristics of 
PE firms), such as previous experience, specification, and the human capital, contribute to 
the portfolio companies’ operating performance. Nevertheless, current SMBO studies on 
these two perspectives only examine their impact on investment returns at fund level (e.g. 
Degeorge et al., 2013; Arcot et al., 2014). Only Jenkinson and Sousa (2013) focus on the 
company level, but they only examine the impact of the selling and buying PE firms’ 
previous experience on efficiency gains (profits and profitability), whereas the competitive 
advantages of PE firms are multidimensional, with influence on both efficiency gains and 
growth performance. Therefore, we fill this gap in chapter 4 through comprehensively 
exploring the determinants of post-SMBO operating performance from PE firms’ 
perspectives, in order to understand both the selling and buying PE firms’ behaviour when 
they invest in SMBOs. 
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Table 1.1: Selected studies on post-buyout operating performance 
Authors Country  Period Sample Findings 
Kaplan (1989a) US 1980-1986 76 PE-backed PTP 
buyouts 
Increases in operating income /assets (sales) by 7.1%-36.1%; decreases in capital expenditures / assets (sales) 
by 4.4% - 31.6%; increases in net cash flow / assets ( sales) by 28.3% - 85.4% after buyouts 
Smith (1990) US 1977-1986 58 PE-backed PTP 
MBOs 
Increases in operating cash flows / operating assets (the number of employees). Tightened working capital but 
not layoffs and reductions in capital expenditures contribute to the increases. 
Opler (1992) US 1985-1989 44 PTP LBOs 11.6% increase in industry adjusted operating profits /sales and 40.3% increase in industry adjusted operating 
profit / the number of employees after buyouts. Decreases in capital expenditure, paid income tax and 
research and development expenditure. 
Wright et al. (1992) UK 1980s 182 MBOs and 
MBIs 
68% of sample MBOs and MBIs experience increases in profitability after transactions. 
Wright et al. (1996) UK Mid-1980s 409 MBOs MBOs show increases in return /assets and profit / the number of employees in the third to fifth post-buyout 
years, compared to non-MBOs.  
Cressy et al. (2007) UK 1995-2002 122 PE-backed 
buyouts 
PE-backed buyouts have 4.3% and 6.97% higher operating profitability and turnover growth than controlled 
non-buyouts companies, respectively.  
Amess and Wright (2007) UK 1993-2004 533 LBOs MBO companies have higher employment growth performance than non-buyout companies.  
Bergstrom et al. (2007) Sweden 1999-2001 69 Buyouts EBITDA margin, return on invested capital, and sales growth increase by 3.07%, 17.38%, and 3.45% after 
transactions, individually.  
Acharya et al. (2013) Western 
Europe 
1991-2007 395 PE-backed 
LBOs and MBOs 
Sample companies experience increases in operating performance measured by sales, profitability, and 
EBITDA multiple during PE (buyout) ownership.   
Boucly et al. (2011) France 1994-2004 839 LBOs Buyout companies have better performance in profitability and growth than matched non-buyout companies.  
Guo et al. (2011) US 1990 - 2005 94 PTP LBOs Significant improvements in EBITDA/ sales and net cash flow / sales are only observed when using industry, 
previous performance, and market-to-book adjusted benchmark to estimate the changes in performance from 
pre- to post- buyouts. However, the magnitudes of these increases are much smaller than those of Kaplan 
(1989a). Furthermore, traditional unadjusted and industry-adjusted benchmarks do not demonstrate 
significant performance improvement.   
Desbrières and Schatt 
(2002) 
France 1988-1994 110 Buyouts Sample buyout companies show decreases in return/equity, return/ investments, and margin ratios 
(EBIT/Sales, Net profit/Sales, and Cash flow/Sales) in the first two years after transactions, related to 
matched industry peers. 
Jelic and Wright (2011) UK 1980 - 2004 1,225 MBOs No significant improvements in leverage and operating efficiency after transactions. Sample companies show 
significant increases in profitability and employment up to three post-buyout years, significant increases in 
output up to five post-buyout years, and significant decreases in dividend payments up to five post-buyout 
years. 
Weir et al. (2008) UK 1998-2004 112 PTP buyouts Compared to the industry matched peers, sample buyout companies obtain significant improvement in return 
on capital equity while significant deterioration in   return on capital equity and EBITDA to total assets after 
transactions. 
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Table 1.2: Selected studies on SMBOs’ motivations and performance 
Panel A: Motivations 
Authors Country  Period Sample Hypotheses Findings 
Wright et al. (2000b) UK 1984 -1997 229 SMBOs/BIs Enterprise hypothesis; Incumbent management team 
hypothesis 
Accepting enterprise hypothesis to some extent; 
Accepting incumbent management team 
hypothesis.  
Kitzmann and Schiereck 
(2009) 
Worldwide 1999-2004 - Pecking order hypothesis Rejecting pecking order hypothesis. 
Wang (2012) UK 1997-2008 485 SMBOs Efficiency gains hypothesis (value creation 
hypothesis); Market condition hypothesis; Collusion 
hypothesis 
Accepting market condition hypothesis. 
Achleitner et al. (2012a) North America 
and Europe 
1995-2008 1,112 exited LBOs 
(340 SMBOs) 
Pecking order hypothesis; 
Market condition hypothesis; 
Debt capacity hypothesis; 
Fund pressure hypothesis 
Accepting market condition hypothesis, debt 
capacity hypothesis, and fund pressure 
hypothesis. 
 
Bonini (2013) Europe 1998-2008 2,911LBOs, vs. 
163 SMBOs 
(about 90 UK 
SMBOs) 
Value creation hypothesis; 
Mispricing hypothesis (market condition hypothesis); 
Collusion hypothesis 
Accepting mispricing hypothesis. 
 
Jenkinson and Sousa 
(2014) 
Europe 2000-2007 759 PE exiting 
deals 
Specializations hypothesis (value creation 
hypothesis); 
Pecking order hypothesis; 
Market condition hypothesis; 
Fund pressure hypothesis 
Accepting market condition hypothesis and 
fund pressure hypothesis. 
Arcot et al. (2014) Worldwide 1980-2010 9,771 LBOs 
(1,274 SMBOs) 
Fund pressure hypothesis Accepting fund pressure hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Panel B: Empirical studies on post-SMBO operating performance 
Authors Country  Period Sample SMBO 
sources 
Performance 
measures 
Abnormal 
performance 
measure 
methods 
Relevant determinants of 
post-SMBO performance 
Models for 
determinants 
Findings  
Bonini (2013) Europe 1998-
2008 
2,911LBOs, 
vs. 163 
SMBOs 
(about 90 
UK 
SMBOs) 
Mergermarket, 
S&P LCD 
Operating margin 
ratios, turnover 
ratios, return on 
Investment ratios, 
Return on equity 
ratios, Liquidity 
ratios, Capital 
structure ratio 
Yearly 
performance 
changes, two 
years window 
(compared with 
one year prior 
SMBOs)  
- - Compared to the significant 
and great improvement of 
operating performance in 
primary buyouts, operating 
performance in secondary 
round experiences 
considerably smaller and/or 
even not significant 
improvement. 
Achleitner and 
Figge (2014) 
Worldwide 1990-
2010 
2,456 
realized 
buyout 
transaction 
with 448 
SMBOs (99 
UK 
SMBOs) 
Databases  
complied by 
three European 
funds of funds 
EBITDA growth, 
sales growth, and 
changes in 
EBITDA margin 
(measured as 
EBITDA/sales) 
OLS; 
 Heckman two 
steps regression, 
- - No convincing evidence 
exhibits that post-SMBO 
performance is significantly 
different from the post-
buyout performance of other 
types of buyouts. 
Wang (2012) UK 1997-
2008 
140 SMBOs 
vs. 465 first-
time buyouts 
Zephyr  Target's size (fixed 
assets and sales), 
operating cash 
flow(EBITDA, 
EBITDA/sales, 
EBITDA/fixed 
assets) , 
profitability 
(Earnings/sales, 
ROA) 
Yearly 
performance 
changes, three-
year window 
(compared with 
one year prior 
SMBOs) 
- - Significant increase in fixed 
assets, sales, and profits 
(EBITDA), but firms’ 
profitability and EBITDA/ 
sales decreases. Thus, 
SMBOs do not improve 
operating efficiency gains.  
Smit and 
Volosovych 
(2013) 
UK 1999-
2008 
101 SMBOs Thomson one 
banker and 
SDC Platinum 
Profitability (ROS 
and ROA) 
Performance 
changes, From -1 to 
the last year before 
exit 
Pre-SMBO performance, 
Management equity 
participant, CEO 
replacement, club PE 
participants, PE reputation, 
Sponsor directors/ board 
size, Bank loans/ Total 
debt, Entry leverage, 
leverage change   
OLS Significant reductions in 
profitability; Pre-SMBO 
performance, positive 
leverage change and CEO 
replacement can improve 
post-SMBO operating 
performance   
60 
 
(Continued) 
Jelic and 
Wright (2011)  
UK 1980-
2004 
 1,125 
MBOs 
(about 94 
SMBOs) 
 Various 
databases (e.g. 
CMBOR, 
Quarterly 
Reviews, 
KPMG MBO 
commentaries) 
 Profitability, sales 
efficiency, Output 
(Sales), 
Dividends, Total 
employment, and 
Leverage 
Yearly 
performance 
changes, five-
year window 
( compared with 
the median value 
of performance 
over three years 
prior SMBOs 
 PE backing GLS random-
effects model 
corrected for 
selection bias 
Significantly increases in 
output, sales efficiency, and 
dividend, while significant 
decreases in leverage and 
profitability.  
 PE backing does not have 
significant impact on post-
SMBO performance. 
Jenkinson and 
Sousa (2013)  
UK 2000-
2007 
194 SMBO 
exits vs. 114 
IPO exits 
Captical IQ 
and Private 
Equity Insight 
Total assets, total 
sales, EBITDA, 
and net cash flow 
Yearly 
performance 
changes, three-
year window 
(compared with 
one year prior 
SMBOs) 
Previous deal holding 
period, selling and 
Purchasing PE firms' 
experience 
OLS Targets exited through 
SMBOs underperform those 
exited through IPOs; This 
underperformance could be 
partially explained by the 
previous holding period and 
the purchasing PE firms' 
experience.  
Achleitner et 
al.(2012b) 
- - The case of 
Brenntage 
backed by 
BC partner  
private source Gross profits, 
EBITDA growth, 
Sales growth,  
EBITDA margin, 
and capital 
expenditure 
Average annual 
values over the 
holding periods 
- - SMBOs can achieve further 
operational performance 
improvement which is 
reflected in EBITDA growth, 
sales growth, and EBITDA 
margin. 
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Table 1.3: Selected empirical studies on corporate governance of buyouts 
Panel A: Leverage 
Authors Country  Period Sample Findings 
Cotter and Peck (2001) US 1984-1989 64 LBOs Debt has positive effect on post-buyout operating performance of deals without buyout 
specialists on the board.  
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) UK 1995-2004 321 existed UK buyouts Debt coverage only has weak influence on LBO returns.  
Achleitner et al. (2010) Europe 1991-2005 206 buyouts For larger buyouts, leverage effect on value creation is more important compared to 
smaller buyouts. 
Guo et al. (2011) US 1990 - 2005 94 PTP LBOs Higher debt leads to better cash flow performance  
 
Panel B: Managerial ownership  
Authors Country  Period Sample Findings 
Thompson et al. (1992) UK 1982-1989 31MBOs Higher managerial equity after transaction is associated with higher post-buyout 
performance. 
Denis (1994) - Mid-1980s Case study (1 LBO vs. 1 
leveraged recapitalization 
transaction) 
Managerial ownership increases after transactions. Increased managerial ownership in 
LBO, together with board monitoring, enhances manager’s motivation to improve 
operating performance. 
Phan and Hill (1995) US 1986-1989 214 LBOs Increased managerial ownership improves the efficiency gains. 
Bruton et al. (2002) US 1980-1988 39 buyouts Increased managerial ownership has positive effect on post-buyout operating 
performance. 
Renneboog et al. (2007) UK 1997-2003 181 PTP buyouts Incentive realignment contributes to shareholders’ returns. 
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) UK 1995-2004 321 existed UK buyouts For large buyouts and successful buyouts, managerial ownership is an important 
determinant of enterprise value.  
Acharya et al. (2013) Western 
Europe 
1991-2007 395 PE-backed LBOs and 
MBOs 
 
Guo et al. (2011) US 1990 - 2005 94 PTP LBOs Buyouts with higher level managerial ownership do not have superior operating 
performance.  
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Panel C: Board of directors 
Authors Country  Period Sample Findings 
Cotter and Peck (2001) US 1984-1989 64 LBOs Buyouts have a smaller board size. Buyout specialists take more seats on the boards in 
smaller boards. 
Gong and Wu (2010) US 1990-2006 126 LBOs 51 % CEOs are changed within two years after transactions. Buyouts with higher pre-
buyout agency costs and lowers pre-buyout operating performance are more likely to 
change CEOs. 
Acharya et al. (2013) Western 
Europe 
1991-2007 395 PE-backed LBOs and 
MBOs 
2/3 sample buyouts replace CEOs/CFOs within 100 days after transaction. PE firms 
intensively interact with CEOs/CFOs. 
Guo et al. (2011) US 1990 - 2005 94 PTP LBOs Replacing CEO improves cash flow performance.  
Cornelli and Karakas (2013) UK 1998-2003 88 PTP LBOs After transactions, board size decreases and the fraction of PE specialists on the board 
increase. Higher fraction of PE specialist directors leads to lower possibility of CEO 
turnovers. CEO turnover and high fraction of PE specialists directors improve post-
buyout operating performance. 
Rauch and Umber (2012) Germany 1997-2009 211 PE investments 50% of sample PE investments are backed active PE firms. Active PE firms have positive 
effect on their target companies operating and financial performance.  
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Table 1.4: Selected studies on competitive advantages of PE firms and performance 
Authors Country  Period Sample Variables (PE firms’ competitive 
advantages) 
Findings 
Meuleman et al. 
(2009) 
UK 1993-
2003 
238 PE-backed UK 
buyouts  
PE experience, Investments/executive PE experience has a positive relationship with growth performance but 
not profitability and efficiency. Investments/executive is negatively 
correlated to profitability and growth.  
De Clercq and 
Dimov (2007) 
US 1962-
2002 
547 VC firms Internal knowledge measured by 
previous industry knowledge, external 
knowledge measured by  number of 
syndicate partners and number of prior 
integrations  
More previous industry knowledge and cooperating with more or 
familiar other VC firms improve the investments’ performance (e.g. 
going public and acquisitions).  External knowledge and internal 
knowledge complement each other. 
Cressy et al. 
(2007) 
UK 1995-
2002 
122 PE-backed buyouts Industry specialization, stage(buyout) 
specialization 
Industry specialization brings in 6%-8.5% to operating profitability. 
Stage (buyout) specialization only improves growth performance to some 
extent.  
Gomper et al. 
(2008) 
Worldwide 1975-
1998 
1,084 VC firms (13,785 
invested companies) 
Overall experience, industry 
experience, industry specialization 
VC firms with more overall experience and industry experience, but not 
industry specialized experience are more likely to exit their investments 
through IPOs or merger/acquisition. However, industry-specific 
experience is more important than overall experience in indentifying 
good opportunities.  
Acharya et al. 
(2013) 
Western 
Europe 
1991-
2007 
395 PE-backed LBOs 
and MBOs 
Operational and industrial background, 
financial background 
With regard to the way of improving performance, general partners with 
operational and industrial background have greater degree of governance 
intervene while those with financial background outperform with merger 
and acquisition events.  
Bottazzi et al. 
(2008) 
European 1998-
2001 
119 VC deals Venture experience, business 
experience, science education 
Compared to venture experience and science education, general partners 
with business experience are more active in their portfolios with more 
successful investments.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SMBOS: BUYING TIME OR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE?
13
 
2.1 Introduction 
           The debate on the post-SMBO operating performance of the target companies has 
attracted much attention from scholars in PE and buyout areas. For instance, Wright et al. 
(2009b) suggest that the value creation mechanisms have already existed in primary 
buyouts, resulting in difficulties of obtaining further value creation for the following buyout 
investors. Under these circumstances, a significant improvement in operating performance 
for target companies might not be possible in SMBOs (Jelic and Wright, 2011). One the 
other hand, operating performance improvement of target companies may still be possible. 
For instance, some PE firms from initial rounds may be forced to exit early due to the fund 
expiry (Achleitner and Figge, 2014; Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014). Moreover, second round 
PE firms could create value by adopting new strategies or by changing existing practices.  
           Recent emerging research on SMBOs reposts mixed evidence in terms of post-
SMBO operating performance. For example, Achleitner and Figge (2014) put forward the 
argument that (worldwide) SMBOs are not different from other types of buyouts in terms of 
operating performance. However, the study of Bonini (2013) reposts no significant 
performance improvement after European SMBOs. With regards to UK data, Wang (2012) 
finds that SMBOs outperform primary buyouts in creating cash flows but underperform in 
creating earnings. Also, Jelic and Wright (2011) demonstrate significant outperformance in 
terms of output and dividends, but significant underperformance in terms of gearing and 
profitability in the post-SMBO phase.  
                                                        
13
 Parts of this chapter were published in Zhou et al. (2014). 
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           However, recent research only focuses on operating performance, in terms of 
efficiency gains such as profitability, in the first three years after SMBO (Bonini, 2013; 
Wang, 2012; Achleitner and Figge, 2014) and the operating performance in long run during 
the period of early 2000s (Jelic and Wright, 2011). Growth however is a highly 
recommended measure in the strategic entrepreneurship literature. More specifically, 
traditional agency theory tends to highlight the reduction of costs caused by over-
investment and over-diversification, while ignoring the strategic entrepreneurship 
dimension. The strategic entrepreneurship perspective claims that, in the buyout context, 
managers and PE firms have a strong incentive to utilize their idiosyncratic knowledge, 
skills, experience, and capabilities to exploit growth opportunities and create wealth 
(Wright et al., 2000b; Meuleman et al., 2009, Zhou et al., 2013).  
           Furthermore, previous studies have found evidence that value creation mechanisms, 
including managerial ownership, high leverage (debt bonding), and governance intervention 
on the boards, drive the post-buyout performance (Rauch and Umber, 2012; Cornelli and 
Karakas, 2013; Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007; Guo et al., 2011). The prolongation of the 
longevity of the buyout structure caused by SMBOs may change the explanatory powers of 
these value creation mechanisms (Wright et al., 2009b). Nevertheless, evidence on both the 
growth performance of target companies and the determinants (value creation mechanisms) 
of the performance is scarce. This paper aims to fill this gap by further examining whether 
SMBOs just buy time or improve the performance of target companies. 
          Based on a hand-collected dataset of 491 UK SMBOs from 2000 to 2007 and their 
exit statuses and post-SMBO performance, we firstly examine whether the target 
companies’ operating performance achieved improvements after SMBO transactions. More 
specifically, we examine the target companies’ post-SMBO performance in regard to 
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profitability, productivity, and growth. We also compare the performance of PE-backed 
SMBOs with that of non-PE-backed SMBOs. Secondly, we analyze whether value creation 
mechanisms associated with the PE model and buyouts, such as high leverage and 
managerial ownership, still have the power to explain changes in performance after SMBOs.  
           The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents the data description and main methodology. Section 2.4 
discusses the results of univariate and regression analyses. In section 2.5, we check for the 
results’ robustness, followed by section 2.6 which is the conclusion.    
2.2 Hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Post-SMBO performance 
2.2.1.1 SMBOs buy time? 
          Before SMBOs, the governance mechanisms (managerial ownership, governance 
intervention, and high leverage) had already existed in the companies (Wright et al., 2009b). 
The effects of these mechanisms are likely to last for 2-3 years after buyout (Wiersema and 
Liebeskind, 1995). After this period, the effects on the performance seem to decline (Jelic 
and Wright, 2011). Moreover, PE firms normally exit when the marginal value added is less 
than the marginal costs (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). In other words, when exiting, 
their skill set is exhausted and no further value creation can be achieved. The going public 
and trade sale would be the first choices for exits, as they could enhance the reputation of 
the PE firms (Schwienbacher, 2002). When a going public and a trade sale are not available, 
a SMBO may be one of the few options left. In addition, management investments in the 
SMBOs are usually greater than primary buyouts (Achleitner and Figge, 2014). Although 
increased managerial equity shares may lead to a greater incentive, it may also induce 
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greater entrenchment behavior. Based on the above arguments, it is impossible for SMBOs 
to obtain performance improvement. They are, therefore, just used as means to buy more 
time before IPO or trade sale exits.   
           Hypothesis 1: SMBOs underperform in post-SMBO period.  
2.2.1.2 SMBOs improve performance? 
           In contrast, there are some arguments that support the idea of performance 
improvement by SMBOs. With regards to PE firms, in the primary buyout phase, the 
literature suggests that PE-backed companies can obtain greater performance improvement 
in buyouts, compared to non-PE-backed companies (Jain and Kini, 1995; Meuleman et al., 
2009). This is due to PE monitoring participation in the management of the target 
companies (Cressy et al., 2007). Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) also claim that PE firms’ 
strong industry background and operational experience can improve the target companies’ 
performance. However, PE funds have a limited life span. When the fund approaches the 
end of its lifetime, the primary PE firms will be forced to exit from the buyouts. We, 
therefore, hypothesize that at least some of the funds would reach their end before all 
potential improvements to the portfolio companies are achieved. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that some of the PE funds may exit their portfolio companies early in order to 
generate a track record of success to enhance their reputation (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014; 
Harford and Kolasinski, 2010; Strömberg, 2008; Achleitner et al., 2011). Furthermore, in 
the SMBO phase, the secondary PE firms may possess specific complementary knowledge 
and skills (Acharya et al., 2013; Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014), which may help them to find 
performance improvement potentials. For instance, some primary buyout target companies 
are small private companies, backed by relatively small PE firms (Kitzmann and Schiereck, 
2009). When the target companies are mature and expand, the small PE firms are unable to 
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manage them based on their limited experience and human resource. Therefore, it is more 
optimal to be sponsored by bigger PE firms with more personnel and experience (Wang, 
2012). With respect to management, they usually remain on the boards (of these companies) 
and purchase some equity in the SMBOs with good prospectus (Wright, 2000b). Target 
companies may, therefore, still benefit from the continuing involvement of PE firms and 
management.  
           Hypothesis 2: SMBOs outperform in post-SMBO period.  
2.2.2 The determinants of post-SMBO performance 
2.2.2.1 Managerial ownership 
           Buyout investors improve the incentive alignment between managers and 
shareholders by motivating managers to make a meaningful investment (Jensen, 1989; 
Kaplan, 1989a). The greater the share managers invest in, the stronger incentive they will 
have to improve the performance. A number of studies demonstrate that increased 
management equity shares can improve companies’ performance (e.g. Nikoskelainen and 
Wright, 2007; Phan and Hill, 1995; Thompson et al., 1992; Malone, 1989). 
           The motivation of managers reinvesting in SMBOs, however, is questionable. They 
have already participated in the ownership. And the managerial ownership and performance 
could have a non-monotonic relationship.
14
 High levels of managerial ownership can cause 
dilution of control by PE firms. Management may be able to take very risky investments, 
causing worse performance in SMBOs.  
            Achleitner et al. (2012b) find that in the absence of different skills among primary 
and secondary PE firms in a SMBO, the impact of incentive alignment is positively related 
                                                        
14
 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), for example, report a significant non-monotonic relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash holding.  
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to the managerial ownership. They argue that the management commits relatively little 
resources in the primary buyout. In the secondary round, after they fully understand the 
intention and reward of the management package, the increased managerial ownership 
makes the incentive alignment more effective. Furthermore, other managers (middle 
managers) will be attracted by the benefits and invest their own money in secondary rounds, 
result in more effective incentive alignment. Overall, reinvesting by existing shareholder-
managers signals, outside investors, their confidence in the company. The impact of 
managerial ownership in SMBOs will, therefore, continue to create operational value.  
Hence, 
           Hypothesis 3: Managerial ownership is positively related to post-SMBO 
performance.  
2.2.2.2 Leverage 
           Higher leverage also avoids the management to waste money due to the obligation to 
pay for principals and interests (e.g. Kaplan 1989b, Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009, Harford 
and Kolasinski, 2010). The lower the ratio of profits or cash flow to interest payments, the 
greater the leverage is (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007). 
          Hypothesis 4: Leverage is positively associated to post-SMBO performance.  
2.3 Data and methodology 
2.3.1 Data and sample descriptive statistics 
           We started our data collection from the Centre for Management Buyout Research 
(CMBOR) database.
 15
 The original deal list consists of 612 UK SMBOs with exits during 
2000-2007. We also hand-collected data on activities, deal values, PE backing, names of PE 
                                                        
15
 CMBOR database uniquely has a comprehensive coverage of all types of UK buyouts from the 1960s. 
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firms for PE-backed SMBO, and capital structure in the transaction year from CMBOR, 
Thomson One Banker, websites of PE firms, and the website www.growthbusiness.co.uk. 
Our sample ended in 2007 in order to track the long term operating performance. 
           We cross checked the SMBO deal list with the buyout deals in Thomson One Banker. 
There were 3216 UK buyouts in Thomson One Banker between 2000 and 2007, including 
buyouts such as IBO, MBO, MBI, and BIMBO. We checked both the names and announced 
dates of the buyouts. For those we were not sure of by names, we checked their previous 
buyout and exit dates for which we tracked back to before 2000 and tracked forwards to 
after 2007, respectively. This procedure matches 305 SMBOs in the original list with 
Thomson One Banker’s LBOs list, remaining either ambiguous (79) or cannot find matched 
LBOs (228). Thomson One Banker only has 167 SMBO deals in UK from 2000 to 2007. 
By using the similar matching method, only 135 deals in Thomson One Banker can be 
matched with the original CMBOR deal list.
16
               
           Thomson One Banker and Worldscope are two commonly used worldwide databases 
cited in the literature due to their reliability and comprehensive data collection for public 
companies. Specific to our case, however, the majority of target companies are missing in 
Thomson One Banker and Worldscope, as they are small- and medium- size private 
companies. Thus, we chose the FAME database to collect the financial information. 
Through using the FAME database, we were able to collect accounting data up to 10 years, 
corporate structures and the corporate family, shareholders, subsidiaries, and industry for 
516 sample SMBOs. In order to examine the impact of SMBO, for SMBOs exited before 
December 31
st
, 2010, we only collected the accounting data from three years before SMBO 
to the year exited from SMBO. For SMBOs that were not exited by that date, we collected 
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 The business and company-related news and M&A deals and rumors are from Zephyr database which is a 
comprehensive M&A database with integrated company details. 
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the accounting data from three years before SMBO to the fifth year after SMBO. We 
excluded SMBOs from the financial industry since their accounting reports differ from 
other industries. Our final sample consisted of 491 SMBOs. 
           Based on the 491 SMBOs, we collected the data of managerial ownership and 
leverage. Since there are no public sources providing the managerial ownership data of 
private companies, we manually collected the data from annual returns by proceeding in the 
following ways. First, although there are many individual investors in the ownership 
structure, there is no obvious information on the positions of some individuals in annual 
returns. Hence, we used Amadeus database to identify whether one individual investor 
belongs to the senior management team. Second, we calculated the managerial ownership 
of the senior management team. For those that were not employees in the companies, we 
checked their relationship with other managers. Indeed, family members of some managers 
also hold shares. We counted this part of shares as shares belonging to the relevant 
managers. In some cases, some managers also use their trustees to invest, so we added this 
to their percentage of equity shares.    
           Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of population and sample SMBOs from 2000 to 
2007, by entry (Panel A). This figure demonstrates the number of SMBOs has increased 
dramatically from 2000, which is consistent with the findings of other worldwide or 
European SMBO studies (e.g. Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014; Achleitner and Figge, 2014). 
Panel B demonstrates an increasing trend in the number of exit SMBOs, from 2002 to 2007. 
During 2007 to 2009, the number of exit SMBOs decreases dramatically, due to the 
worldwide financial crisis.   
Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
              Among 491 sample SMBOs, 323 deals are PE-backed, while 168 deals are not 
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(Table 2.1). The trade sale (82 deals) is the most popular exit route from SMBO. Tertiary 
management buyout (69 deals) is the second popular exit route, followed by receivership 
(41 deals). Finally, 287 SMBOs remained as SMBOs by December, 31
st
, 2010.  
Insert Table 2.1 about here 
           According to traditional 2-digit SIC code industry classification, our sample SMBOs 
are classified into 59 separate industries. However, these industries were too narrow to do 
our following analysis due to data limitations. Therefore, we adopted the industry 
classification scheme from Gompers et al. (2008) to reclassify our sample into 9 broad 
industries based on Venture Economics’ industry classification (VEIC). These industries are 
Internet and Computers, Communications and Electronics, Business and Industrial, 
Consumer, Energy, Biotech and Healthcare, Financial Service, Business Service, and all 
others. As a consequence, the 9 industry classes are more in line with the technology and 
management expertise in venture capital industry. For details, the Business Services 
includes companies associated with: services, transport, hotel, leisure, paper and packaging, 
wholesale, and distribution. The Business and Industrial includes companies associated 
with: manufacturing, construction, engineering, house building, vehicles and sheep building, 
steel, metals, and non-metals. For other industry classes, we linked 3-digit primary US SIC 
code of our sample companies and VEIC industry group, by using the concordance of 
VEIC code and US SIC code (Dushnitsky et al., 2009).
17
 This procedure identifies the 
VEIC industry group of US SIC code. Finally, we reclassified our sample into 8 industry 
classes (excluding Financial Service). When we did not access the SIC code, we assigned 
industries classes in the light of their transaction activities. The results of our sample 
industry distribution by exit status, exit routes, and PE backing are reported in Table 2.2.  
                                                        
17
 We are indebted to Gary Dushnitsky for providing us with the concordance that links VEIC and SIC 
schemes. 
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Insert Table 2.2 about here 
       Noticeably, Business Services (41% and 203) is the largest industry group in our 
sample. As to exit routes, in terms of percentage (Panel A), IPO exit tend to be more 
popular than other exit routes in Internet and Computers, Communication and Electronics, 
and Consumer. Tertiary management buyout and receivership exits tend to be more popular 
in Business Services. However, in terms of numbers of SMBOs (Panel B), Trade sales tends 
to be more popular in Business and Industrial and Consumer while Tertiary management 
buyout are the most popular exit route in Business Services.    
2.3.2 Variables and methodology 
2.3.2.1 Performance measures 
          This chapter uses three different dimensions of performance measures at company 
level, including profitability, productivity, and growth. Profitability is considered the direct 
reflection of buyout value creation. To measure profitability, we used return on assets (ROA) 
and return on sales (ROS) which are estimated as earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
scaled by total assets and revenue, respectively. One of the limitations of ROA is related to 
use of total assets. For example, due to historic cost accounting, changes in total assets may 
affect ROA while actual profitability may remain the same. The limitation of ROS is that it 
does not reflect the actual productivity of the assets, as it could be improved by the 
enhanced marketing strategy. Therefore, we employ both measures to test the profitability. 
          Although profitability is crucial, it cannot capture all behavioral aspects motivated 
from agency and strategic entrepreneurship activities. We, hence, employ productivity 
(SALEMP) and growth ratios. Productivity (SALEMP) captures output and input ratio of the 
company and is measured by inflation adjusted sales scaled by the number of employees. 
Following Meuleman et al. (2009), growth ratios are measured by sales growth (SALG) and 
74 
 
employment growth (EMPG). They are two most commonly used indicators in 
entrepreneurial growth literature (Delmar et al., 2003). Sales growth captures growth in 
additional revenue creation while employment growth captures the growth in labor 
resources. Unlike Meuleman et al. (2009), we use the average value of sales or the number 
of employees in year t and year t-1 as denominator
18
. Sales growth (SALG) is the difference 
between sales in year t and year t-1 scaled by their average value. Employment growth 
(EMPG) is the difference between the numbers of employees in year t and year t-1 scaled 
by their average value. 
2.3.2.2 Abnormal performance  
           There are two approaches commonly used to measure abnormal performance after a 
corporate event or decision (Ghosh, 2001; Powell and Stark, 2005). The first approach is 
combined with ‘level’ and ‘change’ models which we will discuss in detail later. The 
second approach is a regression-based model introduced by Healy et al. (1992), involving 
regressing the industry adjusted performance after event on the industry adjusted 
performance before event. The slope coefficient is the multiple of the post-event industry 
adjusted performance on pre-event industry adjusted performance. The intercept measures 
the abnormal performance arising from the event. If we constrain the slope coefficient to 
one, the regression-based model is the same as the ‘change’ model. In fact, there is no 
consensus on the preference of the two approaches. In this chapter, we prefer the first 
approach as the majority of the buyout literatures does. This is because the ‘level’ and 
‘change’ models approach allow us to observe abnormal performance year by year during 
the entire post-SMBO period. Second, the regression-based model fails to produce a 
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 Using average values as denominators to measure the growth rate is common in the literature of analysing 
dynamics or expansion of the companies, as it is similar to the log differences in terms of some properties 
while also accommodates entry and exit (Davis et al., 1996).  
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reliable measure of abnormal performance for each target company that we will use to 
analyze the determinants of post-SMBO abnormal performance.  
           Following Barber and Lyon (1996), we use both ‘level’ and the ‘change’ models to 
estimate the expected performance. The ‘level’ model uses unadjusted changes as expected 
performance. The ‘change’ model uses the industry adjusted median as the benchmark. The 
industry benchmark is widely used in the literature which controls for the omitted variables 
bias in the ‘level’ model that only uses the company’s prior performance as a benchmark. 
The omitted variables bias could stem from business life cycles, industry technical 
development, and the financial crisis. These factors could enable significant trend changes 
after the event year. The expected performance models are as follows:  
                                                          E(Pit)= Pi,t-k;                                              (Equation 1)  
                                                     E(Pit) = Pi,t-k+ ∆PIit  ;                                     (Equation 2) 
           Where Pit denotes the performance of company i in period t. E(Pit) is the expectation 
of performance of company i in period t. Pit-k is k-year median pre-event performance of 
company i.  PIit is defined as the performance of industry control group for company i in 
period t.  ∆PI𝑖𝑡 is the difference between industry control group’s pre-event performance 
and post-event performance in period t. Equation 1 is ‘level’ model, while equation 2 is 
‘change’ model.  
           Earnings may be overstated in the year before the event is announced (Jain and Kini, 
1994). Hence, many studies adopt the median performance of several years before event. In 
this study, we will employ the median value of three years prior to the event (-1 to -3) to be 
the pre-event performance. Then, we compare the performance in each post-event year with 
the pre-event performance, up to five years. Hence, the abnormal performance could be 
calculated as the difference between actual performance and expected performance. The 
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formula is as follows:  
                                                        APit=Pit- E (Pit)                                             (Equation 3) 
           Where, Pit is the actual performance of company i in year t; APit is the abnormal 
performance for various performance ratios: ROA, ROS, SALEMP, EMPG, and SALG. We 
will exclude the event year 0. Because this year includes both pre-and post- event 
operations, it is difficult to define this year as pre-event year or post-event year. In our 
univariate analysis, we test whether the abnormal performance is significantly changed 
from the first to the fifth post-event year. All estimates in our analysis are based on 99% 
winsorized data, in order to eliminate the influence from outliers. In addition, we employ a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test whether the median value of abnormal performance in 
each post-event year equals to zero or not.
19
  
2.3.2.3 Regression model 
           We adopt a panel regression via a GLS random-effects procedure with robust 
standard error and omitted collinear covariates to examine our hypotheses. We employ the 
panel regression instead of OLS because the panel regression uses the data from the entire 
post-event (i.e. SMBO) period while OLS either takes average values across the period or 
relies on data from only one post-event year. More specifically, our univariate analysis 
shows a decline in post-SMBOS period. Unlike the OLS regression, the panel regression 
takes into account this trend by including data from the entire post-event period. In addition, 
the panel regression considers the impact of estimation error caused by the correlation of 
the residuals across companies (Fama and French, 2001).  
                                                        
19
 We decide the accounting year closed on and after deal announced date as year 0. For those deals that are 
announced on the dates after the accounting year closed dates, we treat the following accounting year as year 
0. For example, the accounting year of the target company for 2000 is from October, 1999 to September, 2000. 
If a SMBO is announced in January, 2000, we will define the accounting year 2000 as year 0. If the SMBO is 
announced in October, 2000, we will define the accounting year 2001 as year 0. 
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           Thus, we regress the abnormal performance (AROA, AROS, ASALEMP, AEMPG, 
and ASALG) with variables of managerial equity ownership (MGTSHARE) and leverage 
(DEBTCOV). Control variables are PE firms’ involvement (PE), the nature logarithm of 
SMBO’s deal value (LNSIZE), the financial crisis effect (Crisis), performance in the form 
of ROA in the year before SMBO transaction (ROAt-1), and the duration in SMBOs 
(LNDURATION). Entry year dummies and industry dummies are included to control for 
time factor and industry factor. The regression model is as follows:
20
   
 APit=α+β1MGTSHAREit+β2DEBTCOVit+β3PEi+β4LNSIZEi+β5Crisisit+β6ROAt-1i  
                       +β
7
𝐿𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖+ε
it
                                                        (Equation 4) 
2.3.2.4 Variables 
            1) Managerial equity ownership. In order to enhance incentive alignment between 
managers and shareholders, buyout investors require the managers to invest their own 
money in the equity shares (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989a). The greater the share the 
management invests in, the stronger incentive they will have to improve performance. 
Following Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007), we use the management’s share in proportion 
to the total equity in year t (MGTSHARE) as the variable for management equity ownership.  
           2) Leverage. We adopt debt coverage (DEBTCOV) to measure the debt’s controlling 
effect. The more time needed to pay off the debt, the greater the incentive management will 
have to improve performance. It is estimated as the amount of long term and shot term debt 
of the target company in year t scaled by the operating income before interests, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in year t.   
          3) Control Variables. We include several control variables related to the company’s 
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 Both the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and the Hausman test suggest random-effects GLS 
regression is superior to pooled regression and fixed-effects regression. 
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performance in our regression analysis. The nature logarithm of SMBO’s deal value 
(LNSIZE) is taken into control for the scale effect. Larger companies may be more 
profitable than smaller ones, while smaller ones may have more opportunities to grow. It is 
measured by the logarithm of deal value. Our period for performance includes the recent 
financial crisis. To take this into account, we include a dummy variable (Crisis) that equals 
1 if the year experiences on financial crisis, and 0 otherwise. We define the calendar years 
of 2008, 2009, and 2010 as financial crisis years. The pre-SMBO underperforming 
companies may have greater improvement in performance after SMBO. Hence, we control 
for the previous profitability performance, which is measured by the performance in one 
year before SMBO (ROAt-1). PE backing (PE) is also included to control for the effect of 
PE firms. Duration (LNDURATION) measures the holding period in SMBO, which is the 
logarithm of the number of months from the SMBO date to the exit date if the SMBO exits 
or the number of months from the SMBO date to the last date if the SMBO does not exit. It 
controls for the influence of the longevity of buyout. The longer the holding period, the less 
the performance can be improved.    
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Univariate analysis 
           Sample descriptive statistics and correlation are presented in Table 2.3.
21
 In Panel A, 
PE-backed SMBOs are approximately three times as large as their non-PE-backed 
counterparts. Moreover, average debt coverage is 5.025 (median=1.434), confirming that 
SMBOs have high leverage
22
. Although the difference in debt coverage between PE-backed 
and non-PE-backed SMBOs is insignificant, PE-backed SMBOs seem to have more debt 
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 Definitions of variables are presented in Appendix 2. 1 
22
 The large difference between mean and median is caused by the skew distribution of debt coverage. Some 
companies have debt coverage over 100. 
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capacity than others. Gearing (GEAR) of PE-backed SMBOs is significant greater than that 
of non-PE-backed SMBOs, suggesting that PE-backed SMBOs have a greater fraction of 
debt on total equity. In addition, management shares of the total equity is 59.8% on average 
(median=59.9%). 100% of equity non-PE-backed SMBOs are financed by management; 
while the management of PE-backed SMBOs only invest in 37% equity. The average 
duration for primary buyout is 59.866 months (almost 5 years), consistent with earlier 
studies in buyout (Strömberg, 2008). However, the average duration of SMBO is 40.574 
(more than 3 years), shorter than that of primary buyout.  
           Panel B presents the correlation test for all variables used in regressions. The 
correlation coefficient between managerial ownership (MGTSHARE) and PE backing (PE) 
is significantly high (coefficient: -0.68). Considered with the potential multicollinearity 
issue, we conducted the regressions without control variables (See Appendix 2.3). The 
results are similar as our main results.
23
  
Insert Table 2.3 about here 
           Table 2.4 reports the results of various performance measures. Panel A and Panel B 
show the statistics of pre- and post-SMBO performance measures, individually. Panel C 
presents the differences in the mean and median values of various performance measures 
between pre-and post-SMBOs with respective p-values. According to the results, we can 
see that ROA, EMPG, and SALG significantly decrease from pre- to post-SMBO in both 
mean and median values, while ROS only has significant decrease in mean value. By 
contrast, SALEMP increases significantly in median values after SMBOs. Furthermore, PE-
backed SMBOs tend to have better performance in terms of profitability and growth, but 
worse performance in terms of productivity, related to non-PE-backed deals.  
                                                        
23
 In fact, the coefficient of managerial ownership is marginally significant in the model of AROA (we obtain 
the similar results by using fixed effect models, see Appendix 2.2). 
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Insert Table 2.4 about here 
           Table 2.5 presents the median values of unadjusted abnormal performance ratios 
(‘level’ model based on equations 1 and 3) and industry adjusted abnormal performance 
ratios (‘change’ model based on equations 2 and 3) up to five years after the SMBO 
transactions. To estimate the industry adjusted abnormal performance ratios, we collected 
performance data for all UK active and inactive private companies (40,267 companies) 
from the FAME database and estimated the relevant median ratios based on the industry 
classification strategy described above.  
Insert Table 2.5 about here 
          Our unadjusted abnormal performance of profitability ratio AROA is significantly 
negative in each post-SMBO year, from -0.008 in the first year to -0.047 in the fifth year, 
consistent with previous UK SMBO studies (Jelic and Wright, 2011; Wang, 2012). When 
scaled by sales, profitability (AROS) shows statistically insignificant increases (0.008) in 
the first year after SMBO, followed by a statistically significant decrease (in years four and 
five). The industry adjusted abnormal performance also show similar statically significant 
negative results, with greater magnitude. SMBO target companies may underperform their 
industry peers. Other than these, all ratios show a decreasing trend during the five years 
after SMBO. One explanation is that companies may obtain expansion which causes an 
increase in non-productive assets, resulting in sales scaled ratios being unchanged while 
assets scaled ratios decrease.   
           Consistent with Jelic and Wright (2011), our results show a significant increase in 
productivity (measured by ASALEMP) up to four years after SMBO. However, the positive 
change tends to decrease till a significantly negative change in the fifth year after SMBO. 
Moreover, when we control for industry influence, the positive changes disappear, 
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suggesting that the positive abnormal performance in productivity may be caused by 
industry improvement.  
          As the profitability ratios, significant decreases are observed in the unadjusted growth 
ratios (measured by AEMPG and ASALG). Interestingly, after being industry adjusted, sales 
growth increases in post-SMBO years one and four, although the values are insignificant. In 
sum, these results offer evidence that performances reduce after SMBO, except from 
unadjusted productivity.   
2.4.2 Regression results  
           Table 2.6 presents the results of the panel regression.
24
 
25
 Panel A uses unadjusted 
abnormal performance measures as the dependent variables, while Panel B uses industry 
adjusted abnormal performance measures as the dependent variables. In Panel A, R2 differs 
from 5.00% of the model for ASALG to 24.75% of the model for AROA.  Wald Chi 2 is 
significant for models with AROA, ASALEMP, AEMPG, and ASALG, suggesting our 
models are fitted for the data. It should be noticed that the Ns of our regressions are reduced 
dramatically, due to our unbalanced panel dataset and the data limitations of independent 
variables, especially managerial equity ownership (MGTSHARE) and leverage (DEBCOV). 
Furthermore, FAME database does not provide accounting information for all companies 
before 2003. We manually collected accounting data for industry benchmarks for SMBOs 
from 2000 to 2003. However, we still cannot collect data for certain industries (e.g. Biotech 
and Healthcare) and performance measures, due to the data limitation. In particular, there 
are only few companies with accessible accounting data in FAME database before 2001. As 
a consequence, the Ns of industry adjusted regression are smaller than the Ns of unadjusted 
                                                        
24
 We also carried out fixed effect models (Appendix 2.2).  The results are similar but stronger than the results 
we used GLS random-effects models.  
25
 We tried the regression without control variables. The results are economically and statistically similar to 
our main results (see Appendix 2.3).  
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regression.  
Insert Table 2.6 about here 
          We predict that managerial equity ownership (MGTSHARE) has significant and 
positive relationship with post-SMBO performance (H3). The coefficient of managerial 
ownership is predominantly positive but not statistically significant in all models, except 
the negative and insignificant coefficient in the model of AROS. Hence, our results show 
little evidence that SMBOs with higher managerial ownership perform better, and are 
thereby inconsistent with the idea that the greater share the management invests, the 
stronger incentive they will have to improve the performance. Our results are also 
inconsistent with our prediction that SMBOs with higher leverage (DEBCOV) have better 
post-SMBO performance (H4). For instance, the coefficient of leverage is significant and 
negative in the models of AROA measured abnormal performance of profitability 
(coefficient: -0.000, z-stat: -5.145) and ASALEMP which measures abnormal performance 
of productivity (coefficient: -0.001, z-stat: -3.578). However, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is very small which almost could be zero. Taking the model of ASALEMP as an 
example, a one unit increase in leverage only create 0.1 percentage decrease in post-SMBO 
abnormal performance in productivity. These results imply that the disciplining effect of 
high leverage disappears in the secondary round, inconsistent with the results of Smit and 
Volosovysvh (2013) that leverage change is positively related to post-SMBO performance. 
On the one hand, high debt does not motivate a target company’s management to improve 
performance as primary buyouts. On the other hand, the debt burden beyond the companies’ 
capacity and high levels of debt will increase the failure risk of the target company. In Panel 
B, we find that when we use industry adjusted abnormal performance measures, the values 
of R-square increase for all models except from the model of AROA. Furthermore, the 
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results are similar to the results in Panel A, while the absolute values of z-statistics of 
leverage in models for AROA and ASALEMP are greater than their counterparts (z-stat: -
5.638 and -3.726, respectively), implying that, after controlling for the industry changes in 
performance, leverage has stronger influence on post-SMBO performance.  
          With regard to control variables, we find that the coefficient on pre-SMBO 
performance (ROAt-1) is significant and negative in models for both AROA and AROS 
measured profitability in both panels, suggesting that companies with better pre-event 
performance have less ability to improve these performances after SMBO. The potentials of 
performance-especially profitability improvement of better deals (companies with better 
previous performance), may be exhausted by primary investors to a large extent. Hence, the 
achievements of the second stage could not exceed those of the primary stage. This 
provides some evidence in support of H1. Our results show size (LNSIZE) is significantly 
and positively associated with the models for AROS. We also find evidence that financial 
crisis (Crisis) does harm to post-SMBO performance. For instance, the financial crisis is 
significantly and negatively related to post-SMBO abnormal performance in employment 
(AEMPG) and sales growth (ASALG) (both unadjusted and industry adjusted) and industry 
adjusted productivity (ASALEMP). PE backing (PE) SMBOs do not seem to be associated 
with changes in performance, with the exception of productivity models. The results show 
that PE backing has a positive relationship with post-SMBO abnormal performance in 
productivity (unadjusted: coefficient: 0.110, z-stat: 2.587; industry adjusted: coefficient: 
0.106, z-stat: 2.597), indicating that PE-backed SMBOs perform better that non-PE-backed 
SMBOs in productivity.  
2.5 Robustness and further analysis 
            In this section we conduct some robustness tests and further analysis. First, we 
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present the results for the alternative measures of profitability. Next, we use alternative 
benchmarks to examine the post-SMBO abnormal performance. This is followed by 
examination of the post-SMBO abnormal performance of subsamples in terms of different 
exit routes. We then discuss the post-SMBO abnormal performance of subsample with 
primarily holding period data. Furthermore, we investigate the post-SMBO abnormal 
performance by PE backing. In addition, we examine the alternative measure of leverage.  
Finally, we consider the potential sample selection bias. 
2.5.1 Alternative measure of post-SMBO performance  
           In our univariate analysis, we employ EBIT to estimate profitability. However, this 
measure could be obscured by depreciation and amortization, which could be used to 
manage earnings. Thus, in order to test robustness, we adopted alternative profitability 
measures by calculating it as the operating income before depreciation and amortization 
scaled by total assets (EBITDAA) or sales (EBITDAS). The results are presented in Table 
2.7.  
Insert Table 2.7 about here 
           The results suggest significantly negative changes in both unadjusted and industry 
adjusted profitability scaled by total assets (AEBITDAA) from the first to the fifth post-
SMBO year. When scaled by sales, the changes in the first two years lose significance. Our 
results show a reducing trend from the first to the fifth post-SMBO year. These results are 
consistent with our findings with EBIT, except that EBITDA yields worse profitability than 
EBIT. We expect an increase in depreciation and amortization caused by increases in non-
productive assets. This supports our explanation about the worse performance of ROA than 
that of ROS.  
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2.5.2 Alternative benchmarks of post-SMBO performance 
            Barber and Lyon (1996) find that failure to consider the size and pre-event 
performance of the company will create bias when examining post-event abnormal 
performance. Second, buyouts can create significant performance changes in the target 
companies, due to their special ownership structure and governance mechanisms. The 
abnormal performance of SMBOs based on the ‘level’ and ‘change’ models could be 
attributed to the underperformance of the whole buyout industry. Third, the performance 
improvement sources for public-to-private deals are unlikely suitable to private-to-private 
deals (Chung, 2011).  
           Therefore, in order to further investigate performance after SMBOs, we also used the 
private-to-private MBOs without SMBO experience (primary MBOs) as benchmark.
26
 We 
matched our sample with primary MBOs based on 8 industries, size (measured by the 
logarithm of median total asset three years before buyouts), and pre-event performance 
(measured by median ROA three years before buyouts). Since this matching approach 
concerns on multiple dimensions, we adopted Propensity Score Matching method (PSM) 
similar to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Traditional matching methods will decrease the 
specification and power of statistic results when encountering multiple matching 
dimensions. PSM transfers all matching dimensions into a proxy named propensity score, 
with reducing the biases generated by traditional matching methods.
27
  For PSM, we used 
Probit estimation and one by one nearest matching without replacement.
28
 After obtaining 
358 matched pairs, we still matched the calendar year in which the transaction was 
completed. This procedure results in 152 SMBOs matched with 152 primary MBOs. This 
                                                        
26SMBO could be viewed as a type of private-to-private management buyouts. 
27 Li and Zhao (2005) and Cheng (2003) test both traditional multiple-dimensional matching method and PSM and find 
that there are abnormal performances under PSM while not under traditional method. Rin et al. (2011) also state that PSM 
takes advantage of matching on observations. 
28
 Unreported results find that one-by-one nearest matching with replacement shows similar results. 
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matching process results in primary MBOs matched with multiple SMBOs. For those 9 
primary MBOs that were matched with multiple SMBOs, we calculated the average values 
of these SMBOs as counterparts. The abnormal performance was calculated as the 
difference in performance between SMBO and primary MBO in year t after transaction 
minus the difference of performance between SMBO and primary MBO before transaction 
year. 
           The results are presented in Table 2.8. Panel A presents the comparison between full 
samples of SMBOs (491 deals) and primary buyouts (348 deals). This Panel demonstrates 
significant underperformance of SMBOs in terms of profitability, productivity, and growth, 
in spite of significantly outperformance of SMBOs in the first year after transaction in 
terms of productivity. The results of comparison between matched samples are reported in 
Panel B. These results show even worse performance in SMBOs, compared to primary 
MBOs. This could be because of the outperformance of primary MBOs after transactions. 
Our findings support the evidence obtained above that performance deteriorates after 
SMBOs. Especially, compared to matched primary MBOs, the outperformance in 
productivity disappears.   
Insert Table 2.8 about here 
2.5.3 Post-SMBO performance by exit routes 
           If SMBOs do not improve, the SMBOs are unlikely to exit via IPO. In Table 2.2, we 
see there are still SMBOs exited through IPO and trade sales. TMBO is still the second 
most popular exit route. This may imply the existence of selection bias in our analysis. 
Specialists and managers may sell their shares in more successful companies in IPO or sell 
these companies to other companies. If this selection bias is present, our sample still 
includes successful SMBOs. Especially, the IPO and trade sales deals will perform 
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differently from others.  
          We divided our sample into subsamples by exit routes and compared their post-
SMBO performance. The first group consists of exit and non-exit SMBOs. The comparison 
results are reported in Panel A in Table 2.9. There is no significant results to support the 
suggestion that exited SMBOs outperform non-exited SMBOs. We compared the post-
SMBO abnormal performance of SMBOs exited via IPO, trade sales, and receivership with 
the post-SMBOs abnormal performance of SMBOs exited via TMBO. The results are 
shown in Panel B. IPO deals perform significantly better than TMBO deals in growth. 
Despite not being significant, there is some evidence that IPO deals also have better 
performance in profitability. Trade sales deals significantly outperform TMBO deals in 
productivity. Also there is some evidence that trade sales deals outperform TMBO deals in 
employment growth, without significance. Receivership deals underperform TMBO deals 
in all performance in the first post-SMBO year. The results are significant in ROS and sales 
growth. Surprisingly, after the first year, TMBO deals seem to underperform receiverships.   
Insert Table 2.9 bout here 
2.5.4 ‘Early’ vs. ‘Late’ exits 
           As discussed in Section 2.2, on the one hand, primary PE funds may be forced to exit 
within the typical holding period due to several reasons such as the limited life of PE funds 
and chasing a better reputation. Even PE funds may exit early to create a track record for 
their reputation. When PE funds exit early, especially in the first 2-3 buyout years, the 
performance improvement potential would likely not be exhausted by value creation 
mechanisms. There still is the probability of positive performance improvement, no matter 
what the ownership structure is. One the other hand, SMBOs could be adopted as a ‘last 
resort’ when the holding period exceeds the typical holding period. In such circumstance, 
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PE funds exist in current portfolio too long to create value and to find a good exit route. If 
these are true, SMBOs with the two purposes may present different abnormal performance 
after SMBO. Hence, it is necessary to investigate the post-SMBO performance in terms of 
the holding period in primaries.   
           We collect the data of primary holding period and divide the sample SMBOs into the 
‘early’ and ‘late’ exits subsamples. The ‘early’ exit subsample is defined as those cases 
where the primaries’ holding period is shorter than 2 years. The ‘late’ exit subsample is 
defined as those where the primaries’ holding period is equal to or longer than the typical 
holding period, 4 years. The abnormal performances of the two subsamples in SMBO phase 
are presented in Table 2.10. Although our results suggest a lack of improvement in the 
performance in the ‘early’ exit subsample, they do not show the significant evidence of 
decrease. Indeed, we only observe significant and positive abnormal performance in 
unadjusted productivity in the first and fourth years after transaction, and significant and 
negative abnormal performance in the fifth year. The results for other performance 
measures, no matter unadjusted or industry adjusted, are not statistically significant. In the 
‘late’ exit subsample, we find mixed evidence in terms of profitability. Whilst AROA shows 
deterioration over five years after SMBOs, AROS shows improvement in the first post-
SMBO year. Also, similar to results obtained in the univariate analysis, productivity obtains 
improvement in the first three years after transactions, while when using industry adjusted 
benchmark, the results are consistent with AROA. Besides, in terms of growth ratios, 
SMBOs only underperform in employment growth in the third year and in sales growth in 
the fifth year. Comparing the two subsamples, we can easily see that ‘early’ exit subsample 
perform better than ‘late’ exit subsample to some extent, lending some evidence to support 
the conjecture that SMBOs with short primary holding period seem to have more potential 
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for performance improvement than others.
29
   
Insert Table 2.10 about here 
2.5.5 Does PE backing matter? 
           The literature suggests that PE-backed companies can obtain greater performance 
improvement in buyouts than non-PE-backed companies. This is because firstly PE firms 
monitor the management to eliminate the agency costs and participate in the management 
of the companies in which they invest and take a position on the board of directors (e.g. 
Cressy et al., 2007). Secondly, the professionals in PE firms have a strong industry 
background and operational experience (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), which can drive 
value creation (Meuleman et al., 2009). For instance, Jain and Kini (1995) claim that 
venture capitalists could use their expertise and monitoring to add value for entrepreneurial 
firms. Siegel et al. (2011) also argue that the effects of PE funds on the post-investment 
performance of their portfolio companies are closely related to the prior experience and 
specialist sector expertise of their fund managers. In regressions, we included PE backing 
as one explanatory variable and find that PE-backed SMBOs perform better than others in 
terms of productivity. Next, we carried out a comparison of post-SMBO abnormal 
performance of PE-backed and non-PE-backed subsamples. The results are presented in 
Table 2.11.    
           PE-backed SMBOs generally have better performance in terms of profitability 
(AROS) and productivity (ASALEMP) than non-PE-backed SMBOs up to three to four 
years. However, the differences are statistically significant only in respect of productivity, 
                                                        
29
 We also tested the abnormal performance of SMBOs that have primary holding period larger than and equal 
to 2 years but shorter than 4 years (Please see Appendix 2.4). Similar to ‘late’ exit subsample in Table 4.10, 
the results also show significant and negative abnormal performance in AROA, AROS, AEMPG, and ASALG. 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the industry adjusted AROA and ASALEMP of ‘late’ exit subsample 
tend to be worse than those of ‘middle’ exit subsample. Moreover, as ‘late’ exit subsample, ‘middle’ exit 
subsample tends to underperform ‘early’ exit subsample.    
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consistent with our regression results. Furthermore, in contrast with Jelic and Wright (2011), 
our results in profitability (AROA) demonstrate that PE-backed SMBOs significantly 
underperform their counterparts in year three and five. The results of growth performance 
fluctuate over the five years after the SMBO transactions. Generally, PE-backed SMBOs 
outperform in growth in the first post-SMBO year and underperform in the following two 
or four years before reversing. Overall, the results provide mixed evidence of the impact of 
PE backing on post-SMBO performance.  
Insert Table 2.11 about here 
2.5.6 Alternative measure of leverage 
           In the previous section, we identified a negative relationship between leverage and 
post-SMBO performance. To estimate its robustness, we used another well-known ratio, 
gearing, as an alternative measure of leverage instead and reran the regressions with 
unadjusted performance ratios. We estimated gearing (GEAR) as the sum of long term and 
shot term debt divided by the total equity. In fact, due to the special ownership structure of 
management buyouts, gearing also could be used as a proxy for managerial equity holding. 
The more debt is required for financing, the fewer shares managers will purchase 
(Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007). Gearing shows how much fund is borrowed as the 
percentage of equity. As a consequence, managers will have less incentive to improve 
performance. Combined with its implications in terms of both debt discipline and the 
impact of management alignment, we expect a negative relationship between gearing and 
post-SMBO abnormal performance. The results are presented in Table 2.12.
30
    
Insert Table 2.12 about here 
           The coefficient of gearing is significant and negative in the models for AROA 
                                                        
30
 GEAR has more firm-year observations than DEBCOV (Please see Table 2.3), which results in higher Ns 
compared to Panel A of Table 2.6.   
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(coefficient: -0.017, z-stat: -2.321) and AROS (coefficient: -0.012, z-stat: -3.528), consistent 
with the results by using debt coverage. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient of 
gearing is greater than those of debt coverage. For instance, a one unit point increase in 
gearing will lead to a 1.7 percent decrease in post-SMBO performance in AROA, compared 
to a decrease of almost zero by using debt coverage. The greater impact of leverage could 
be explained by the dual implications of gearing.   
2.5.7 Potential sample selection bias 
           Our sample descriptive statistics shows that PE-backed SMBOs tend to differ from 
non-PE-backed SMBOs in terms of industry distribution, size, and pre-event performance. 
These differences suggest that PE firms may not choose a random company to invest in. 
They may do due diligence to choose good companies which may have more probability of 
success after SMBOs. Hence, it is important to control for the PE firms’ sample selection 
bias when studying the impact of governance mechanisms on post-SMBOs performance. To 
address the sample selection bias, we followed Jelic and Wright (2011) and adopted 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we use a Probit 
regression to estimate the probability of receiving PE backing (Lambda). The dependent 
variable is a PE dummy (PE) which equals 1 if PE-backed and 0 otherwise. The estimated 
variable (Lambda) will be added as an independent variable to correct the sample selection 
bias in the second stage for explaining the post-SMBOs performance. The second stage 
employs the same panel regression as equation 4.  
           We hypothesize that the choice of PE backing would be associated with size, pre-
event performance, and industry. For instance, Brau et al. (2003) argues that small 
companies may not be successfully listed. Strömberg (2008) finds a significant association 
between size and exit routes. Bienz (2004) highlights that highly profitable companies are 
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easier to take public. Sudarsanam (2005) finds operating performance is one of the 
determinants of the exit routs. PE firms tend to invest in companies with good performance 
that means promising prospects. Baya and Chemmanur (2006) argue that industry 
characteristic could influence on the exit strategy choice. For example, highly fragmented 
industries like services are more likely to be sold to strategic acquirers (e.g. large 
companies in the same industry), while they are less likely to be sold to a financial acquirer 
(e.g. private equity firms). The Probit model is as follows:
31
 
                        PEi=α+β1BSERVICESi+β2LNSIZEi+β3ROAt-1i+εi                    (Equation 5) 
           Where, PE equals 1 if the SMBO is PE-backed and 0 otherwise; BSERVICES equals 
1 if the SMBO’s target company is from Business Service industry and 0 otherwise. 
LNSIZE indicates the nature logarithm of SMBO’s deal value. ROAt-1 is return on assets in 
one year before SMBOs. 
            In the second stage model, the regression model is as follows:  
 APit=α+β1MGTSHARit+β2DEBTCOVit+β3PEi+β4LNSIZEi+β5Crisisit+β6ROAt-1i 
                  +β
7
LNDURATIONi+β8Lambdait+εit
                                                   (Equation 6) 
Where, the variables are the same as equation 4. Lambda is the fitted probability of 
receiving PE backing which is estimated from the first stage. The results of our first stage 
regression analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 2.13. Size is positively and significantly 
associated with PE backing (coefficient: 1.298), suggesting that PE firms tend to choose 
larger target companies in which to invest. Similarly, pre-SMBO profitability performance 
(measured by ROAt-1) has a positive and significant relationship with PE backing 
(coefficient: 0.626), consistent with the results in Table 2.4 that suggest that PE-backed 
SMBOs perform better in profitability before SMBO transactions. This result indicates that 
                                                        
31
 A Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test justifies our preference for Probit over Logit model.   
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SMBOs that have better previous performance are more likely to receive PE backing. The 
industry dummy (BSERVICES) is negatively and significantly associated with PE backing 
(coefficient: -0.234). Panel B shows the results are qualitatively similar as those in Table 
2.6. Lambda is only significant for AROA models (unadjusted: coefficient: -0.074, z-stat: -
1.850; industry adjusted: coefficient: -0.130, z-stat: -2.233) but not statistically significant 
for others, suggesting that sample selection bias might be a problem for the former. Thus, 
we conclude that although sample selection bias exists in our data, it does not affect our 
results of the main explanatory variables.  
Insert Table 2.13 about here 
2.6 Conclusion 
          Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of 491 UK SMBO deals from 2000 to 2007, 
their exit statuses, and post-SMBO performance of target companies, we first investigated 
whether SMBOs improve the performance of target companies or not. Second, we 
examined the impact of traditional buyout governance mechanisms of managerial 
ownership and leverage on post-SMBO performance.  
           Our analysis suggests that the most popular exit routs for our sample SMBOs are: 
trade sales (82 deals), tertiary management buyout (69 deals), and receivership (41 deals). 
IPO (12 deals) is the least popular exit route. Large SMBOs and SMBOs with better pre-
event performance have more probability to be the targets of PE firms. The industry 
distribution of PE-baked SMBOs is also significantly different from that of non-PE-backed 
SMBOs. 
           Our univariate analysis of the changes in performance after SMBO finds strong 
evidence of a reduction in profitability and growth after SMBO transaction, supporting the 
buying time hypothesis. As for productivity, the unadjusted abnormal performance shows 
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significant improvement after SMBOs. But when controlling for the industry benchmark, 
the results demonstrate decreases, suggesting SMBOs target companies underperform their 
industry peers in productivity. We also find a decreasing trend in terms of profitability, 
productivity, and growth from the first to the fifth post-SMBO year. For the robustness test, 
we use alternative measures for profitability, the results are consistent with our main results. 
We also compare the post-buyout abnormal performance of our sample with matched 
primary private-to-private MBOs. We find target companies of SMBOs perform worse than 
those of primary MBOs in profitability, productivity, and growth, providing more evidence 
to support the buying time hypothesis. 
           We carried out some further univariate analysis. First, we compared the post-SMBO 
abnormal performance by exit routes. The results provided some evidence that SMBOs 
exited via IPO and trade sales have better post-SMBO performance than SMBOs exited via 
tertiary management buyouts. This indicates that better companies still choose to exit 
through IPO and trade sales. Surprisingly, we find SMBOs exited via tertiary management 
buyouts seem to perform worse than those exited via receivership after the first post-SMBO 
year. Second, we investigated the comparison of post-SMBOs performance between PE-
backed SMBOs and non-PE-backed SMBOs. Our study shows mixed results of the impact 
of PE backing on post-SMBO performance. For instance, PE-backed SMBOs show 
significant underperformance in profitability (measured by ROA) from the third post-
SMBO year, compared with their counterparts. In contrast, PE-backed SMBOs perform 
better in productivity in the first three post-SMBO years, followed by subsequent 
underperformance. Generally, PE-backed SMBOs outperform in growth in the first post-
SMBO year and underperform in the following two or three years till reversing. Third, we 
investigated whether the length of the holding period in primary buyout has an impact on 
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post-SMBO performance. We find that SMBOs exited early in the primary buyouts seem to 
perform better than those exited late in the primary buyouts. For instance, the results are 
insignificant in profitability and growth for the former, other than the significant positive 
abnormal performance in unadjusted productivity in the first and fourth years. Nevertheless, 
the results for the later show significant reductions in profitability (measured by ROS), 
industry adjusted productivity, and growth ratios.  
           Our multiple regression analysis shows that debt coverage is significantly and 
negatively related to the post-SMBO performance in profitability (measured by AROA), 
productivity (measured by ASLAEMP), suggesting that a high debt burden has a detrimental 
effect on the target companies’ performance. We do not find any evidence on the impact of 
managerial ownership on post-SMBO performance. Moreover, the findings show that PE-
backed SMBOs have better performance in productivity than non-PE-backed SMBOs. The 
above results robust to different abnormal performance measures (using industry adjusted 
abnormal performance as dependent variables) and different leverage measure (using 
gearing to proxy for leverage). In addition, sample selection biases do not influence our 
results. 
           Overall, our analysis here testifies to the contrasting performance experience of 
primary and secondary buyouts. The benefits of resolving the agency problem with high 
debt and incentive alignment of managerial ownership seem to be exhausted in primary 
buyouts. Rather, the lack of effect of managerial ownership on post-SMBO performance 
implies the possibility of entrenchment behavior where the management from the primary 
buyout continues into the SMBO with a larger equity stake and less control by PE firms. 
The high debt burden seems to exceed the target companies’ debt capacity and causes 
performance decay in the secondary round.  
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of SMBOs by year 
This figure shows the distributions of the population and sample of SMBOs by entry and exit years, from 
2000 to 2010. Panel A shows the distribution of SMBOs by entry years while Panel B shows the distribution 
of SMBOs by exit years. The population is from CMBOR database. The sample is the dataset after employing 
data selection criteria.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
S
M
B
O
 d
ea
ls
 n
u
m
b
er
 
Entry year 
Panel A: SMBOs by entry years 
Population
Sample
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
S
M
B
O
 d
ea
ls
 n
u
m
b
er
 
Exit year 
Panel B: SMBOs by exit years 
Population
Sample
97 
 
Table 2.1: Sample SMBOs 
This table presents sample SMBOs in terms of PE backing, exit statuses, and exit routes from 2000 to 2010. 
The population is the number of UK SMBOs prior to applying any data selection criteria. The sample is the 
number after employing data selection criteria. Exit routes include initial public offering (IPO), tertiary 
management buyout (TMBO), trade sale (Sale), and receivership (Recei.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Industry distribution 
This table shows sample SMBOs’ industry distribution in terms of exit statuses, exit routs, and PE backing. 
Exit routes are: initial public offering (IPO), tertiary management buyout (TMBO), trade sale (Sale), and 
receivership (Recei.). Non-exit is defined as the SMBO which does not exit by 31/12/ 2010.  Reported figures 
in Panel A and Panel B are the proportion and the corresponding numbers of SMBOs in industry groups, 
respectively. Reported P-values are two samples Kolmogorov Smirnov (K-S) test for differences in industry 
distributions in terms of exit routs, exit statuses, and PE baking. Details of industry grouping are discussed in 
section 2.3.1. 
 
 
 Population  Sample 
Total number of SMBOs 612 491 
PE-backed 396 323 
Non-PE-backed 216 168 
Numbers of Exits from SMBO 254 204 
IPO 12 12 
TMBO 83 69 
Sale 95 82 
Recei. 64 41 
Still in SMBO by 31/12/2010 358 287 
 Panel A: 
  
Exit status 
   
PE backing 
 
Total   
sample 
  
Exit 
   
Non-
exit 
 
PE Non-PE 
  Industry (%): IPO TMBO Sale Recei. 
       1. Internet &Computers 8 3 4 2 
 
3 
 
3 4 
 
3 
2. Communications   &        
Electronics 17 0 6 5 
 
3 
 
4 4 
 
4 
3. Business & Industrial 17 13 23 22 
 
22 
 
17 27 
 
21 
4. Consumer 33 25 29 20 
 
22 
 
27 16 
 
23 
5. Energy 0 1 0 0 
 
2 
 
2 1 
 
1 
6.Biotech & Healthcare 8 9 7 0 
 
2 
 
6 1 
 
4 
7. Business Services 17 46 27 51 
 
44 
 
39 45 
 
41 
8. All other 0 3 4 0 
 
2 
 
2 2 
 
2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
100 
 
100 100 
 
100 
% of total sample 2 14 17 8 
 
59 
 
66 34 
 
100 
 
IPO vs. 
TMBO 
IPO vs. 
Sale 
IPO vs. 
Recei. 
TMBO vs. 
Sale 
TMBO 
vs. Recei. 
Sale vs. 
Recei. 
Exit vs. 
Non-exit 
PE vs. 
Non-PE 
K-S test P 
-value     0.109 0.939 0.139 0.042 0.680 0.109 0.787 0.071 
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Table 2.3: Sample descriptive statistics 
This table presents the results of the sample descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for deal characteristics. Values of descriptive statistics in terms of PE backing are median 
values. P-values are from the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann Whitney) test for differences of different variables 
between PE-backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs. N for LNSIZE (ln(million GBP), 1st DURA(month), 2nd 
DURA(month), and DURATION(month) is the number of SMBOs in the transaction years. N for GEAR(%), 
MGTSHARE(%), and DEBTCOV(%) is the number of firm-year observations, up to five years after SMBO 
transactions. Panel B presents the results of Pearson correlation of all variables used in this chapter.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix 2.1.    
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics               
 
 
 
 Panel B: 
  
Exit status 
   
PE backing 
 
Total   
sample 
  
Exit 
   
Non-
exit 
 
PE Non-PE 
  Industry (%): IPO TMBO Sale Recei. 
       1. Internet &Computers 1 2 3 1 
 
9 
 
9 7 
 
16 
2. Communications   &        
Electronics 2 0 5 2 
 
9 
 
13 7 
 
20 
3. Business & Industrial 2 9 19 9 
 
63 
 
55 46 
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4. Consumer 4 17 24 8 
 
63 
 
88 27 
 
115 
5. Energy 0 1 0 0 
 
6 
 
5 1 
 
6 
6.Biotech & Healthcare 1 6 6 0 
 
6 
 
18 1 
 
19 
7. Business Services 2 32 22 21 
 
126 
 
127 76 
 
203 
8. All other 0 2 3 0 
 
5 
 
8 3 
 
11 
Total 12 69 82 41 
 
287 
 
323 168 
 
491 
    Full sample      PE backing(median) 
 N mean median S.D.  PE  non-PE P-Value 
LNSIZE(ln(million 
GBP)) 
447 
1.308 1.342 0.747 
 
1.602 0.531 0.000 
GEAR(%) 1146 1.551 0.780 2.093 
 
0.824 0.670 0.000 
MGTSHARE(%) 977 0.598 0.599 0.351 
 
0.370 1.000 0.000 
DEBTCOV(%) 725 5.025 1.434 32.060 
 
1.358 1.649 0.192 
1
st
 DURA(month) 238 59.866 53.000 32.807 
 
50.000 57.000 0.156 
2
nd
 DURA(month) 204 40.574 37.500 20.465 
 
38.000 37.000 0.548 
DURATION(month) 491 56.637 54.000 26.212 
 
50.000 63.000 0.000 
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Panel B:  Pearson correlation               
   (1)  (2) (3)  (4)   (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  
AROA(1) 1.00 
                AROS(2) 0.49 1.00 
               
 
0.00 
                ASALEMP(3) 0.14*** 0.07* 1.00 
              
 
0.00 0.08 
               AEMPG(4) 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.05 1.00 
             
 
0.00 0.00 0.28 
              ASALG(5) 0.20*** 0.05 0.38*** 0.61*** 1.00 
            
 
0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 
             Industry adjust. AROA(6) 0.98*** 0.40*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 1.00 
           
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            Industry adjust. AROS(7) 0.41*** 0.95*** 0.08* 0.11** 0.05 0.36*** 1.00 
          
 
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.21 0.00 
           Industry adjust. 
ASALEMP(8) 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.93*** 0.01 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 1.00 
         
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          Industry adjust. AEMPG(9) 0.18*** 0.11** -0.15*** 0.94*** 0.46*** 0.11 0.09* -0.20*** 1.00 
        
 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 
         Industry adjust. ASALG(10) 0.15*** -0.01 0.34*** 0.50*** 0.90*** 0.23*** -0.01 0.34*** 0.38*** 1.00 
       
 
0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 
        MGTSHARE(11) 0.13*** 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.09* 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.04 1.00 
      
 
0.00 0.46 0.83 0.67 0.61 0.06 0.77 0.27 0.52 0.36 
       DEBCOV(12) -0.13*** 0.09** -0.05 -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.08** 0.12*** -0.02 -0.11** -0.09** -0.04 1.00 
     
 
0.00 0.04 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.64 0.03 0.04 0.27 
      GEAR(13) -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09* -0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.18*** 0.25*** 1.00 
    
 
0.38 0.31 0.13 0.23 0.31 0.05 0.59 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.00 
     LNDURATION(14) -0.06* 0.05 0.22*** 0.01 -0.06 -0.10** 0.05 -0.09** 0.03 -0.06 0.19*** -0.13*** -0.11*** 1.00 
   
 
0.06 0.18 0.00 0.78 0.16 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.54 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    LNSIZE(15) -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.11** 0.00 0.00 -0.55*** 0.02 0.11*** -0.18*** 1.00 
  
 
0.12 0.16 0.60 0.86 0.30 0.72 0.12 0.01 0.97 0.95 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 
   Crisis(16) -0.02 0.01 -0.15*** 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.07** -0.20*** 0.11*** 1.00 
 
 
0.50 0.78 0.00 0.83 0.22 0.69 0.19 0.69 0.38 0.21 0.21 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.00 
  ROA t-1(17) -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.07* -0.12*** -0.10** -0.09* -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.08* -0.07* -0.04 -0.08* -0.07** 0.16*** 0.07*** 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.89 
 PE(18) -0.08** -0.01 -0.07* -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.08* -0.02 -0.05 -0.68*** 0.07* 0.10*** -0.13*** 0.53*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 
  0.01 0.78 0.05 0.67 0.94 0.20 0.55 0.05 0.56 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 2.4: Summary results of performance measures 
This table reports summary results of various performance measures in terms of full sample and PE backing. 
Panel A reports the results of performance measures before SMBO (3 years). Panel B reports the results of 
performance measures after SMBO (5 years), respectively. Values related to PE backing are median values. N 
is the number of firm-year observable SMBOs for different performance measures. The performance 
measures are: (1) Profitability: return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS); (2) Productivity (SALEMP): 
The logarithm value of inflation adjusted sales (thousand GBP) scaled by the number of employees in year t; 
(3) Growth ratios: employment growth (EMPG) and sales growth (SALG). Panel C are differences in mean 
and median values estimated by performance measures before SMBOs minus their counterparts after SMBOs. 
The results are based on 99% winsorized data. P-values are from the t-test for differences in the mean values 
and Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann Whitney) test for differences in median values. Definitions of these 
performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
  Full sample    PE backing(median) 
  N Min. mean median Max. S.D.   PE 
non-
PE 
P-Value 
Panel A: Pre-SMBO   
ROA 981 -0.380 0.089 0.077 0.500 0.129 
 
0.088 0.06 0.000 
ROS 899 -1.231 0.049 0.056 0.384 0.175 
 
0.072 0.032 0.000 
SALEMP 917 1.206 2.134 2.071 4.966 0.479 
 
2.039 2.138 0.000 
EMPG 671 -0.437 0.034 0.026 0.494 0.169 
 
0.037 0.004 0.001 
SALG 654 -0.515 0.105 0.076 0.925 0.240  0.088 0.037 0.000 
Panel B: Post-SMBO   
ROA 1199 -0.639 0.062 0.067 0.410 0.143 
 
0.064 0.067 0.301 
ROS 1009 -5.975 -0.010 0.054 0.856 0.685 
 
0.068 0.042 0.000 
SALEMP 880 0.241 2.171 2.102 5.021 0.504 
 
2.068 2.198 0.000 
EMPG 1052 -0.585 0.003 0.010 0.364 0.161 
 
0.021 0.000 0.000 
SALG 947 -0.750 0.051 0.047 0.936 0.251 
 
0.060 0.018 0.000 
Panel C: Pre vs Post                  
 
Mean P-value Median P-value 
      ROA 0.026 0.000 0.010 0.000 
      ROS 0.059 0.012 0.001 0.834 
      SALEMP -0.037 0.115 -0.031 0.002 
      EMPG 0.031 0.000 0.017 0.002 
      SALG 0.055 0.000 0.029 0.000          
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Table 2.5: Summary results of post-SMBO performance 
This table shows the results of median values of post-SMBO abnormal performance for the full sample, from 
the first to the fifth year (Y 1-5) after SMBO transactions. Abnormal performance (𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) is calculated 
as:𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡). where, 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the actual performance in year t after SMBO transactions while 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) is 
the expected performance of the target company in year t after SMBO transactions. 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) is estimated by two 
models: 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, and 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡; where, the former is ‘level’ model (unadjusted ) and the 
latter is ‘change’ model (industry adjusted). The presented values are median values of 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡  in the form of 
performance measures as follows: (1) Profitability: abnormal return on assets (AROA) and abnormal return on 
sales (AROS); (2) Productivity: abnormal sales per employee (ASALEMP); (3) Growth ratios: abnormal 
employment growth (AEMPG) and abnormal sales growth (ASALG). All results are used 99% winsorized data. 
The Wilcoxon signed rank test (median=0, vs. median≠0) is adopted to test the significance of abnormal 
performance. ***, **, *, are the significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Definitions of 
these performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
(# observations; # positive observations) 
  Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Profitability  
AROA 
Unadjusted  -0.008** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.047** 
 
(294:137) (255:101) (191:69) (151:52) (103:36) 
Industry  adjusted -0.009** -0.028*** -0.036*** -0.066*** -0.045* 
 (287:133) (252:91) (187:64) (119:36) (74:32) 
AROS 
Unadjusted  0.008 -0.001 -0.004 -0.014** -0.017** 
 
(236:128) (204:101) (153:69) (123:50) (91:31) 
Industry  adjusted 0.007 -0.003 -0.008* -0.005 -0.017* 
  (224:122) (194:92) (146:58) (90:42) (62:24) 
Productivity 
ASALEMP 
Unadjusted  0.038*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.022 -0.023*** 
 
(234:159) (199:128) (146:88) (125:73) (82:35) 
Industry  adjusted -0.023** -0.036*** -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.078** 
   (195:73)  (164:56)  (122:35)  (77:24)  (35:10) 
Growth ratios 
     
AEMPG 
Unadjusted  -0.004 -0.022** -0.039*** -0.038** -0.056** 
 
(226:110) (191:77) (144:55) (83:28) (48:15) 
Industry  adjusted -0.014 -0.026* -0.032*** -0.046* -0.027 
 (192:89) (161:71) (119:39) (67:29) (36:14) 
ASALG 
Unadjusted  -0.016* -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.098*** -0.126*** 
 
(204:94) (177:74) (132:50) (73:21) (47:11) 
Industry  adjusted 0.008 -0.012 -0.041 0.011 -0.071* 
   (198:101)  (173:83)  (129:57)  (73:40)  (47:18) 
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Table 2.6: The influence of managerial ownership and leverage on post-SMBO performance 
This table reports the results of the panel regression for the influence of managerial ownership and leverage 
on post-SMBO performance, up to five years after SMBO transactions. Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal 
performance as dependent variables, while Panel B uses industry adjusted abnormal performance as 
dependent variables. Definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix 2.1.The results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and 
omitted collinear covariates. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. Coefficients 
and z-statistics are presented. Industry and entry year dummies are included. N is the number of firm-year 
observations used for the estimation, from the first to the fifth post-SMBO years. ***, **,* are significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance  
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
MGTSHARE 0.032 -0.031 0.003 0.023 0.089 
 
1.582 -1.329 0.125 0.503 0.928 
DEBCOV -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 
 
-5.145 -0.617 -3.578 -1.159 -0.796 
ROA t-1 -0.355*** -0.505*** -0.206 -0.105 -0.118 
 
-3.671 -4.031 -1.109 -0.792 -0.566 
LNDURATION -0.018 0.076 0.038 -0.011 -0.010 
 
-0.533 1.425 0.296 -0.099 -0.066 
LNSIZE 0.008 0.051** -0.010 0.036 0.057 
 
0.864 2.274 -0.278 1.163 1.266 
Crisis -0.014 0.009 -0.002 -0.049** -0.107*** 
 
-1.455 0.557 -0.205 -2.388 -3.772 
PE -0.001 -0.024 0.110*** -0.024 0.029 
 
-0.088 -1.011 2.587 -0.571 0.445 
INTERCEPT 0.076 -0.035 -0.006 0.183 0.038 
 
0.868 -0.214 -0.026 0.842 0.134 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 24.75 17.02 6.13 8.67 5.00 
Wald Chi2 91.564*** 46.097*** 85.727*** 37.596** 67.640*** 
N 619 563 502 490 486 
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
MGTSHARE 0.027 -0.022 -0.011 0.000 0.053 
 
1.220 -1.105 -0.348 0.010 0.570 
DEBCOV -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 
 
-5.638 -0.273 -3.726 -1.187 -0.723 
ROA t-1 -0.342*** -0.370*** -0.100 -0.091 -0.149 
 
-3.406 -4.137 -0.601 -0.743 -0.657 
LNDURATION -0.085* 0.049 -0.053 0.037 -0.076 
 
-1.891 1.099 -0.389 0.312 -0.457 
LNSIZE 0.016 0.044** -0.005 0.031 0.060 
 
1.380 2.415 -0.143 1.014 1.302 
Crisis -0.003 0.010 -0.030*** -0.060** -0.062* 
 
-0.232 0.738 -3.075 -2.401 -1.902 
PE -0.004 -0.009 0.106*** -0.053 0.023 
 
-0.177 -0.491 2.597 -1.094 0.330 
INTERCEPT 0.160 -0.080 -0.226 0.301 -0.091 
 
1.533 -0.617 -0.913 1.360 -0.262 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 22.86 17.64 12.50 10.25 15.56 
Wald Chi2 99.367*** 39.779*** 485.162*** 46.233*** 64.576*** 
N 605 546 447 404 474 
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Table 2.7: Profitability performance based on EBITDA 
This table reports the results of abnormal performance in profitability based on operating income before 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Abnormal performance (𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) is calculated as: 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡). 
where, 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the actual performance in year t after SMBO transactions . 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) is the expected performance of 
the target company in year t after SMBO transactions. It is estimated by two models: 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, and 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 ; where, the former is ‘level’ model (unadjusted) and the latter is ‘change’ model 
(industry adjusted). The presented values are median values of 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 . EBITDAA is EBITDA divided by total 
assets at the end of the year; EBITDAS is EBITDA divided by sales. All results are used 99% winsorized data. 
The Wilcoxon signed rank test is employed to test the significance of abnormal performance. ***, **, *, 
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
(# observations; # positive observations)         
  
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
AEBITDAA Unadjusted  -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.048*** -0.058*** 
 (294:121) (255:97) (191:66) (151:46) (103:31) 
Industry adjusted   -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.041*** 
 (287:121) (251:95) (187:63) (118:39) (73:27) 
AEBITDAS Unadjusted  0.004 -0.005 -0.006** -0.019*** -0.027*** 
 (236:128) (204:94) (153:64) (123:42) (91:28) 
Industry adjusted   0.004 -0.007 -0.009*** -0.014 -0.016* 
  (224:120) (194:88) (145:58) (87:36) (57:22) 
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Table 2.8: Differences in post-buyout performance between SMBOs and primary MBOs 
This table presents the median values of the differences of abnormal performance measures between SMBOs 
and primary private-to-private MBOs, up to five years after SMBO. Differences are estimated as the abnormal 
performance of SMBOs in year t minus the abnormal performance of primary private-to-private MBOs in 
year t. Panel A shows the differences of full samples. Panel B shows the differences of matched samples. 
Matching is based on industry, size, pre-buyout performance, and buyout year, with using propensity score 
matching method. All results are obtained by using 99% winsorized data. We employ the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann Whitney) test to test the equality of abnormal performance from the two samples. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Definitions of abnormal performance measures 
are presented in Appendix 2.1.                        
 
  Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Panel A: Comparison of non-matched samples 
  
  
  
  
  
Profitability 
    
AROA -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.059*** -0.134*** -0.041 
AROS -0.002 -0.008* -0.011*** -0.020*** -0.022** 
Productivity         
ASALEMP 0.020** -0.008 -0.007 0.027* -0.057*** 
Growth ratios         
AEMPG -0.017 -0.004 -0.039*** -0.020 -0.050 
ASALG -0.021 -0.061** -0.067*** -0.067* -0.155*** 
Number of SMBOs               491   
Number of primary MBOs   348   
Panel B: Comparison of matched samples  
Profitability  
    
AROA -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.082*** -0.146*** -0.052 
AROS -0.000 -0.004 -0.018*** -0.028*** -0.033* 
Productivity         
ASALEMP 0.020* -0.010 -0.022 -0.090*** -0.852*** 
Growth ratios         
AEMPG -0.014 -0.015 -0.038** -0.008 -0.110 
ASALG -0.010 -0.063 -0.089*** -0.067 -0.213*** 
Number of SMBOs               152   
Number of primary MBOs   152   
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Table 2.9: Post-SMBO performance by exit routes 
This table presents the P-values of the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann Whitney) test for differences in median 
unadjusted abnormal performance measures in the light of exit routes, up to five years after SMBO 
transactions. Panel A shows the comparison between exited SMBOs and non-exited SMBOs. ‘+’ indicates that 
exited SMBOs outperform non-exited SMBOs; ‘-’ indicates that exited SMBOs underperform non-exited 
SMBOs. Panel B shows the comparison among exited SMBOs through tertiary management buyouts 
(TMBOs) and exited SMBOs through IPO, trade sale, and receivership, respectively.  ‘+’ indicates that exited 
SMBOs through TMBOs outperform other exit types; ‘-’ indicates that exited SMBOs through TMBOs 
underperform other exit types. N.A. means that the data is not applicable during the post-SMBO years. Bold 
numbers indicate that the differences are significant at levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Definitions of abnormal 
performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Exited vs. Non-exited SMBOs  
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
AROA -0.607 -0.446 -0.818 +0.445 -0.608 
AROS -0.492 +0.875 -0.469 -0.932 -0.485 
ASALEMP -0.379 -0.645 -0.641 +0.528 +0.628 
AEMPG -0.912 -0.991 +0.177 +0.626 -0.903 
ASALG +0.107 +0.870 +0.540 -0.747 -0.135 
Panel B: performance in post-SMBOS years, grouped by exit routes  
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
TMBO vs. IPO      
AROA -0.788 -0.472 +0.828 -0.643 n.a. 
AROS +0.883 -0.697 -1.000 -0.885 n.a. 
ASALEMP +0.453 +0.688 -0.588 n.a. n.a. 
AEMPG -0.078 -0.095 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
ASALG -0.687 -0.096 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
TMBO vs. Trade sales      
AROA -0.451 +0.733 +0.191 -0.622 -0.317 
AROS -0.778 +0.671 +0.059 +0.621 -0.423 
ASALEMP -0.017 -0.106 -0.054 -0.050 +0.394 
AEMPG -0.709 -0.235 -0.803 -0.308 -0.165 
ASALG +0.592 -0.936 +0.548 +0.571 -0.157 
TMBO vs. Receivership      
AROA +0.194 -0.628 -0.263 -0.022 -0.116 
AROS +0.083 +0.663 +0.779 -0.712 -0.514 
ASALEMP +0.851 +0.517 +0.617 -0.762 +0.348 
AEMPG +0.231 +0.580 -0.780 +1.000 +0.559 
ASALG +0.017 -0.477 -0.896 -0.486 -1.000 
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Table 2.10: ‘Early’ vs. ‘late’ exits 
This table presents unadjusted and industry adjusted median values of abnormal performance measures for 
‘early’ and ‘late’ exit subsamples, from the first to fifth year (Y1-5) after SMBO transactions. The ‘early’ exit 
subsample is defined as that the primaries’ holding period is shorter than 2 years. The ‘late’ exit subsample is 
defined as that the primaries’ holding period is equal to or longer than 4 years. Unadjusted abnormal 
performance is estimated based on ‘level’ model. Industry adjusted abnormal performance is estimated based 
on ‘change’ model. All results use 99% winsorized data. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is for testing the 
significance of abnormal performance. ***, **, *, are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Definitions of abnormal performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
 (# observations; # positive observations) 
      Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Early Profitability 
     
 
AROA Unadjusted 0.002 0.053 0.031 0.042 -0.087 
   
(20:10) (16:10) (10:6) (6:5) (7:1) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.011 0.051 0.004 -0.000 0.044 
   
(20:11) (16:10) (10:5) (4:2) (2:1) 
 
AROS Unadjusted 0.021 0.003 0.007 0.028 -0.037 
   
(16:10) (14:7) (10:5) (5:4) (7:1) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.026 0.013 -0.001 -0.000 0.014 
   
(16:11) (14:8) (10:5) (4:2) (2:1) 
 
Productivity 
     
 
ASALEMP Unadjusted 0.093* 0.043 0.047 0.180* -1.855* 
   
(16:11) (14:8) (10:6) (4:4) (5:1) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.039 -0.013 -0.061 -0.004 -0.05 
 
  
 
(15:9) (13:4) (10:4) (4:2) (1:0) 
 
Growth ratios 
     
 
AEMPG Unadjusted -0.019 -0.035 -0.09 0.005 -0.074 
   
(13:6) (12:5) (9:6) (3:2) (2:0) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.096 -0.124 -0.146 -0.074 -0.133 
   
(12:4) (11:5) (8:2) (2:0) (2:0) 
 
ASALG Unadjusted -0.027 -0.05 -0.102 -0.102 -0.152 
   
(13:6) (12:4) (9:2) (3:0) (2:0) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.019 -0.011 -0.093 -0.061 -0.118 
      (13:6) (12:5) (9:2) (3:1) (2:0) 
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(Continued) 
 (# observations; # positive observations) 
      Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Late Profitability  
     
 
AROA Unadjusted 0.001 -0.014** -0.037*** -0.053*** -0.034* 
   
(111:56) (102:45) (74:25) (56:18) (38:15) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.003 -0.039*** -0.047*** -0.100*** -0.021 
   
(107:52) (100:37) (77:23) (44:11) (28:13) 
 
AROS Unadjusted 0.019** 0.014 0.003 -0.004 -0.013 
   
(81:51) (74:43) (55:32) (40:19) (34:14) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.018* 0.000 -0.005 0.016 -0.026 
   
(78:48) (72:36) (53:26) (28:17) (23:8) 
 
Productivity 
     
 
ASALEMP Unadjusted 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.025** 0.011 -0.023* 
   
(82:59) (73:46) (50:30) (42:22) (27:10) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.024* -0.032** -0.053** -0.037 -0.114 
 
 
 
(70:27) (62:22) (44:15) (25:10) (11:4) 
 
Growth ratios 
     
 
AEMPG Unadjusted 0.006 -0.012 -0.056** -0.006 0.010 
   
(87:45) (78:33) (59:20) (33:14) (22:11) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.001 -0.012 -0.051** -0.037 0.005 
   
(74:37) (67:30) (48:14) (25:11) (15:8) 
 
ASALG Unadjusted 0.002 -0.027 0.005 -0.040 -0.144** 
   
(76:41) (68:33) (50:26) (24:9) (17:3) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.01 0.006 -0.024 0.034 -0.111* 
      (73:38) (67:34) (49:24) (24:13) (17:4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Table 2.11: PE-backed vs. Non-PE-backed SMBOs 
This table displays the P-values of the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann Whitney) test for the differences of median 
values of abnormal performance measures between PE-backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs, up to five years 
after SMBO transactions. ‘+’ indicates that PE-backed SMBOs outperform non-PE-backed SMBOs; ‘-’ 
indicates that PE-backed SMBOs underperform non-PE-backed SMBOs. Unadjusted abnormal performance 
is estimated based on ‘level’ model. Industry adjusted abnormal performance is estimated based on ‘change’ 
model. Bold numbers indicate that the differences are significant at levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Definitions of 
abnormal performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
    YI Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Profitability       
AROA Unadjusted  -0.365 -0.104 -0.022 -0.115 -0.000 
 
Industry  adjusted -0.748 +0.529 -0.026 -0.191 - 0.018 
AROS Unadjusted  +0.633 +0.596 +0.294 +0.468 -0.011 
  Industry  adjusted +0.455 + 0.247 -0.750 +0.184 +0.388 
Productivity       
ASALEMP Unadjusted  +0.029 +0.123 +0.309 -0.736 -0.000 
 
Industry  adjusted +0.076 + 0.060 +0.042 +0.161 -0.225 
Growth ratios      
AEMPG Unadjusted  +0.185 -0.973 -0.271 +0.970 +0.635 
  Industry  adjusted +0.280 -0.708 - 0.212 -0.289 +0.496 
ASALG Unadjusted  +0.294 -0.232 -0.329 -0.129 -0.533 
  Industry  adjusted + 0.814 -0.437 - 0.066 - 0.012 - 0.611 
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Table 2.12: Alternative measure of leverage 
This table reports the results of the panel regression for the influence of governance mechanisms on post-
SMBO performance, up to five years after SMBO transactions, with an alternative measure of leverage 
(GEAR). Definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix 2.1. The dependent variables are unadjusted 
abnormal performance measures. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated 
by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. P-values for the 
Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. Coefficients and z-statistics are presented. Industry and 
entry year dummies are included. N is number of firm-year observations used for the estimation, from the first 
to the fifth post-SMBO years. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
MGTSHARE 0.023 -0.039* 0.021 -0.036 0.104 
 
0.795 -1.845 0.911 -0.506 1.148 
GEAR -0.017** -0.012*** 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 
-2.321 -3.528 0.545 0.007 -0.088 
ROA t-1 -0.617*** -0.473*** -0.339 -0.264 -0.372 
 
-3.913 -3.787 -1.339 -1.429 -1.258 
LNDURATION -0.068 0.092* 0.029 0.150 0.093 
 
-0.777 1.675 0.195 0.973 0.608 
LNSIZE 0.021 0.042* 0.027 0.022 0.075 
 
1.000 1.812 0.696 0.562 1.595 
Crisis -0.019 -0.002 0.005 -0.022 -0.094*** 
 
-1.625 -0.168 0.419 -0.654 -2.945 
PE -0.050 -0.028 0.063 -0.021 -0.002 
 
-1.151 -1.155 1.242 -0.400 -0.036 
INTERCEPT -1.038 -0.032 0.008 -0.003 -0.092 
 
-0.987 -0.195 0.031 -0.011 -0.323 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square 13.28 12.95 6.11 4.43 4.50 
Wald Chi2 47.520*** 43.251*** 69.405*** 42.422*** 70.688*** 
N 740 611 548 563 531 
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Table 2.13: The influence of managerial ownership and leverage on post-SMBO performance-
corrected for sample selection bias 
This table reports the results of the panel regression for the influence of managerial ownership and leverage 
on post-SMBO performance, corrected for sample selection bias. Panel A reports the results of pooled Probit 
regression with the robust variance estimate for the profitability of receiving PE backing by the sample 
SMBOs. The Probit regression is converged after three iterations. Panel B is the results of panel regression by 
using unadjusted abnormal performance measures as dependent variables. Lambda is fitted probability of 
receiving PE backing which is estimated from the Probit regression. The results are based on 99% winsorized 
data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted 
collinear covariates. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. Coefficients and z-
statistics are presented. Industry and year dummies are included.  N is number of observations used for the 
estimation, from the first to the fifth post-SMBO year. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. 
 
Panel A: 1
st
 Step: Probit regression 
Independent variables      Coefficient 
BSERVICES 
   
-0.234*** 
LNSIZE 
   
1.298*** 
ROA t-1 
   
0.626** 
INTERCEPT 
   
-0.945*** 
Log likelihood 
 
-770.289 
Pseudo R2 (%) 
  
27.89 
Wald Chi 2 
  
446.46*** 
N       1725 
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Panel B: 2
nd
 Step: Panel regression  
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
MGTSHARE 0.030 -0.031 0.004 0.024 0.090 
 
1.470 -1.341 0.168 0.523 0.947 
DEBCOV -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 
 
-5.226 -0.627 -3.668 -1.156 -0.794 
ROA t-1 -0.392*** -0.514*** -0.135 -0.065 -0.100 
 
-4.008 -3.842 -0.599 -0.492 -0.445 
LNDURATION -0.011 0.077 0.016 -0.020 -0.014 
 
-0.332 1.456 0.117 -0.185 -0.093 
LNSIZE -0.036 0.040 0.065 0.083 0.079 
 
-1.476 0.562 0.728 0.920 0.727 
Crisis -0.014 0.009 -0.002 -0.049* -0.108*** 
 
-1.458 0.556 -0.202 -2.371 -3.768 
PE -0.003 -0.025 0.113** -0.022 0.030 
 
-0.205 -1.025 2.572 -0.520 0.469 
Lambda -0.074* -0.018 0.133 0.083 0.039 
 
-1.850 -0.165 0.843 0.599 0.202 
INTERCEPT 0.158 -0.015 -0.131 0.096 -0.001 
 
1.531 -0.071 -0.538 0.358 -0.002 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 25.28 16.95 7.18 8.87 5.05 
Wald Chi2 94.637*** 46.515*** 84.522*** 37.885*** 70.437*** 
N 619 563 502 490 486 
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Appendix 2.1: Definitions of variables 
Description Variable Definition 
Performance measures 
Profitability    
Return on assets ROA Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
scaled by total assets in year t.  
EBITDAA Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total 
assets  in year t. 
Abnormal return on assets AROA The difference between actual ROA in year t 
and expected ROA in year t. 
AEBITDAA The difference between actual EBITDAA in year 
t and expected EBITDAA in year t. 
Return on sales ROS Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
scaled by total sales  in year t. 
EBITDAS Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total 
sales.  in year  
 
Abnormal return on sales AROS The difference between actual ROS in year t and 
expected ROS in year t. 
AEBITDAS The difference between actual EBITDAS in year 
t and expected  EBITDAS  in year t. 
Productivity    
Sales  efficiency SALEMP The logarithm value of inflation adjusted sales 
(thousand GBP) scaled by the number of 
employees  in year t. 
Abnormal sales  efficiency   ASALEMP The difference between actual SALEMP in year 
t and expected SALEMP in year t. 
Growth ratios   
Employment growth EMPG The difference between the numbers of 
employees in year t and year t-1 scaled by the 
average value of the numbers of employees in 
year t and year t-1.  
Abnormal employment growth AEMPG The difference between actual EMPG in year t 
and expected  EMPG  in year t. 
Sales growth SALG The difference between sales in year t and year 
t-1 scaled by average of sale in year t and year t-
1. 
Abnormal sales growth ASALG The difference between actual  SALG  in year t 
and expected SALG in year t. 
Determinants of performance 
Managerial ownership 
Management share MGTSHARE The percentage of target company’s common 
equity contributed by the management in year t. 
Leverage   
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(Continue)   
Debt coverage  DEBTCOV The amount of long term and shot term debt 
divided by EBITDA in year t. 
Gearing GEAR The sum of long term and shot term debt 
divided by the total equity in year t.  
 
Determinants of PE backing and control variables 
PE backing   
PE-backed PE A dummy variable which equals 1 if SMBO is 
backed by PE firms and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables   
Companies’ size  SIZE The SMBO deal value (£ million). 
 LNSIZE The logarithm value of SIZE. 
Companies’ industry BSERVICES A dummy variable which equals 1 if the SMBO 
is from Business Service Industry and 0 
otherwise. 
Financial crisis  Crisis A dummy variable which equals 1 for 
observations from 2008, 2009, and 2010 (the 
financial crisis years) and 0 otherwise.  
Lambda Lambda The fitted probability of receiving PE backing, 
estimated by equation 5. 
Pre-SMBO performance ROA t-1 The performance ratio in the form of ROA in 
year preceding the SMBO. 
The longevity of buyout 1
st
 DURA 1
st
 DURA indicates the number of months from 
the primary buyout date to the SMBO date.   
 2
nd
 DURA The number of months from the SMBO date to 
the exit date if the SMBO was exited. 
 DURATION The number of months from the SMBO date to 
the exit date if the SMBO was exited or the 
number of months from the SMBO date to the 
last date (31/12/2010) if the SMBO was not 
exited.  
 LNDURATION The  logarithm value  of  DURATION 
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Appendix 2.2: Fixed-effects regression 
This table presents the results of fixed-effects panel regression for the influence of managerial ownership and 
leverage on post-SMBO performance, up to five years after SMBO transactions. The results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a fixed-effects model with robust standard error and omitted 
collinear covariates. P-values for F test are for probability >F. Coefficients and z-statistics are presented. N is 
number of observations used for the estimation, from the first to the fifth post-SMBOS year. ***, **,* are 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are presented in 
Appendix 2.1. 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
MGTSHARE 0.062*
32
 -0.012 0.025 -0.019 0.174 
 
1.968 -0.362 0.558 -0.160 0.931 
DEBCOV -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002** 
 
-2.080 -1.522 -3.357 -4.196 -2.598 
ROA t-1 - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
LNDURATION - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
LNSIZE - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
Crisis -0.014** 0.009 -0.003 -0.045* -0.107*** 
 
-2.064 1.260 -0.361 -1.779 -3.116 
PE - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
INTERCEPT -0.029 0.037* 0.039 0.024 -0.109 
 
-1.420 1.701 1.315 0.312 -0.922 
Year dummy - - - - - 
Industry dummy - - - - - 
R-square (%) 0.86 0.07 0.08 3.74 0.81 
F test 4.39*** 1.29 4.03*** 7.18*** 6.07*** 
N 619 563 502 490 486 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
32
 The significance at 1% level is because of deleting PE-backed dummy. 
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Appendix 2.3: The influence of managerial ownership and leverage on post-SMBO performance-
without control variables 
This table reports the results of the panel regression for the influence of managerial ownership and leverage 
on post-SMBO performance, without control variables. We use unadjusted abnormal performance measures 
as dependent variables. Definitions of the variables are presented in Appendix 2.1.The results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and 
omitted collinear covariates. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) is for probability > Chi 2. Coefficients 
and z-statistics are presented. Industry and year dummies are included. N is number of observations used for 
the estimation, from the first to the fifth post-SMBOS year. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively.  
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
MGTSHARE 0.043** -0.030 -0.022 0.017 0.004 
 
2.358 -1.532 -0.953 0.475 0.063 
DEBCOV -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 
 
-4.943 -0.579 -3.622 -1.186 -0.813 
ROA t-1 - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
LNDURATION - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
LNSIZE - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
Crisis - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
PE - - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
INTERCEPT 0.011 0.100 0.131* 0.155** 0.104 
 
0.177 1.117 1.933 2.298 0.707 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 7.64 4.61 2.57 6.75 3.09 
Wald Chi2 57.820*** 29.313** 39.426*** 29.568** 29.080** 
N 619 563 502 490 486 
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Appendix 2.4: ‘Middle’ exits 
This table presents unadjusted and industry adjusted median values of abnormal performance measures for 
‘middle’ exit subsamples, from the first to fifth year (Y1-5) after SMBO transactions. The ‘middle’ exit 
subsample is defined as that the primaries’ holding period is shorter than 4 years but lager than and equal to 2 
years. Unadjusted abnormal performance is estimated based on ‘level’ model. Industry adjusted abnormal 
performance is estimated based on ‘change’ model. All results use 99% winsorized data. The Wilcoxon signed 
rank test is for testing the significance of abnormal performance. ***, **, *, are significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. Definitions of abnormal performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
 
 (# observations; # positive observations) 
      Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Middle Profitability 
     
 
AROA Unadjusted -0.018* -0.038*** -0.031** -0.056*** -0.119*** 
   
(75:32) (65:18) (49:17) (39:13) (15:2) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.024 -0.037 -0.029 -0.059 -0.138* 
   
(74:28) (65:24) (48:13) (29:9) (11:2) 
 
AROS Unadjusted 0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.019** -0.025*** 
   
(61:31) (55:24) (40:15) (31:11) (13:1) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.002 -0.02 -0.010** -0.018 -0.027 
   
(59:20) (54:14) (39:9) (22:7) (9:1) 
 
Productivity           
 
ASALEMP Unadjusted 0.036** 0.023* 0.019 0.02 -0.001 
   
(58:39) (50:32) (39:22) (29:17) (9:4) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.022 -0.047 -0.052 -0.044 -0.078 
 
   (53:9) (44:4) (34:4) (18:2) (5:1) 
 
Growth ratios 
     
 
AEMPG Unadjusted 0.001 -0.054** -0.060*** -0.134** -0.129 
   
(60:30) (52:17) (39:12) (20:4) (7:1) 
  
Industry adjusted -0.016 -0.057** -0.038** -0.194 0.024 
   
(51:24) (44:15) (35:10) (18:6) (5:3) 
 
ASALG Unadjusted -0.038 -0.066** -0.062*** -0.120* -0.126 
   
(56:24) (50:15) (36:10) (19:5) (7:0) 
  
Industry adjusted 0.007 -0.045 -0.024 -0.017 0.031 
    (56:28) (50:22) (36:16) (19:9) (7:4) 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSIDE SMBOS’ BOARDS 
3.1 Introduction  
           The literature suggests that buyouts enhance corporate governance via changes to the 
boards of directors and management (Cumming et al., 2007; Acharya et al. 2013) and via 
leverage and alignment of managerial and shareholder incentives (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 
1989a). In a SMBO, the initial (primary) buyout is acquired by a new set of PE financiers 
and/or management, together with new borrowings. In 2012, the PE market experienced an 
increase in SMBOs, accounting for upwards of 18 per cent of deal volume and 47 per cent 
of deal value in Europe (e.g. Wang, 2012). Despite their increasing popularity, and the 
different managerial and governance processes in SMBOs compared to traditional buyouts 
(Siegel et al., 2011), there is paucity of research on SMBO corporate governance and the 
role of boards in particular. 
           Studying SMBOs as a distinct group has potential to advance understanding of 
several issues related to corporate boards. As SMBOs represent both an exit route from 
primary buyout structures and a new buyout form, they shed new light on the debate about 
buyouts as a long term organizational form (Wright et al., 1995; Strömberg, 2008; Jelic, 
2011). SMBOs suggest that the nature of the buyout form may need to change to ensure 
longevity and along with it the board expertise to deliver future performance (Cumming et 
al., 2007). For example, SMBOs typically involve the replacement of existing CEOs/CFOs, 
and changes to board membership, yet companies remain in private ownership (i.e. in a 
buyout form) instead of going public (i.e. IPO). SMBOs therefore provide a novel context 
to examine CEO and boardroom succession since they do not involve transition to a public 
ownership form. 
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           Recent literature provides mixed evidence on the post-SMBO performance of target 
companies. Nevertheless, what drives the post-SMBO operating performance of target 
companies is still a puzzle. Chapter 2 reports the lack of a statistically significant 
relationship between high leverage and managerial ownership and the operating 
performance of target companies. In this chapter, we examine the importance of the board 
of directors for the performance of SMBOs. 
           Other than the core role of boards in company operational processes, the dual 
function of boards consists in monitoring and advisory (or enterprising and service) 
functions, which also offer the possibility of success in SMBOs. The monitoring function 
aims to eliminate agency problems while advisory functions affiliate the operational 
strategies. As we discussed in the literature review chapter, the “traditional” buyout 
literature emphasizes the importance of agency problems (e.g. Jensen’s (1989) free cash 
flow hypothesis) and bypasses other possible entrepreneurial advantages of buyouts (based 
on the strategic entrepreneurship perspective). Given the nature of SMBOs, existing agency 
costs have already been reduced. This is the reason why these traditional value creation 
mechanisms become invalid. Under such circumstances, the entrepreneurial advantages of 
buyouts should emerge. In particular, the advisory function of the board dominates the 
monitoring function, as along with the ownership transition new blood is injected into the 
board of directors. For instance, an existing CEO/CFO may be replaced to introduce more 
entrepreneurial managers. New and more PE is represented on the board to advise the 
entrepreneurial activities. Hence, it is plausible to investigate the role of the board of 
directors in SMBOs, especially its relationship with post-SMBO growth performance.   
           This chapter represents one of the first studies to investigate the impact of the board 
of directors on post-SMBO performance. We employ the same variables as suggested in the 
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board literature to proxy for the quality of boards (monitoring and advisory functions). 
Although some of these variables treat the effects of the monitoring and advisory functions 
as a whole, in a private company scenario the monitoring function may fade away. On the 
other hand, from the strategic entrepreneurship perspective, we use growth performance to 
measure the entrepreneurial activities. A high quality advisory function may promote the 
opportunity- and advantage-seeking abilities of the companies. As a consequence, 
improvements in performance may not be reflected initially in profitability, but still create 
company value through growth improvement.  
           We firstly document the changes in board size, changes to the top management 
(CEO/CFO), the appointment of independent outside directors and PE directors, and insider 
directors’ skills before and after SMBO transactions. Then we investigate whether these 
changes exert an influence on post-SMBO performance. We extend the dataset in Chapter 2 
by manually collecting board related data, resulting in 262 UK SMBOs completed from 
2000 to 2007. To the best of our knowledge, this dataset is the most comprehensive dataset 
on SMBOs’ boards. We utilize panel regression rather than the commonly used OLS 
method. Heckman two-stage model and dynamic GMM panel model are considered to 
check for potential sample selection bias and the endogeneity issue. The test-down method 
is also conducted to test the necessity of our tested independent variables and the 
multicollinearity among independent variables.     
           Our study extends the current literature in several areas. First, previous studies on 
corporate governance in buyouts almost exclusively examine large PE-backed or PTP 
buyouts (e.g. Acharya et al., 2013; Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). However, these buyouts 
tend to only account for a small proportion of overall buyout transactions (Cumming et al., 
2007; Strömberg 2008; Jelic and Wright, 2011). Furthermore, the role and focus of boards 
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in PTP buyouts tends to be different from those in smaller private-to-private transactions. 
We contribute the literature by examining boards in private-to-private buyouts (e.g. SMBOs) 
that has hitherto been neglected. Second, we examine both PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
SMBOs. Without PE backing, the management teams in non-PE-backed buyouts lose the 
advice (and monitoring) offered by PE firms. It is, therefore, important to compare the 
importance of boards in PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts. Third, given that SMBOs 
typically change boards and top management, while remaining in private ownership (i.e. in 
a buyout structure), we are able to examine the direct effects of changes in board 
characteristics (e.g. director skills) on performance. Fourth, we make more general 
contributions to the corporate governance literature by extending the understanding of the 
heterogeneity of boards in private companies, in contrast to the great body of existing 
research that focuses on boards in publicly listed corporations. Fifth, portfolio company 
level performance data provides richer performance metrics compared to PE fund/firm level 
data (e.g. IRR and multiples). Furthermore, whilst previous studies examine only 
profitability (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Wintoki et al., 2012), our sample 
allows examination of the links between board characteristics and the different aspects of 
the performance (e.g. sales growth, profitability, productivity, employment growth). Finally, 
we shed more light on the current debate regarding the reasons for the recent popularity of 
SMBOs and their benefits for investors (i.e. general and limited partners) and portfolio 
companies (i.e. managers and shareholders). 
           The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 specifies the 
tested hypotheses, followed by section 3.3 that presents sample selection and data 
description. Section 3.4 analyses the main empirical results. Section 3.5 checks the 
robustness and presents further analysis. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.     
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3.2 Hypotheses development 
           According to agency theory, the superiority of buyout organization, to a great extent, 
is rooted in high leverage, enhanced managerial incentive and the PE firm’s governance 
monitoring and intervention (e.g. Acharya et al., 2013; Gong and Wu, 2011; Cornelli and 
Karakas, 2013; Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989a; Guo et al., 2009). Via the primary buyout 
phase, the benefits from eliminating agency issues have already been achieved by the first 
round investors (Wright et al., 2009b). SMBOs continue the buyout organizational form, 
implying that eliminating agency issues should not be the main way in which the investors 
can achieve performance improvement. The improved monitoring function of the board in 
the secondary phase, albeit demanded by shareholders, may not be as important as in the 
primary phase. Moreover, the management entrenchment issues and loosened PE firms 
control caused by increasing managerial ownership may lead to worse post-SMBO 
performance. However, the current mixed evidence on post-SMBO performance, especially 
the outperformance evidence (Wang, 2012; Achleitner and Figge, 2014), reveals the 
drawbacks of agency theory.  
           The strategic entrepreneurship perspective (or resource-based view), as we discussed 
in the literature review chapter, may be a more useful approach in SMBOs, which can also 
support the advisory function of the board. The strategic entrepreneurship perspective, 
involves opportunity- and advantage-seeking behaviors (Ireland et al., 2003). This 
perspective assumes that opportunity- and advantage-seeking behaviors based on resource 
heterogeneity and immobility create a competitive advantage (Priem and Butler, 2001), so 
that they can lead to performance generation by exploiting growth opportunities (Ireland et 
al., 2003). As argued by Meuleman et al. (2009), in the buyout context, the heterogeneity 
and immobility of resources are related to the idiosyncratic knowledge, skills, experience, 
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and capabilities of existing managers, PE firms, and the specialist expertise of PE firms. 
Not only do buyouts use strong governance to motivate the management to utilize these 
resources (Wright et al., 2009a), they also employ heterogeneous resources from PE firms 
and their experts. 
           Given the achievement of the optimal monitoring function of the board and 
management incentive in the primary buyout, the breakthrough for SMBOs may be the 
enhancement of the advisory function of the board. There are two reasons. First, most of 
SMBOs are small-medium-sized companies which may be in the expansion phases. The 
role of the board, thus, may be changed as SMBOs develop over their life-cycle, as 
suggested by Filatotchev and Wright (2005). Second, as is the nature of SMBOs, the main 
difference between SMBOs and primary buyouts in corporate governance could be the 
board of directors. The transition in ownership could result in substantial changes in board 
composition. According to the strategic entrepreneurship perspective, there is heterogeneity 
of directors’ knowledge, skills, experience, capabilities, and resources. The investors could 
replace inefficient directors with directors who possess knowledge, skills, experience, and 
capabilities that are more suitable to the SMBO phase to facilitate performance 
improvement through pursuit of growth opportunities. The resources and capabilities 
required by SMBOs may be from PE directors (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Meuleman et 
al, 2009), new top management, and/or motivated inside employees, especially influential 
inside directors (Meuleman et al, 2009). 
3.2.1 Board size  
           In the literature review, we discussed the mixed evidence on the relationship 
between operating performance and board size. Buyout deals do not usually receive the 
optimal board size of seven to nine directors as recommended by Jensen (1993) and Lipton 
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and Lorsch (1992). Hence, we argue here that SMBOs may adjust the board size to some 
extent to achieve the optimal board size to improve company performance. Especially when 
the company is in an expansion phase, the investors (e.g. PE firms) could employ more 
outsider directors and/or inside directors to help growth, so the board size will increase and 
post-SMBO performance will be better. Thus, we expect,   
           Hypothesis 1: Board size of SMBO is positively associated to post-SMBO 
performance.  
3.2.2 PE specialists on board  
            Incoming PE firms in SMBOs are likely to appoint their representatives specialized 
in monitoring (Jenter and Kanaan, 2011) and advising (Politis and Landstrom, 2002) as 
board members. New PE specialists are particularly important when buyouts performed 
poorly during the primary stage (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). For example, Chahine 
and Goergen (2011) report that venture capital firms are more likely to be on the board of 
IPOs with reported losses in the year prior to the IPO. The monitoring and advisory 
expertise of PE specialists will likely focus on turning around firms that under-performed as 
primary buyouts through active board involvement focused on identifying and closing 
poorly performing areas, improving the efficiency of operations, and reinvigorating areas 
with growth potential. Hence, 
             Hypothesis 2: The fraction of PE-related directors is positively related to post-
SMBO performance. 
3.2.3 Independent outside directors  
             Independent outside directors do not share the same role in private companies as in 
public companies. For example, the advisory function of independent outside directors is 
more important in private (i.e. SMBO) than in public companies. Due to PE involvement, 
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monitoring executive managers is not the focus of independent outside directors in private 
companies.33 This is because independent outside directors are usually nominated by the 
outside shareholders (usually the minority shareholders). However, there are few/no outside 
shareholders other than PE firms in SMBOs. Obviously, PE firms do not need to recruit 
additional independent outside directors to improve monitoring. Second, the monitoring 
function of boards in private companies is not as important as that in public companies.     
Therefore, we argue that the nomination of independent outside directors is undertaken with 
the aim of obtaining professional advice from these experts, academics, or entrepreneurs. 
This advice might improve SMBOs’ performance.  
              Hypothesis 3: The fraction of independent outside directors is positively related to 
post-SMBO performance. 
3.2.4 Changing top managers 
            Changing the top managers (CEO and/or CFO) is also a crucial tool often used by 
PE firms (Wright, et al., 2009a). New boards are in better position to change the CEO 
and/or CFO especially if buyouts are facing difficulties (e.g. Cornelli and Karakas, 2013; 
Acharya et al., 2013; Gong and Wu, 2011; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Guo et al., 2011). 
             The majority of SMBOs are still PE owned so that the same PE model may 
continuously be applied. When companies underperform before SMBO transactions, the 
ineffective CEO and/or CFO may be replaced with a more experienced CEO and/or CFO 
capable of executing the performance improvement plan. With respect to the non-PE-
backed SMBOs, changing the CEO and/or CFO may still happen when the previous CEO 
and/or CFO retire or leave the position for other reasons. The newly nominated CEO and/or 
CFO might bring in new expertise to help improve the companies’ performance. Therefore,     
                                                        
33
 Unlike public companies, nominating independent outside director is not compulsory in SMBOs. 
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            Hypothesis 4: Changing CEO/CFO is positively related to post-SMBO performance. 
3.2.5 Inside directors’ skills 34  
           Given the importance of the advisory function of the board, it is important to 
examine the impact of inside directors’ skills on post-SMBO performance. We use 
independent outside directorships as a proxy for inside directors’ skills to identify potential 
crucial variety amid inside directors.
35
 Hence, 
           Hypotheses 5: SMBO with insider directors with independent outside directorship is 
positively associated to the post-SMBO performance.  
3.3 Sample selection and data description 
3.3.1 Data collection 
           Buyout organizations have a complex ownership structure, with several layers of 
companies. For instance, in some cases, the target company in both primary and secondary 
buyouts is wholly owned by a new company which is usually created as ‘empty shell’ 
company at the time of the buyout(s). The management team and PE firms therefore hold 
the shares of the ‘empty shell’ company. In other cases, there are several layers of new 
created companies at the transaction time or in the following years, which cause the 
ownership structures to change over time. The management team and PE firms therefore 
also hold the shares of the ultimate holding company. Therefore, we establish the ownership 
structure of target companies from 3 years before to 5 years after SMBO transactions using 
the approach from Cornelli and Karakas (2013), by using FAME and annual returns.36  
            We manually collected data of the boards, according to the ownership structure, 
                                                        
34
 Inside directors are defined as full time employees of the company. 
35
 The same variable was used in previous literature, e.g. Masulis and  Mobbs (2011). 
36
 UK companies are required to offer the name lists of board of directors and shareholders in annual returns 
every year. 
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from https://www.duedil.com/, annual returns, annual accounts, Amadeus, and Nexis UK. 37 
We compared the boards of the target companies and the boards of their holding companies. 
The board of the target company may be very small (1 or 2 directors as a symbolic board), 
while all the important decisions are made by the relevant board in the holding company or 
the ultimate holding company. Indeed, there is an overlap between these boards. Specially, 
in some cases all the directors of target companies take seats in the board of the holding 
company on which PE specialists and other affiliated outside directors (e.g. lawyer and 
consultant) also sit. If the board of the holding company includes outside directors or 
directors related to PE sponsors, we identify this board as the relevant board. In other cases, 
the boards of target companies are larger than boards of holding company and include all 
the directors of them. For these cases, we identify the board of the target company as the 
relevant board. 
           Private companies do not provide full information about their directors’ functions. In 
order to obtain the directors’ functions, we use the names of directors’ name and companies’ 
name to search for director’s information by using deal announcements, Bloomberg 
business week website http://investing.businessweek.com/, Linkedin, and zoom 
information http://www.zoominfo.com/.
38
 We believe that this is the most comprehensive 
dataset on SMBO boards used in the literature so far.  
           We followed the following process to clarify the board’s composition. First, we 
identified the directors whose function in the board is venture capitalists or private equity 
specialists, or who are also directors or employees of PE firms or directors (function as 
fund manager, investment banker, or consultant) of companies backed by the same PE firms 
                                                        
37
 Amadeus offers current and previous directors, management, and staff information. Nexis UK provides part 
biography information of directors and individuals.   
38
Zoom information is a B2B data front-runner that provides detailed profiles of 95 million businesspeople all 
over the world. 
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as PE-related directors. Directors nominated by PE firms are also classified as PE-related 
directors. Second, we classified the directors whose function in the board is non-PE related, 
i.e. investment banker, chartered accountant, solicitor, lawyers, businessman, university 
professor, consultant, retired insiders, non-executive director, and non-executive chairman, 
director of an investing companies, advisor, and directors who are executive directors of 
other affiliated companies as outside directors. Independent outside directors do not hold 
ownerships of the target companies and are not employees of affiliated companies. Third, 
we define inside directors as the CEO, executive chairman, president, vice president, CFO, 
COO, managing director, finance director, sales director, operating director, manager, 
marketing director, general managers, company secretary, executive directors of 
subsidiaries, and other executive directors. We extract data on the independent outside 
directorship of insiders from Keynotes, https://www.duedil.com/ and http://company-
director-check.co.uk/. Independent outside directorship is defined as holding a seat in the 
board of unaffiliated companies. Unaffiliated companies are classified as companies of 
which none of block holders is the director of inside director’s home board, which are not 
in the same corporate group as an inside director’s home company, and which do not have 
other observable relationship with the directors or the home company. Finally, we collected 
information on changes in the top management. In most deal announcements of SMBOs, 
the demission of top managers, such CEO, CFO, and/or managing directors, will be 
announced. 39  In cases without a CEO, CFO and managing director, we consider the 
executive chairman as top management. After combining these different data sources, we 
obtained a sample of 262 UK SMBOs from 2000 to 2007.  
           Panel A in Table 3.1 presents the distributions of the sample SMBOs from 2000 to 
                                                        
39
 In cases where we were not able to obtain this information from deal announcements, we turn to board’s 
composition to check the changes in top management. 
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2010, by entry, exit, and PE backing. This panel demonstrates that although there was a 
small decrease from 2002 to 2003, the number of entry SMBOs increased from 2000 
(except non-PE-backed SMBOs), consistent with other worldwide (e.g. Jenkinson and 
Sousa, 2014; Bonini, 2013) and UK (Jelic, 2011; Zhou et al., 2013) studies. This panel also 
demonstrates an increasing trend in the number of exits from SMBOs from 2003 to 2007. 
During 2007 to 2009, the number of exits from SMBOs decreased sharply but returned to 
pre-crisis levels more recently. There are 172 PE-backed and 90 non-PE-backed SMBOs.   
Insert Table 3.1 about here 
           The results of our sample industry distribution by PE backing are reported in Panel B 
of Table 3.1. We classified our sample buyouts into 9 broad industries: Internet and 
Computers, Communications and Electronics, Business and Industrial, Consumer, Energy, 
Biotech and Healthcare, Financial Services, Business Services, and all others.
40
 Similar to 
chapter 2, Business Services (38.93%) is the largest industry group in our sample, followed 
by Consumer (24.05%) and Business and Industrial (22.90%).  PE-backed SMBOs tend to 
be more popular in Consumer sector while less popular in Business and Industrial sector. 
The result of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, however, suggest same industry 
distributions of PE-backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs.  
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
41
 
           Panel A of Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics of the total sample and 
subsamples by PE-backing. Notably, the managerial ownership (MGTSHARE) accounts for 
61.4% on average (60% in median) in full sample, suggesting high managerial ownership 
in SMBOs. Moreover, the median value of it in the non-PE-backed subsample is 100%. 
Second, we observe significant differences between PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
                                                        
40
 For more details, see Zhou et al. (2013). 
41
 Definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix 3.1.  
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subsamples for all variables. PE-backed SMBOs have lower managerial ownership while 
higher leverage than non-PE-backed SMBOs. Also, PE-backed SMBOs exhibit better 
previous performance than non-PE-backed SMBOs. PE-backed SMBOs seem to be larger 
than non-PE-backed SMBOs. But non-PE-backed SMBOs spend longer in the secondary 
stage, compared to PE-backed SMBOs.  
Insert Table 3.2 about here 
           Panel B presents the Pearson correlation for all variables used in our main 
regressions. The significant correlation coefficients between MGTSHARE and LNSIZE and 
MGTSHARE and PE are -0.60 and -0.71, respectively, suggesting potential 
multicollinearity problem in regressions.
42
   
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards: Post- vs. Pre- SMBOs 
           Table 3.3 presents our univariate analysis of board changes and characteristics in the 
sample SMBOs and differences between PE-backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs 
subsamples. The average board size (BS) of the full SMBO sample after SMBO 
transactions is 5.148 (Panel A
43
). As expected, the average board size is lower than in large 
publicly owned companies in the UK.
44
 The average board size of the full sample does not 
change significantly between the pre- and post- SMBO periods.  
           We find that the average board size of PE-backed SMBOs is larger than in non-PE-
backed SMBOs, regardless of the pre-and post-SMBO phases. Furthermore, PE-backed 
                                                        
42
 To resolve this issue, we replace the managerial ownership with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
management participates in the SMBO transaction and zero otherwise. The regression results (See 
Appendix3.2) are qualitatively similar as our main results. Hence, we still use the original variable definition 
for managerial ownership. 
43
 We provide evidence by using median values in Appendix 3.4. The results are similar.  
44
 Guest (2009) for example reports an average board size of 7.18 of his sample of large UK firms from 1981 
to 2002. 
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SMBOs significantly increase the board size by 0.222, on average, after SMBO 
transactions. In contrast, in the non-PE-backed subsample the board size decreases 
significantly by 0.402, on average. We also observed significant changes in the 
configuration of the boards in sample SMBOs. For example, the fraction of inside directors 
on the board (Insiders) decreases significantly (by 4.219% on average) in PE-backed 
subsample while increases significantly (by 10.523% on average) in non-PE-backed 
subsample. There are more directors on average related to (i.e. appointed or employed by) 
PE firms (PED) in the post-SMBO phase (3.381% increase in full sample and 7.944% in 
PE-backed subsample) compared to the pre-SMBO phase. By contrast, the average fraction 
of independent outside directors on the boards (Independent outsiders) decreases 
significantly in both the full sample and the non-PE-backed subsample (1.100% and 2.321% 
on average, respectively). Similarly, we observed a significant decrease in other outsiders 
(Others). Overall, PE-backed SMBOs tend to replace insiders and non-PE-related outsiders 
with PE-related directors. Taking seats on boards, therefore, is still an important corporate 
governance mechanism in PE-backed SMBOs. Notably, the demand for hiring non-PE-
related outsiders is weakened, because PE-related directors, per se, are experienced and 
professional experts who can satisfy the monitoring and advising demands. As expected, in 
non-PE-backed SMBOs more mangers (e.g. insiders) are taking seats on the board. 
Outsiders are more likely to be fired by non-PE-backed SMBOs, as outsiders are usually 
the representatives of the outside shareholders who exit through SMBOs.  
Insert Table 3.3 about here 
           Panel B shows the characteristics of skilled insiders (OD) and their other 
engagements (MOD). In the five year period after the SMBOs, 17.669% of firm-year 
observable SMBOs have skilled insiders with independent outside directorships. The 
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percentage of firm-year observable SMBO boards with skilled insiders in the PE-backed 
subsample (19.766%) is significantly greater than that of non-PE-backed subsample 
(13.911%). PE-backed SMBOs are therefore more likely to recruit skilled insiders onto the 
boards. However, we do not observe statistically significant differences between both 
subsamples with respect to the busy insiders (MOD).   
           Panel C demonstrates that 47.641% of SMBOs of the full sample SMBOs replace 
top managers such as CEOs and CFOs (MGTCHAN) after transactions. More specifically, 
51.416% of SMBOs of the PE-backed subsample change top managers, which is 
significantly greater than in the non-PE-backed subsample (40.909%). Replacing top 
managers is therefore an important corporate governance mechanism adopted by PE firms. 
In addition, our results show that 21.189% of non-PE-backed SMBOs remove PE-related 
directors from their boards after SMBO transactions, along with the exit of selling PE firms.  
3.4.2 Post-SMBO performance 
           We adopt the same measurements of post-SMBO abnormal performance as Barber 
and Lyon (1996).45 Table 3.4 shows the abnormal performance of the sample SMBOs up to 
five years after SMBO transactions. Panel A presents the results of the sample. The results 
from the ‘level’ model demonstrate significant decreases in (unadjusted) performance, 
except for productivity which increases significantly. However, when we control for 
industry performance benchmark (i.e. industry adjusted performance), the results show a 
significant deterioration in performance, except for the sales growth. Underperformance is 
particularly evident in the forms of profitability (AROA), productivity (ASALEMP) and 
employment growth (AEMPG). This is the case both in the terms of the statistical 
significance and the number of companies with negative performance. Panel B presents the 
                                                        
45
 See Chapter 2 for more details.  
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results stratified by PE backing. The results of the PE-backed subsample are similar to the 
results in Panel A. Other than the industry adjusted abnormal performance in productivity, 
the results of the non-PE-backed subsample do not demonstrate strong evidence of 
underperformance after SMBO transactions. When we use industry adjusted measurements, 
we do not observe significant and negative results of employment growth and sales growth. 
Panel C presents the difference values in abnormal performance between PE-backed and 
non-PE-backed SMBOs. We can see that in general PE-backed SMBOs underperform non-
PE-backed SMBOs in terms of profitability and growth ratios. Even though PE-backed 
SMBOs outperform non-PE-backed SMBOs in productivity, this superiority reverses in 
year 5.    
Insert Table 3.4 about here 
3.4.3 Characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance-univariate 
analysis    
           Table 3.5 presents the univariate analysis of post-SMBO abnormal performance and 
key corporate governance variables. In Panel A, column (1) presents the differences in the 
median values of post-SMBO abnormal performance of SMBOs with and without skilled 
insiders (OD). SMBOs with skilled insiders on the boards perform better than their 
counterparts. For instance, the median values of abnormal performances of SMBOs that 
have skilled insiders on the boards are significantly greater than those of SMBOs that do 
not have skilled insiders on the boards in terms of productivity, employment growth, and 
sales growth (unadjusted difference: 0.020, 0.026, and 0.072, respectively; industry 
adjusted difference: 0.017, 0.029, and 0.073, respectively).
46
 
                                                        
46
 The difference in median values of industry adjusted AROS is 0.010, indicating that SMBOs with skilled 
insiders only weakly outperform those without skilled insiders in terms of industry adjusted AROS measured 
profitability.  
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           Column (2) shows the difference in post-SMBO abnormal performance of SMBOs 
with and without replaced top managers (MGTCHAN). We do not observe strong evidence 
that SMBOs which replace top managers have a better post-SMBO abnormal performance 
than SMBOs not replacing top managers, except with regard to employment growth and 
unadjusted AROA. For example, the industry adjusted employment growth of SMBOs with 
replacing top managers is significantly smaller compared to their counterparts which did 
not replace top managers. 
           Column (3) focuses on the importance of removing PE-related directors from the 
board (removed PED). We tested the difference in abnormal performance between non-PE-
backed SMBOs that used to have PE-related directors before transaction and non-PE-
backed SMBOs that did not have PE-related directors either before or after SMBOs. We 
found that the former performs significantly worse than the latter in terms of employment 
growth (unadjusted difference: -0.063; industry adjusted difference: -0.076) and sales 
growth (industry adjusted difference: -0.084). These results suggest the importance of PE-
related directors in improving the target companies’ performance.   
Insert Table 3.5 about here 
           In Panel B, we compare the median values of post-SMBO abnormal performance of 
SMBOs with and without skilled insiders and changing top managers in terms of PE 
backing. With respect to the PE-backed subsample, SMBOs with skilled insiders on the 
boards perform better than their counterparts in employment growth (industry adjusted) and 
sales growth (both unadjusted and industry adjusted). SMBOs with top managers’ 
replacement outperform their counterparts in industry adjusted productivity while 
underperforming in industry adjusted employment growth. As to the non-PE-backed 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
135 
 
subsample, compared to SMBOs without skilled insiders on the boards, SMBOs with 
skilled insiders on the boards perform better in ROS measured profitability (both unadjusted 
and industry adjusted), productivity (unadjusted), employment growth (industry adjusted), 
and sales growth (both unadjusted and industry adjusted). SMBOs which replace top 
managers perform better than others in unadjusted profitability (measured by both ROA and 
ROS). Overall, skilled insiders tend to play a more important role in the non-PE-backed 
subsample.    
3.4.4 Characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance-multivariate 
analysis    
           To test our hypotheses on the influence of board structure on post-SMBO 
performance, we use random-effects GLS regression.  
APit=α+β1LNBSit+β2 PEDit+β3Independent outsidersit+β4MGTCHANi+β5ODit+β6MODit
+β
7
MGTSHARit 
          +β
8
GEARit++β9LNDURATIONi+β10LNSIZEi+β11Crisisit+β12ROAt-1i+β13PEi
+ε
it
              (Equation 1) 
Where, dependent variables (APit) are abnormal performance ratios of profitability (AROA, 
AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), and sales growth 
(ASALG). In addition to the control variables used in previous chapter, we include two 
important governance mechanisms of buyouts: managerial ownership (MGTSHARE) and 
leverage (GEAR). We also control for busy directors (MOD), as too many independent 
outside directorships (more than three) may decrease their attractiveness to their home 
board (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). The regression includes entry year dummies and 
industry dummies to control for time factor and industry factor. In order to correct for the 
heteroskedasticity of standard errors, z-statistics are based on robust standard errors. We 
also omit variables that cause multicollinearity problems.  
           The results of our regression models for the full sample are presented in Table 3.6. 
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Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performances while Panel B uses industry adjusted 
abnormal performance as a robustness test. In Panel A, the R-squared of the models varies 
from 5.71% (estimates for ASALEMP) to 14.10% (estimates for AROA). In Panel B, the R-
squared of the models varies from 6.37% (estimates for ASALG) to 12.25% (estimates for 
AROA). Wald Chi2 is statistically significant in the models of all performance measures in 
both panels.  
Insert Table 3.6 about here 
           We expected the board size (LNBS) to have a positive relationship with post-SMBO 
performance (H1). In Panel A, the coefficients on board size are not statistically significant, 
except for the model with the abnormal performance in employment growth (AEMPG). In 
AEMPG regression the coefficient on board size is negative and marginally significant 
(coefficient: -0.100, z-stat: -1.891). When we control for industry benchmark (Panel B), the 
coefficients for board size remain not statistically significant in all models. These do not 
lend support to H1. A possible reason could be related to our earlier findings that the 
average board size of the full sample does not change significantly after SMBO transactions.  
           We predicted a positive effect of the fraction of PE-related directors on the board 
(PED) on post-SMBO performance (H2). In Panel A, the effect of the fraction of PE-related 
directors on the board is positive and significant in the model for AROA (coefficient: 0.233, 
z-stat: 2.501), marginally significant in the model for ASALEMP (coefficient: 0.103, z-stat: 
1.781), marginally significant in the model for ASALG (coefficient: 0.396, z-stat: 1.826), 
and insignificant in the other two models. The variation in the magnitude of the coefficient 
suggests that the fraction of PE-related directors on the board matters most for profitability 
(AROA) and sales growth (ASALG). For example, a one point increase in the fraction of PE-
related directors on the board leads to 23.3% and 39.6% increases in AROA and ASALG, 
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while only 10.3% increases in ASALEMP. These findings are consistent with our prediction. 
When we use industry adjusted abnormal performance as the dependent variables, we find 
that the magnitude of the coefficient increases, compared to those from regressions using 
unadjusted abnormal performance (Panel B). For instance, a one point increase in the 
fraction of PE-related directors on the board leads to 24.8% (z-stat: 2.492), 11.4% (z-stat: 
1.722), and 42.2% (z-stat: 2.009) increases in AROA, ASALEMP, and ASALG, respectively. 
           The coefficients for independent outsiders (Independent outsiders) are not 
statistically significant (models in both Panel A and Panel B), except in the model for 
AEMPG (Panel A). The positive impact of the fraction of independent outsiders on 
unadjusted abnormal performance in employment growth is economically and statistically 
significant (coefficient: 0.493, z-stat: 1.995), suggesting that a one point increase in the 
fraction of independent outsiders on the board will increase the unadjusted abnormal 
performance in employment growth by 49.3%. Thus, we find little evidence to support our 
H3. One interpretation of the above results is that PE-related directors already possess the 
necessary skills, experience, and knowledge, causing independent outsiders to be less 
important.    
           We also predicted that replacing top managers on the boards (MGTCHAN), 
especially CEOs, will improve post-SMBO performance (H4). Nevertheless, we only 
demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between replacing top managers and 
post-SMBO performance in both unadjusted (coefficient: 0.124, z-stat: 2.573) and industry 
adjusted (coefficient: 0.123, z-stat: 2.35) ASALG. This result is consistent with those in 
Cornelli and Karakar’s paper (2013) that CEO turnover is not sensitive to previous 
performance and does not improve post-buyout operating performance. 
           Finally, we expected that skilled inside directors will enhance post-SMBO 
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performance (H5). In other words, SMBOs with skilled insiders (OD) perform better than 
others.
 47
 The coefficients for skilled insiders are not statistically significant in regressions 
for unadjusted and industry adjusted abnormal performance in profitability (measured by 
both AROA and AROS). In Panel A, the coefficients for SMBOs with skilled insiders are 
positive and marginally significant in the model for ASALEMP (coefficient: 0.028, z-stat: 
1.651), significant in the model for AEMPG (coefficient: 0.080, z-stat: 2.309), marginally 
significant in the model for ASALG (coefficient: 0.085, z-stat: 1.688). The SMBOs with 
skilled insiders on the boards (OD) exhibit higher positive changes in unadjusted 
productivity, employment growth, and sales growth. When using industry adjusted 
abnormal performance as the dependent variables in these three models (Panel B), the 
magnitude of the coefficients increases and the absolute values of t statistics become greater, 
suggesting even more influence on the post-SMBO performance. These results are 
consistent with our univariate analysis and our H5. Overall, skilled insiders (OD) are an 
important driver of post-SMBO performance.  
           Among the control variables, the busy directors dummy (MOD) does not impact 
post-SMBO performance. Higher leverage (GEAR) is associated with lower profitability 
(unadjusted: AROA and AROS; industry adjusted: AROS) in the post-SMBO phase.
48
 As 
expected, the recent financial crisis is negatively associated with profitability (unadjusted 
AROS), productivity (industry adjusted ASALEMP), employment growth (unadjusted and 
industry adjusted AEMPG), and sales growth (unadjusted ASALG). Previous performance is 
negatively related to post-SMBO performance in profitability (unadjusted and industry 
adjusted AROA and AROS). Notably, PE backing (PE) does not seem to be an important 
                                                        
47
 We re-estimate the regressions with an alternative measure for skilled insiders by using the fraction of 
insiders (those we can identify the functions) with independent outside directorships on the board. The results 
are qualitatively similar, expect from the OD loses its significance in the model of ASALEMP. 
48
 This result is in line with the evidence that SMBOs are cutting investments in order to meet their debt 
payments (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014). 
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factor of post-SMBOs performance.  
3.5 Robustness checks and further analysis 
3.5.1 Potential endogeneity 
           Endogeneity is viewed as an important and pervasive issue in empirical corporate 
finance research that investigates the causes and effects of financial decisions, due to the 
difficulty of obtaining suitable exogenous factors that reveal the actual relations of causes 
and effects (Wintoki et al., 2012). Endogeneity, therefore, can lead to bias and inconsistent 
estimates that make the results spurious (Roberts and Whited, 2014). For example, we 
usually cannot detect whether the cause and effect relationship between governance 
mechanisms and company performance is reversed or whether governance mechanisms and 
performance are simultaneously caused by other unobservable factors (e.g. Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2001; Wintoki et al., 2012).  
           Roberts and Whited (2012) suggest two main causes of endogeneity: omitted 
variables and simultaneity. Wintoki et al. (2012) add a further cause, namely dynamic 
endogeneity, which is caused by the past company’s performance determining the current 
values of board structure variables which in turn affect the current performance. Empirical 
studies demonstrate that all the three causes affect the relationship between governance 
structure and company performance (e.g. Hartzell et al., 2006). Corporate governance 
researchers usually prefer fixed effects panel models (Wintoki et al., 2012). These 
traditional methods, however, assume the absence of dynamic endogeneity. This 
assumption is not realistic. Therefore, Wintoki et al. (2012) introduce dynamic generalized 
method of moments (GMM) panel models. This approach includes a lagged value of 
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performance in the regression and use system GMM estimation method
49
 to solve the 
edogeineity issues, especially, the dynamic process that exists in the relationship between 
board structure and performance.  Thus, we estimate the following dynamic panel model 
via GMM by employing an instrumental variables set of the lagged values of our dependent 
and independent variables, except for Crisis:
 50
       
APit=α+κAPit-1+γ1LNBSit+γ2 PEDit+γ3Independent outsidersit+γ4MGTCHANi+γ5ODit+γ6MODit  
+γ7MGTSHARit+γ8GEARit+γ9LNDURATIONi+γ10LNSIZEi+γ11Crisisit+γ12ROAt-1i+γ13PEi+μi+εit 
                                                                                                                                               (Equation 2)                         
 The results are presented in Table 3.7. The coefficient estimates for board size (LNBS) are 
not statistically significant in all models. Our results show that the Hansen tests yield p-
values greater than the 10% significant level, suggesting that our instrumental variables are 
valid. Similarly, the p-values from the Arellano-Bond test of second order serial correlation 
AR (2) test are greater than 0.1 and as such, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
second order serial correlation. Therefore, our main finding on the relationship between 
board size and post-SMBO performance is not driven by omitted variables, simultaneity, 
and dynamic endogeneity. However, the F-test for model goodness of fit are very small and 
insignificant for all models, except the model with AROS, indicating that dynamic GMM is 
not suitable to our dataset or that our model is mis-specified.    
Insert Table 3.7 about here 
           One interpretation is that in (primary) buyouts in general, and in SMBOs in 
                                                        
49
 System GMM estimation procedure firstly takes the first difference of equation 2 to eliminate the potential 
bias from time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. Then it estimates the system which consists of both first 
difference model and original model (equation 2 here) via GMM using lagged values of endogenous variables 
(all independent variables except Crisis here) as instruments for the current changes in these endogenous 
variables. One important assumption for this estimation procedure is that these lagged values are exogenous 
and determinants of the changes in these endogenous variables. This assumption is motivated by the theory of 
corporate governance.   
50
 xtabond2 command in Stata (See Appendix 3.3).  
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particular, the above sources of endogeneity may be of less importance. The arrival of PE 
investors and the subsequent changes they make are less likely to be a consequence of a 
negotiation process between the CEO and board members as is normally the case in large 
publicly owned companies. Instead, they are rather abrupt changes imposed by the PE 
firms.51 The abrupt changes are part of the PE’s tool kit for performance improvement. PE 
firms tend to have (almost) all the power to make changes irrespective of the previous 
performance. In non-PE-backed (primary and even more secondary) buyouts ownership is 
concentrated in hands of manager-owners so the bargaining position of the boards is again 
very limited. 
3.5.2 Potential selection biases 
3.5.2.1 PE investment 
           In the SMBO context, we conjecture that PE firms execute due diligence to invest in 
companies with certain characteristics that lead to the success in the SMBO phase. This 
may lead to sample selection bias. The conjecture is in line with our sample descriptive 
statistics (Table 3.2) which suggests significant differences of size and pre-SMBO 
performance between PE-backed SMBOs and non-PE-backed SMBOs.  
           To address issues related to the potential selection bias, we employed a Heckman 
(1979) two-step model similar as Chapter 2 as a robustness test. The two step regressions 
are as follows: 
PEi=α+β1BSERVICESi+β2LNSIZEi+β3ROAt-1i+εi                                                              (Equation 3) 
APit=α+β1LNBSit+β2 PEDit+β3Independent outsidersit+β4MGTCHANi+β5ODit+β6MODit
+β
7
MGTSHAR
it
 
   +β
8
GEARit++β9LNDURATIONi+β10LNSIZEi+β11Crisisit+β12ROAt-1i+β13PEi
+β
14
Lambda1i+ε
it
       
       (Equation 4) 
                                                        
51
 Using the terminology of Wintoki et al., (2012), they tend to be much closer to a ‘natural experiment’. 
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           In the first step, we estimated a Probit regression with a robust variance estimate for 
the probability of a new PE firm’s involvement in a sample SMBO. The dependent variable 
(PE) is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the SMBO is PE-backed and 0 otherwise 
(equation 3).52 We hypothesize that the choice of a PE firm to invest in an SMBO is 
associated with size of the SMBO (LNSIZE), pre-SMBO performance (ROAt-1), and the 
target company’s industry (BSERVICES).53 Lambda1 is the estimated probability of a PE 
firm’s investment in an SMBO. In the second step, we include Lambda1 as an additional 
explanatory variable.  
          The results of the Probit model and new panel regressions are presented in Table 3.8. 
Notably, the coefficient on the previous profitability in the Probit model is not statistically 
significant. Larger companies are more likely to become targets for SMBOs than smaller 
ones. The panel regression results are economically and statistically consistent with those 
reported in Table 3.6, except from the model for AEMPG. In the model for AEMPG, the 
fraction of PE-related directors on the boards (PED) is significantly and positively related 
to the changes in employment growth (coefficient: 0.371, z-stat: 1.718). Furthermore, 
Lambda1 is significant, indicating the existence of a sample selection bias in the AEMPG 
model. Other main results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.6. Our main results in 
Table 3.6 are, therefore, qualitatively robust to the potential sample selection bias. 
Insert Table 3.8 about here 
3.5.2.2 PE-related directors  
           Another potential selection bias could be caused by the decision of PE firms to 
appoint PE-related directors onto the board. This decision may be driven by the target 
                                                        
52
 The Hosmer-Lemeshow suggests that the Probit model fits our data while the Logit model does not.  
53
 The selected variables were identified as important variables for PE’s investments in the existing literature. 
See Brau et al., (2003) and Strömberg, (2008) for size; Bienz, (2004) for pre-event performance; and Berger et 
al., (1999) and Bayar and Chemmanur, (2006) for industry. 
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companies’ quality and PE firms’ ability to identify good deals (Chahine and Georgen, 
2011). For instance, syndicated PE firms are more likely to take more seats on the board 
than others. Highly reputed PE firms are also more likely to identify good deals, hence, less 
likely to take seats on the boards than others. Similarly, high leverage could cause target 
companies under banks’ close scrutiny, so PE firms may be less likely to take seats than 
deals with low leverage. Changing the top managers also reduces the probability of 
appointing PE-related directors. To address this issue, we employed a Heckman (1979) two-
step model again with the PE-backed SMBO subsample. The two step regressions are as 
follows: 
PED dummy
it
=α+β
1
Club dealsi+β2Top10i+β3LNSIZEi+ β4PEi+β5GEARit+β6MGTCHANi+β7Crisisit 
                             + β
8
ROAt-1
i
+εit                                                                                     (Equation 5) 
APit=α+β1LNBSit+β2 PEDit+β3Independent outsidersit+β4MGTCHANi+β5ODit+β6MODit
+β7MGTSHARit 
 +β
8
GEARit++β9LNDURATIONi+β10LNSIZEi+β11Crisisit+β12ROAt-1i+β13PEi
+β
14
Lambda2i+ε
it
          
(Equation 6)                                      
           In the first step, we estimated a Logit regression with a robust variance estimate for 
the probability of PE firms holding seats on the board of the sample SMBO. The dependent 
variable (PED dummy) is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the SMBO board has PE-
related directors and 0 otherwise (equation 5).54 We hypothesized that the decision of a PE 
firm to appoint its own people onto the board is associated with the following: whether the 
deal is syndicated or not (Club deals); the high reputation of the leading PE firms (Top10); 
the size of the SMBO (LNSIZE); whether the SMBO is PE backed (PE); leverage (GEAR); 
whether the board replaces top managers (MGTCHAN); financial crisis (Crisis); and pre-
SMBO performance (ROAt-1). 55  Lambda2 is the estimated probability of PE-related 
                                                        
54
 The Hosmer-Lemeshow suggests that Logit model fits to our data while Probit model does not.  
55
 The selected variables were identified as important variables for PE-related directors in previous literature 
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directors on the boards. In the second step, we include Lambda2 as an additional 
explanatory variable. All results are presented in Table 3.9. The results are consistent with 
our main results presented in Table 3.6 and Lambda2 is insignificant in all models. The 
self-selection bias related to PE-related directors is, therefore, not important in our dataset. 
Insert Table 3.9 about here 
3.5.3 Replacement of top managers and previous performance   
           Companies with poor performance tend to replace CEOs (Hermalin and Weisback, 
2003). Thus, the impact of replacing top managers will depend on companies’ previous 
performance. And companies that perform poorly would be more likely replace top 
managers (e.g. Christian and Marc, 2011). We, therefore, include an interactive variable 
(ROAt-1* MGTCHAN) between the dummy variable for the replacement of top managers 
(MGTCHAN) and the (continuous) variable for previous performance (ROAt-1). If the 
decision to replace top managers depends on previous performance, the coefficient on this 
interactive variable should be significant.  
           The coefficients for the interactive variable represented in Table 3.10 are not 
statistically significant. The relationship between the decision to replace top managers and 
post-SMBO performance is not statistically affected by the previous performance.  
Insert Table 3.10 about here 
3.5.4 PE-related directors and PE firm’s reputation 
           Highly-reputed PE firms often hire better PE specialists and invest in more 
companies.
56
 Given that the number of PE specialists is limited, holding multiple board 
seats will increase the number of portfolio companies per PE specialist. As a consequence, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(see Chahine and Georgen, 2011; Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). 
56
 Here we only discuss the leading PE firms.  
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PE specialists will not be able to spend enough time and energy on a single company and 
probably fail to add value. Alternatively, PE firms could hire more PE specialists to meet 
the demand for their expertise. We expect that highly-reputed PE firms can attract better 
specialists and achieve more efficient allocation of PE specialists across portfolio 
companies. Thus, the reputation of PE firms may affect the relationship between the 
fraction of PE-related directors and post-SMBO abnormal performance.  
           We therefore introduce the interaction term (PED*Top10) of highly-reputed PE firms 
(Top10) and the fraction of PE-related (PED). 
57
 Hence, we repeated the regressions for the 
PE-backed subsample. The results are reported in Table 3.11. The interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant in the model for AROS (coefficient: -0.381, z-stat: -
2.691); significant in the model for AEMPG (coefficient: -0.860, z-stat: -2.630); marginally 
significant in the model for ASALG (coefficient: -0.723, z-stat: -1.740); and not significant 
in the other two models. When SMBOs are backed by highly-reputed PE firms, the fraction 
of PE-related directors has a weaker relationship with post-SMBO performance. 
Interestingly, the negative effect of the interaction term is greater than the main effect of the 
fraction of PE-related directors. As a consequence, the total effect of the fraction of PE-
related directors will be negative in SMBOs backed by highly reputable PE firms.  
Insert Table 3.11 about here 
3.5.5 Removal of PE-related directors  
           In the univariate analysis we find that non-PE-backed SMBOs that remove PE-
related directors from the board tend to underperform their counterparts. The boards 
undergoing transition towards operating without having PE-related directors may be badly 
affected and thus perform worse than those whose boards not undergoing such a transition. 
                                                        
57
 We create a dummy variable (Top10) for top 10 PE firms. 
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Hence, we included a dummy variable for the removal of PE-related directors from the 
respective board (Remove PED) and repeated the regressions for the non-PE-backed 
subsample. 
           The results are presented in Table 3.12. Surprisingly, the coefficients on the dummy 
variable of removing PE-related directors are not statistically significant in all models. 
Moreover, our results show the coefficients for our main explanatory variables (LNBS, 
Independent outsiders, MGTCHAN, and OD) are not statistically significant. The 
coefficient for replacing top managers (MGTCHAN) in model for AROS measured 
profitability (coefficient:-0.115; z-stat: -1.959) is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
One possible explanation for the insignificant coefficient for having skilled insiders on 
boards (OD) could be that the investors in non-PE-backed SMBOs tend to be senior 
managers. If they held seats on the boards in the pre-SMBO phase, they would not be able 
to bring a new expertise to the boards in the post-SMBOs phase. Furthermore, manager-
shareholders might not be as good at choosing skilled executives as PE firms.     
Insert Table 3.12 about here 
3.5.6 Early vs. late exits  
           Primary PE firms may exit early due to the limited life of PE fund or may try to 
enhance their reputation by creating a track record of exits. When PE firms exit early, 
especially in the first 2-3 years, the value creation potential may not be exhausted, thus 
leaving performance improvement potential for the secondary round. Both Arcot et al. 
(2014) and Degeorge et al. (2013) find that SMBO exits are more likely when sellers are 
under exiting pressure to exit than those not encountering such pressure. Under this 
scenario, corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. changing top managers, employing 
independent outsiders) should improve the operating performance as a result. In SMBOs 
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with long holding periods in the pre-SMBO phase, the relationships between the measures 
of the mechanisms adopted to improve the monitoring and advisory functions of boards and 
the post-SMBO performance are therefore expected to be weaker.   
  Insert Table 3.13 about here 
        We stratified the SMBO sample by duration of time spent in the primary stage. We 
classified SMBOs with a primary holding period of less than 3 years and of equal to or 
longer than 3 years into the ‘early’ subsample and the ‘late’ subsample, respectively.5859 The 
results are presented in Table 3.13. Our results of ‘early’ subsample (Panel A) show that the 
coefficient for the fraction of PE-related directors (PED) is positive and marginally 
statistically significant in the model for AEMPG (coefficient: 0.732, z-stat: 1.798). The 
fraction of independent outsiders is positively and significantly associated with post-SMBO 
performance in AEMPG (coefficient: 2.144, z-stat: 2.309) and ASALG (coefficient: 1.898, 
z-stat: 1.840). It should be noticed that the magnitudes of the coefficients are very high. 
Independent outsiders tend to play a crucial role in improving post-SMBO growth 
performance. Moreover, the effect of replacing top managers (MGTCHAN) is stronger than 
the results for the full sample. For instance, the coefficient on replacing top managers is 
0.098 (z-stat: 2.105) in the model for AROA measured profitability and 0.366 (z-stat: 2.150) 
in ASALG. In addition, we find that having skilled insiders (OD) is positively and 
significantly related to the post-SMBO performance in AROA measured profitability 
(coefficient: 0.093, z-stat: 2.621) and AEMPG (coefficient: 0.261, z-stat: 2.319).  
           In the case of the ‘late’ subsample (Panel B), we found a stronger impact of the 
                                                        
58
 We also considered analyzing cases where the holding period was shorter than 2 years. However, there are 
only 19 SMBOs that meet this criterion, causing the regression to be invalid. 
59
 According to Appendix 3.5, we found that the median values of dependent variables (AROA, AROS, 
AEMPG, and ASALG) of these two subsamples are statistically similar, except from ASALEMP. 
Nevertheless, the median values (or the proportions of dummy variables) of the two subsamples are 
significantly different for most explanatory variables, especially, the tested BS, PED, Independent outsiders, 
and OD. 
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fraction of PE-related directors (PED) on the post-SMBO performance compared to the 
results in ‘early’ subsample. For instance, the coefficient for the fraction of PE-related 
directors is positive and marginally significant in the model for AROA (coefficient: 0.179, 
z-stat: 1.778), significant in the model for AEMPG (coefficient: 0.219, z-stat: 2.730), and 
significant in the model for ASALG (coefficient: 0.137, z-stat: 2.161). We also find a 
significantly positive relationship between skilled insiders (OD) and ASALEMP, lending 
some support to the argument that SMBOs exited late in the primary stage are difficult and 
could have no value creation room left.    
           The above results demonstrate that the characteristics of the board of directors play 
an important role in the performance improvement in the ‘early’ subsample. Furthermore, 
for more difficult SMBOs (i.e. the ‘late’ subsample) with a little performance improvement 
potential left, the special skills of PE-related directors tend to be of crucial importance.        
3.5.7 Tested-down regression model
60
 
         First, we conducted the regressions with all parameters (as in Panel A of Table 3.6). 
Second, we excluded the variables with the most insignificant coefficients (those have the 
smallest z-stat) and re-ran the regressions. This procedure was repeated until all remaining 
variables have statistically significant coefficients. The final results are presented in Table 
3.14. 
           The results highlight the importance of boards in enhancing SMBOs’ performance. 
For instance, the significant and positive impact of PE-related directors (PED) on the post-
SMBO performance is observed in all models, except in the model for AROS. Having 
                                                        
60
 We employed Theil’s R^2 criterion to compare equation (1) with these tested-down regression models. The 
results prefer equation (1). Furthermore, the motivation to process the tested-down regression models was to 
examine whether the significances of our focus variables will be affected by excluding insignificant variables 
(multicollinearity issue). Our interest of this chapter is to investigate the impact of all the hypothesized 
independent variables on the dependent variables based on the theories, no matter the results are significant or 
insignificant. Thus, the model selection strategies should not be a critical issue in our case. 
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skilled inside directors (OD) significantly improves post-SMBO performance in terms of 
employment growth (AEMPG) and sales growth (ASALG). The coefficients for board size, 
independent outsiders, and replacing top managers are qualitatively similar to our main 
results reported in Table 3.6. Overall, the boards mainly affect growth performance 
(AEMPG and ASALG) of SMBOs.    
Insert Table 3.14 about here 
3.6 Conclusion 
           Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of 262 UK SMBO deals, we analyzed 
important changes in the board of directors in SMBOs and their effect on post-SMBO 
performance. We argue that the new board structures could improve SMBOs’ performance. 
Our univariate results document significant changes in the board of directors in SMBOs. 
There are also significant differences between our PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
subsamples. For example, the board size decreases significantly in the non-PE-backed 
subsample while PE-backed SMBOs tend to increase the size of their boards after SMBO 
transactions. Non-PE-backed SMBOs are more likely to increase the fraction of insiders. 
Boards in the non-PE-backed subsample exhibit a significant decrease in the fraction of 
independent outsiders. In contrast, PE-backed SMBOs appoint more PE-related directors in 
the post-SMBO transaction phase than in the pre-SMBO transaction phase. PE-backed 
SMBOs are also more likely to replace top managers (e.g. CEO/CFOs), and appoint skilled 
insiders as directors. 
          The results from the univairate analysis show statistically significant 
underperformance after SMBOs. Furthermore, SMBOs with skilled insiders outperform 
SMBOs without skilled insiders especially in terms of productivity and growth. The results 
are robust to alternative performance measures. We also find that removing PE-related 
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directors leads to worse post-SMBO performance in employment growth and sales growth. 
However, we find little evidence that SMBOs that replace the top managers perform better 
than others.   
           As to the multivariate results, we have documented the lack of a statistically 
significant influence of board size on performance (i.e. profitability, productivity, sales 
growth). The results contradict the evidence for samples of larger publicly owned (Yermack, 
1996) and smaller closely held (non-buyout) companies (Eisenberg et al., 1998) and are 
more in line with Wintoki et al. (2012). Furthermore, our results show that the fraction of 
PE-related directors on the board has a positive and significant impact on post-SMBO 
performance in profitability (AROA), productivity, and sales growth. In addition, appointing 
skilled insiders onto the board leads to better post-SMBO performance in productivity, 
employment growth, and sales growth. This is consistent with the results of our univariate 
analysis. Finally, we find little evidence that the fraction of independent outsiders and 
replacing top managers improves post-SMBO performance. The fraction of independent 
outsiders has a positive and significant relationship only with post-SMBO employment 
growth. Replacing top managers only enhances post-SMBO performance in sales growth. 
These results are robust to alternative abnormal performance benchmarks and potential 
selection biases.  The tested-down model method also supports our main results. 
           We perform dynamic panel GMM estimation to address the potential endogeneity 
issue suggested by the corporate governance literature. However, all models, expect from 
the model for AROS, and exhibit no evidence of a significant endogeneity problem. 
           Our robustness checks show that previous performance does not significantly affect 
the relationship between replacing top managers and post-SMBO performance. Secondly, 
the impact of PE-related directors on improving post-SMBO performance tends to be 
151 
 
alleviated by PE reputation. This result suggests the importance of PE firms’ experience, 
knowledge, and /or network on enhancing target company performance. Thirdly, we 
examined the influence of the removal of PE-related directors on post-SMBO performance 
in non-PE-backed subsample. However, we did not obtain any evidence to support the 
importance of removal of PE-related directors for the performance. Finally, we compared 
the early and late exits. In the subsample of “difficult” SMBOs (‘late’ exit), appointing 
more PE-related directors tends to be the most important driver for the performance 
improvement. In the ‘early’ subsample, including independent outsiders, replacing top 
managers, and having skilled insiders play a more important role in performance 
improvement.        
           This chapter has highlighted the importance of the board of directors for post-SMBO 
performance. Although SMBOs tend to underperform, there are still ways to improve 
performance via the impact of the board of directors. This is especially the case for 
employment and sales growth. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of SMBOs 
tend to be in an expansion phase which requires idiosyncratic, skills, and capabilities to 
exploit growth opportunities. In another words, the boards tend to enhance the boards’ 
advisory function of SMBOs. 
           There are several limitations to our research. First, we were not always able to obtain 
full information on board composition for our sample, especially concerning the 
classification of executive and non-executive directors. Second, the reasons for changes in 
top management were not always clearly disclosed. This issue prevents us from further 
investigating the reasons for the negative relationship between top management change and 
post-SMBO performance in employment growth.  
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Table 3.1: Sample distribution across years and industries 
This table shows SMBOs distribution across years and industries by full sample and PE backing. Panel A 
shows the number of entry and exited SMBOs across the years. Exit is defined as the SMBO which was 
exited by 31
st
, December, 2010. Panel B shows industry distribution of SMBOs. Reported figures are the 
proportion of SMBOs in industry groups. Reported P-value is two samples Kolmogorov Smirnov (K-S) test 
for the difference in industry distributions across PE backing. Details of industry grouping are discussed in 
section 3.3.1. 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution across years 
    Full sample           PE backing      
       
PE 
  
Non PE 
Year   Entry   Exit 
 
Entry   Exit 
 
Entry   Exit 
2000 
 
6 
   
4 
   
2 
  2001 
 
18 
   
12 
   
6 
  2002 
 
26 
   
13 
   
13 
  2003 
 
16 
 
2 
 
7 
 
2 
 
9 
  2004 
 
44 
 
5 
 
28 
 
4 
 
16 
 
1 
2005 
 
49 
 
10 
 
28 
 
5 
 
21 
 
5 
2006 
 
48 
 
13 
 
37 
 
12 
 
11 
 
1 
2007 
 
55 
 
23 
 
43 
 
17 
 
12 
 
6 
2008 
   
16 
   
8 
   
8 
2009 
   
12 
   
8 
   
4 
2010 
   
17 
   
12 
   
5 
Total   262   98   172   68   90   30 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution across industries 
    Full sample   PE backing  
Industry (%):       PE    Non PE 
1. Internet &Computers 2.67 
 
2.91 
 
2.22 
2. Communications  & Electronics 3.82 
 
3.49 
 
4.44 
3. Business & Industrial 22.9 
 
18.02 
 
32.22 
4. Consumer 
 
24.05 
 
26.74 
 
18.89 
5. Energy 
 
1.15 
 
1.16 
 
1.11 
6. Biotech and Healthcare 3.82 
 
5.81 
 
0 
7. Business Services 38.93 
 
38.95 
 
38.89 
8. All other 
 
2.67 
 
2.91 
 
2.22 
Total sample   100   65.65   34.35 
P-value  of PE vs. Non-PE:                     0.133 
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Table 3.2: Sample descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation 
This table shows sample descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations. Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
of the full sample (mean, median and standard deviation) and across PE backing (median) for control 
variables: management share (MGTSHARE), leverage (GEAR), return on assets  in year prior to SMBO(ROAt-
1), the logarithm of the holding period (LNDURATION), the logarithm of the size of SMBOs (LNSIZE), 
financial crisis (Crisis), and PE backing (PE). N is the number of SMBOs for ROAt-1, LNDURATION, LNSIZE, 
and PE and is the number of firm-year observations for MGTSHARE, GEAR, and Crisis, up to five year after 
SMBO transactions. Differences are the differences of median values between PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
SMBOs. The Mann Whitney test is used to test the differences. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations for 
all variables. ***, **, *, indicate the significance of the test at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels respectively. The 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  
 
Full sample 
  
 
PE backing (median) 
  N mean S.D. median 
 
PE Non PE Differences 
MGTSHARE 853 0.614 0.341 0.600 
 
0.406 1.000 -0.594*** 
GEAR 727 1.421 1.850 0.730 
 
0.770 0.640 0.129** 
ROAt-1 255 0.115 0.131 0.100 
 
0.115 0.085 0.030*** 
LNDURATION 262 1.721 0.192 1.732 
 
1.708 1.820 -0.112*** 
LNSIZE 261 2.735 1.650 2.862 
 
3.588 1.030 2.558*** 
Crisis 1285 0.596 0.491 1 
 
1 1 0.000*** 
PE 262 0.653 0.476 1 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
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Panel B: Pearson correlations  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) 
ARROA(1) 1                                 
ARROS(2) 0.48*** 1                               
ARSALEMP(3) 0.16*** 0.08* 1                             
AREMPG(4) 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.04 1                           
ARSALG(5) 0.20*** 0.07 0.38*** 0.62*** 1                         
LNBS(6) 0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.07* 0.00 1                       
PED(7) -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.34*** 1                     
Independent outsiders  
(8) 
-0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.09** 0.12*** 0.08*** -0.05* 1                   
MGTCHAN (9) 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.10** -0.05** 0.06** 0 1                 
OD (10) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09** 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1               
MOD(11) -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.07* 0.07** 0.01 -0.02 0 0.48*** 1             
MGTSHARE(12) 0.14*** 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.34*** -0.54*** -0.14*** -0.08** -0.11*** -0.04 1           
GEAR(13) -0.03 -0.04 0 -0.06 -0.04 0.09** 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.08** 0.03 -0.15*** 1         
LNDURATION (14) -0.09** 0.04 0.15*** 0.05 -0.04 -0.25*** -0.25*** 0.07** 0.02 -0.07** -0.02 0.22*** -0.10*** 1       
LNSIZE (15) -0.07** 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.39*** 0.48*** 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0 -0.60*** 0.09** -0.19*** 1     
Crisis(16) 0.01 0.01 -0.10** -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.14*** -0.07** -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07* -0.06* -0.23*** 0.12*** 1   
ROAt-1(17) -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.01 
-
0.13*** 
-0.10** 0.08** 0.05* 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.08** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.02 1 
PE (18) -0.09*** -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.26*** 0.57*** 0.05** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.04** -0.71*** 0.10*** -0.19*** 0.55*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
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Table 3.3: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards- univariate analysis 
This table presents changes and characteristics of SMBO boards, up to five years after SMBO transactions. Panel A shows changes in board size and board composition. 
Presented values are mean values of each variable three years pre- and five years post- SMBO transactions. Difference values are calculated as post-SMBO mean value 
of each variable minus its pre-SMBO mean value. Panel B reports the percentage of firm-year observations of SMBOs with skilled inside directors (OD) and the 
percentage of firm-year observations of SMBOs with busy inside directors (MOD) during SMBO phases, for the full sample and by PE-backing. The difference value 
is the difference of these values between PE-backed and non-PE-backed subsamples. Panel C presents the percentages of SMBOs that changed the top management in 
transaction year (MGTCHAN), and the percentage of non-PE-backed SMBOs that removed PE directors from the boards in the transaction year (Remove PED). We 
used a two-tailed t-test and two-sample proportion test of the differences in means and proportions, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. *, **, ***, 
are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 Panel A: 
No. of 
observations    
Full sample    PE backing (mean) 
  
Mean 
 
PE 
 
Non- PE 
  
Post Pre Difference 
 
Post  Pre Difference  
 
Post  Pre Difference  
BS (N) 1832 5.148 5.154 -0.006 
 
5.509 5.287 0.222** 
 
4.509 4.911 -0.402*** 
Insiders (%)  1832 78.038 76.871 1.167 
 
69.458 73.677 -4.219*** 
 
93.224 82.701 10.523*** 
PED (%) 1832 12.163 8.782 3.381*** 
 
18.828 10.884 7.944*** 
 
0.368
61
 4.945 -4.578*** 
Independent 
outsiders (%) 
1832 3.320 4.420 -1.100*** 
 
3.756 4.356 -0.600 
 
2.216 4.537 -2.321*** 
Others (%) 1832 6.599 9.927 -3.328***   7.958 11.083 -3.125***   4.192 7.817 -3.625*** 
 
      
Panel B:      No. of observations                  Full sample  PE backing  
   PE  Non-PE Difference 
OD (%) 1064 17.669 19.766 13.911 5.855** 
MOD (%) 1064 5.155 4.978 5.469 -0.491 
 
 
Panel C:    No. of SMBOs                Full sample PE backing 
  
PE  Non-PE Difference 
MGTCHAN (%) 262 47.641  51.416 40.909 10.507** 
Remove PED (%) 91 -  -  21.189 -  
                                                        
61
Two cases of non-PE-backed SMBOs have PE specialists on the boards.   
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Table 3.4: Post-SMBO performance 
This table presents the median values of abnormal performance measures for the full sample, up to five post-
SMBO years (Y 1-5). Abnormal performance (𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) is calculated as:𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡). where, 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the 
actual performance in year t after SMBO transactions while 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) is the expected performance of the target 
company in year t after SMBO transactions. It is estimated by two models: 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, and 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡; where, the former is ‘level’ model using unadjusted benchmark and the latter is ‘change’ model 
using industry adjusted benchmark. Panel A presents results for the full sample. Panel B presents results by 
PE backing. Panel C reports the values of differences in abnormal performance between PE-backed and Non-
PE-backed SMBOs. The values are calculated as the median value of PE-backed SMBOs minus that of Non-
PE-backed SMBOs.  All results used 99% winsorized data. Wilcoxon signed rank test (median=0, vs. 
median≠0) is adopted to test the significance of abnormal performance. We used Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann 
Whitney) test for differences in median abnormal performance measures.  ***, **, *, indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
    Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Profitability  Benchmarks 
  
  
 
  
AROA E(Pit) = Pit-k 
-0.009** -0.015*** -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.046*** 
(248:115) (215:85) (164:60) (128:46) (85:31) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.007** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.057*** -0.009 
(244:115) (212:77) (160:55) (102:32) (62:30) 
AROS E(Pit) = Pit-k 
0.011** 0.002 -0.003 -0.014** -0.016** 
(195:109) (169:85) (131:61) (103:43) (74:26) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
0.009 -0.003 -0.006* -0.007 -0.007 
(191:106) (164:78) (127:54) (78:35) (51:23) 
Productivity           
ASALEMP E(Pit) = Pit-k 
0.032*** 0.028*** 0.017* 0.029 -0.008 
(180:120) (157:100) (116:66) (91:56) (52:24) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.024*** -0.042*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.086*** 
(166:62) (140:45) (106:29) (63:20) (29:8) 
Growth ratios           
AEMPG E(Pit) = Pit-k 
-0.011 -0.037*** -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.056** 
(187:110) (158:77) (121:45) (71:23) (39:11) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.021 -0.032* -0.050** -0.056* -0.036 
(160:71) (133:56) (99:32) (55:24) (27:11) 
ASALG E(Pit) = Pit-k 
-0.027** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.098*** -0.141*** 
(173:78) (151:58) (115:41) (63:20) (39:9) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.003 -0.022 -0.04 0.019 -0.031 
(169:84) (147:70) (112:50) (62:36) (39:16) 
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Panel B: PE vs. Non-PE-backed  
 
  
PE-backed  
 
Non PE-backed 
    Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Profitability  Benchmarks 
     
     
AROA E(Pit) = Pit-k 
-0.012** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.074*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.016* -0.001 
(161:75) (144:54) (106:34) (76:26) (45:11) (87:40) (71:31) (58:26) (52:20) (40:20) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.010* -0.032*** -0.047*** -0.067*** -0.100** -0.001 -0.031*** -0.021 -0.044** 0.019 
(158:72) (142:53) (103:31) (58:15) (26:9) (86:43) (70:24) (57:24) (44:17) (36:21) 
AROS E(Pit) = Pit-k 
0.018** 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.032*** 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.016*** -0.004 
(123:71) (114:59) (85:41) (58:27) (40:12) (72:38) (55:26) (46:20) (45:16) (34:14) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
0.014 0.004 -0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.013 -0.006 -0.015* -0.014 
(120:68) (110:57) (82:35) (40:21) (20:10) (71:38) (54:21) (45:19) (38:14) (31:13) 
Productivity           
ASALEMP E(Pit) = Pit-k 
0.043*** 0.034*** 0.025** 0.011 -0.133*** 0.021** 0.024* 0.005 0.041 0.030 
(115:80) (104:68) (74:43) (52:29) (27:8) (65:40) (53:32) (42:23) (39:27) (25:16) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.018 -0.035** -0.057** -0.024 -0.142* -0.036*** -0.053*** -0.110*** -0.071*** -0.065* 
(107:48) (95:34) (69:21) (35:15) (10:8) (59:14) (45:11) (37:8) (31:5) (19:6) 
Growth ratios           
AEMPG E(Pit) = Pit-k 
-0.001 -0.037* -0.076*** -0.061** -0.056 -0.033** -0.036** 0.004 -0.059 -0.058* 
(120:60) (107:44) (84:26) (41:13) (17:2) (67:26) (51:17) (37:19) (30:10) (22:6) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
-0.015 -0.033 -0.094*** -0.089* -0.006 -0.031 -0.029 -0.010 0.015 -0.066 
(103:49) (90:37) (69:18) (31:11) (10:4) (57:22) (43:19) (30:14) (24:13) (17:7) 
ASALG E(Pit) = Pit-k 
0.001 -0.07*** -0.067*** -0.138** -0.201*** -0.042** -0.028 -0.042 -0.032 -0.091** 
(113:57) (102:35) (78:26) (33:8) (14:1) (60:21) (49:23) (37:15) (30:12) (25:8) 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 
0.011 -0.013 -0.045* -0.061 -0.051 -0.021 -0.044 0.012 0.067* -0.031 
(111:58) (100:48) (77:32) (33:15) (14:6) (58:26) (47:22) (35:18) (29:21) (25:10) 
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Panel C: Difference between PE and Non-PE-backed  
    Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Profitability  
     
AROA E(Pit) = Pit-k -0.007 -0.019 -0.028** -0.032 -0.073*** 
 
E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit -0.009 -0.001 -0.026* -0.023 -0.119** 
AROS E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.006 -0.028** 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.01 0.017 -0.002 0.017 0.013 
Productivity 
      
ASALEMP E(Pit) = Pit-k 
0.022** 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.163*** 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.018* 0.018 0.053** 0.047 -0.077 
Growth ratios 
     AEMPG E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.032 -0.001 -0.08 -0.002 0.002 
 
E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.016 -0.004 -0.084 -0.104 0.06 
ASALG E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.043 -0.042 -0.025 -0.106 -0.11 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.032 0.031 -0.057 -0.128* -0.02 
159 
 
Table 3.5: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance-
univariate results 
This table presents the difference of post-SMBO abnormal performance by having skilled insiders (OD), 
changing top management (MGTCHAN), and removing PE directors out from the board (Remove PED).
62
 
The difference is calculated as the median value of post-SMBO abnormal performance of SMBOs that have 
skilled insiders (or, changing the top management, removing PE-related directors) minus the median value of 
post-SMBO abnormal performance of SMBOs that do not have skilled insiders (or, do not change the top 
management, do not removing PE-related directors). Abnormal performance (𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) is calculated as:𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡). where, 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the actual performance in year t after SMBO transactions while 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) is the 
expected performance of the target company in year t after SMBO transactions. It is estimated by two models: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, and 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡; where, the former is ‘level’ model using unadjusted benchmark 
and the latter is ‘change’ model using industry adjusted benchmark. Panel A presents the results for the full 
sample while Panel B presents the results by PE backing. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test the null 
hypothesis of difference in median =0. ***, **, *, indicate significance of the test at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent 
levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Full sample 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
    
OD   MGTCHAN Remove PED 
Profitability ratios Benchmarks       
AROA E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.008 -0.003 -0.012 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.01 0.007 -0.036 
AROS E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.007 0.012** 0.001 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.010* 0.009 0.006 
Productivitys   
   ASALEMP E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.020** 0.005 0.006 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.017* 0.004 -0.02 
Growth ratios   
   AEMPG E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.026* -0.023 -0.063*** 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.029** -0.014** -0.076*** 
ASALG E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.072*** 0.004 -0.059 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.073*** 0.040* -0.084** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
62
 Only for the non-PE-backed SMBO subsample. 
160 
 
Panel B: PE vs. Non-PE-backed  
 
      PE-backed Non-PE-backed 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OD MGTCHAN OD MGTCHAN 
Profitability 
ratios 
Benchmarks 
     
AROA E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.010 -0.022 0.005 0.024** 
 
E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.004 -0.002 0.029 0.033 
AROS E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.006 0.01 0.007* 0.015** 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.006 0.01 0.015** 0.011 
Productivity  
  
  
 
ASALEMP E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.017 0.016 0.045** -0.014 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.014 0.023** 0.019 -0.021 
Growth ratios 
 
  
  
 AEMPG E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.026 -0.025 0.028 -0.006 
 
E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.037* -0.035*** 0.051* 0.023 
ASALG E(Pit) = Pit-k 0.049** 0.014 0.080** 0.011 
  E(Pit) = Pit-k + ΔPIit 0.044** 0.051 0.117* 0.043 
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Table 3.6: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance-regression 
results 
This table reports the results of the panel regression for the influence of board changes and characteristics on 
post-SMBO performance, up to five years after the SMBO. The dependent variables are abnormal 
performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), 
and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performance (‘level’ model), while Panel B 
uses industry adjusted abnormal performance (‘change’ model). The models in Panel A include entry year 
dummies and industry dummies and those in Panel B include entry year dummies.
63
 The results are based on 
99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error 
and omitted collinear covariates. The coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test 
(Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations used in the panel 
model. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels respectively. The variables are defined in 
Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS -0.017 -0.001 -0.034 -0.100* -0.021 
 
-0.669 -0.04 -1.337 -1.891 -0.262 
PED (%) 0.233** 0.067 0.103* 0.340 0.396* 
 
2.501 0.739 1.781 1.554 1.826 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.125 0.042 0.014 0.493** 0.375 
 
0.949 0.680 0.150 1.995 1.432 
MGTCHAN 0.059 -0.008 0.016 0.003 0.124** 
 
1.004 -0.230 0.479 0.076 2.573 
OD -0.011 0.023 0.028* 0.080** 0.085* 
 
-0.479 1.171 1.651 2.309 1.688 
MOD -0.018 -0.030 -0.025 -0.091 0.109 
 
-0.597 -1.017 -0.346 -1.427 1.216 
MGTSHARE 0.014 -0.064* 0.022 -0.087 0.116 
 
0.418 -1.796 0.673 -0.873 0.946 
GEAR -0.018** -0.021*** 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 
-2.250 -2.905 0.568 0.147 0.298 
LNDURATION -0.117 0.237** 0.045 0.230 0.101 
 
-1.032 1.963 0.276 1.329 0.623 
LNSIZE 0.007 0.018 0.015 0.003 0.028 
 
0.564 0.740 0.769 0.156 1.100 
Crisis -0.015 -0.016** 0.006 -0.060** -0.091*** 
 
-1.058 -2.414 0.540 -2.434 -2.824 
ROA t-1 -0.590*** -0.518** -0.327 -0.160 -0.330 
 
-3.682 -2.524 -1.229 -0.868 -1.128 
PE -0.099 -0.057 0.044 -0.093 -0.107 
 
-1.618 -1.310 0.808 -1.342 -1.303 
INTERCEPT -0.908 -0.274 0.003 -0.033 -0.195 
 
-0.885 -0.884 0.009 -0.099 -0.566 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 14.1 9.44 5.71 7.83 8.55 
Wald Chi2 53.491*** 43.436** 77.612*** 53.018*** 57.847*** 
N 654 541 488 487 466 
 
                                                        
63
 The results for industry adjusted abnormal performance including both year dummies and industry 
dummies are very similar to the results without including industry dummies, except for the coefficient on 
Independent outsiders  is significant in the model for AEMPG in the former model specifications.  
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS 0.016 -0.019 -0.024 -0.064 -0.064 
 
0.384 -0.955 -0.774 -1.322 -0.769 
PED (%) 0.248** 0.069 0.114* 0.332 0.422** 
 
2.492 1.082 1.722 1.427 2.009 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.067 0.039 -0.082 0.376 0.295 
 
0.472 0.681 -0.687 1.381 0.96 
MGTCHAN 0.049 0.011 0.011 -0.046 0.123** 
 
0.89 0.544 0.319 -1.310 2.35 
OD 0.019 -0.006 0.037* 0.108*** 0.112** 
 
0.671 -0.275 1.684 2.638 2.115 
MOD -0.047 0.011 -0.048 -0.035 0.120 
 
-1.251 0.553 -0.645 -0.604 1.425 
MGTSHARE -0.011 -0.028 0.054 -0.091 0.232* 
 
-0.144 -1.154 1.403 -1.229 1.775 
GEAR -0.015 -0.010*** 0.008 -0.009 -0.003 
 
-1.609 -2.934 1.301 -0.76 -0.242 
LNDURATION -0.131 0.041 -0.093 0.296 0.015 
 
-1.128 0.634 -0.487 1.516 0.085 
LNSIZE -0.005 0.017 0.018 -0.023 0.030 
 
-0.479 1.630 0.956 -1.169 1.136 
Crisis 0.004 -0.007 -0.022* -0.089*** -0.049 
 
0.202 -1.146 -1.771 -3.158 -1.347 
ROA t-1 -0.632*** -0.317*** -0.157 -0.159 -0.304 
 
-3.550 -3.176 -0.649 -1.251 -0.956 
PE -0.104 -0.038 0.017 -0.063 -0.078 
 
-1.592 -1.635 0.300 -0.972 -0.892 
INTERCEPT -1.005 -0.052 -0.132 -0.235 -0.489 
 
-0.942 -0.355 -0.383 -0.719 -1.203 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 12.25 9.09 7.33 8.75 6.37 
Wald Chi2 47.720*** 39.541*** 285.013*** 29.543* 47.191*** 
N 642 528 437 394 455 
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Table 3.7: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance -Dynamic 
panel GMM estimation 
This table exhibits the results achieved by using dynamic panel GMM estimation for the relationship between 
changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance, up to 5 years after SMBO 
transactions. The dependent variables are estimated as unadjusted abnormal performance measures. L. 
ARROA, L.ARROS, L.ASALEPG, L.AREMPG, and L.ARSALG are lagged levels of ARROA, ARROS, 
ASALEPG, AREMPG, and ARSALG, respectively. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. AR (2) 
testifies second order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals with the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen test testifies whether all instruments are valid. N reports the number of firm-year 
observations used in the panel model. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
The variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS 0.020 -0.213 0.050 -0.430 0.066 
 
0.117 -1.411 0.244 -1.639 0.122 
PED (%) -0.151 0.119 0.419 1.333 0.415 
 
-0.118 0.328 0.371 1.338 0.229 
Independent outsiders (%) -2.699 0.987 0.126 1.180 -2.497 
 
-0.532 0.867 0.098 0.487 -0.596 
MGTCHAN -0.947 -0.650 -2.403 -2.561 -4.739 
 
-0.155 -0.260 -1.109 -0.770 -0.398 
OD 0.649 0.011 -0.006 -0.038 -0.087 
 
0.737 0.131 -0.008 -0.389 -0.102 
MOD -0.107 0.040 0.374 -0.146 0.219 
 
-0.175 0.119 0.338 -0.226 0.186 
MGTSHARE -0.202 0.085 0.110 0.035 -0.327 
 
-0.410 0.240 0.123 0.078 -0.144 
GEAR -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.019 0.015 
 
-0.095 -0.088 -0.123 0.679 0.491 
LNDURATION -5.171 -0.521 -0.209 -0.430 -10.519 
 
-0.670 -0.108 -0.055 -0.180 -0.446 
LNSIZE -1.031 0.102 -0.440 -0.472 -0.940 
 
-0.691 0.175 -0.268 -0.918 -0.383 
Crisis 0.009 -0.040 0.038 -0.071 -0.065 
 
0.072 -0.920 0.142 -0.549 -0.579 
ROA t-1 -18.336 1.096 3.439 -5.044 1.717 
 
-0.580 0.157 0.296 -0.580 0.148 
PE 2.084 -0.366 1.369 1.459 1.447 
 
0.532 -0.201 0.580 0.609 0.265 
L.AROA 0.006 
    
 
0.013 
    L.AROS 
 
-0.243 
   
  
-0.789 
   L. ASALEMP 
 
-0.110 
  
   
-0.427 
  L.AEMPG 
  
-0.132 
 
    
-0.810 
 L.ASALG 
    
0.008 
     
0.029 
INTERCEPT  13.597 1.305 1.190 3.387 22.477 
 
0.675 0.122 0.132 0.685 0.441 
F test 0.59 3.08*** 0.66 0.64 0.34 
Hansen (p-value) 1 0.811 0.389 0.216 0.415 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.883 0.578 0.750 0.284 0.162 
N 435 359 322 323 309 
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Table 3.8: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance-corrected for sample selection bias 
This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the influence of board changes and characteristics on post-SMBO 
performance, up to five years after an SMBO. The Probit regression with robust variance estimate is for the probability of receiving PE backing by the sample SMBOs. 
This model converged after three iterations. The panel regression is for the influence of the board changes and characteristics on post-SMBO performance. The 
dependent variables (AROA, AROS, ASALEMP, AEMPG, and ASALG) are estimated as unadjusted abnormal performance measures (‘level’ model). Lambda1 is the 
fitted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated from the Probit regression model. All the results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters of panel 
regressions are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Entry year dummies and industry dummies are 
included. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations 
in the Probit regression model and the number of firm-year observations in the panel regression model, respectively. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
1st Step: Probit regression   2
nd
 Step: Panel regression           
  PE 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
ROA t-1 0.279 
 
LNBS -0.017 -0.001 -0.034 -0.101* -0.022 
LNSIZE 0.601*** 
  
-0.669 -0.035 -1.32 -1.899 -0.27 
BSERVICES -0.145*** 
 
PED (%) 0.236** 0.056 0.102* 0.371* 0.414* 
INTERCEPT -1.061*** 
  
2.503 0.615 1.766 1.718 1.894 
Log likelihood -582.482 
 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.13 0.035 0.012 0.552** 0.392 
Pseudo R2  (%) 29.19 
  
0.972 0.574 0.132 2.293 1.506 
Wald Chi2 383.80*** 
 
MGTCHAN 0.06 -0.014 0.015 0.008 0.128*** 
N 1270 
  
1.013 -0.365 0.456 0.221 2.628 
   
OD -0.01 0.025 0.028* 0.079** 0.084* 
    
-0.464 1.225 1.661 2.247 1.667 
   
MOD -0.019 -0.028 -0.024 -0.091 0.108 
    
-0.631 -0.93 -0.333 -1.485 1.207 
   
MGTSHARE 0.016 -0.068* 0.02 -0.079 0.123 
    
0.46 -1.934 0.601 -0.786 1.002 
   
GEAR -0.018** -0.021*** 0.003 0.001 0.003 
    
-2.269 -2.882 0.576 0.073 0.253 
   
LNDURATION -0.137 0.273** 0.05 0.196 0.079 
    
-1.101 2.187 0.296 1.18 0.476 
   
LNSIZE 0.074 -0.06 0.015 0.078* 0.066 
    
1.292 -0.742 0.504 1.75 1.111 
   
Crisis -0.015 -0.017** 0.006 -0.059** -0.090*** 
    
-1.05 -2.45 0.53 -2.409 -2.817 
   
ROA t-1 -0.495*** -0.630*** -0.317 -0.062 -0.279 
    
-3.518 -3.313 -1.143 -0.36 -0.95 
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(Continued) 
  
      
         
   
PE -0.091 -0.063 0.053 -0.087 -0.104 
    
-1.618 -1.431 0.958 -1.248 -1.274 
   
Lambda1 0.251 -0.289 -0.029 0.283** 0.144 
    
1.221 -1.176 -0.414 1.965 0.718 
   
INTERCEPT -1.207 0.037 -0.035 -0.355 -0.344 
    
-1.007 0.089 -0.094 -0.841 -0.85 
   
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
   
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
   
R-square (%) 14.34 9.35 5.67 8.96 8.86 
   
Wald Chi2 56.249*** 44.134** 75.823*** 53.258*** 58.905*** 
   N 654 541 488 487 466 
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Table 3.9: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance -corrected for PE-related directors selection bias 
This table reports the results of panel regression for the influence of board changes and characteristics on post-SMBO performance, corrected for sample selection bias 
from PE-related directors, up to five years after the SMBO transactions. The Logit regression with robust variance estimate is for the probability of appointing PE-
related directors onto the board. Panel regression is for the influence of board changes and characteristics on post-SMBO performance. The dependent variables (AROA, 
AROS, ASALEMP, AEMPG, and ASALG) are estimated as unadjusted abnormal performance (‘level’ model). Lambda2 is the fitted probability of having PE-related 
directors, estimated from the Logit regression. All the results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are estimated by a GLS random-
effects model with a robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Entry year dummies and industry dummies are included. Coefficients and z-statistics are 
reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations in the Logit regression and number of 
firm-year observations in the panel regression, respectively. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables are defined in 
Appendix 3.1. 
1st Step: Logit regression   2
nd
 Step: Panel regression       
  
Presence of 
PED 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Club deals 0.301 
 
LNBS -0.019 -0.002 -0.035 -0.100* -0.027 
 
0.840 
  
-0.732 -0.059 -1.399 -1.89 -0.524 
Top10 0.091 
 
PED (%) 0.225** 0.062 0.098* 0.341 0.252** 
 
0.282 
  
2.387 0.68 1.687 1.565 2.08 
LNSIZE 0.379*** 
 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.121 0.04 0.011 0.503** 0.233 
 
4.373 
  
0.979 0.666 0.123 2.141 1.269 
PE 3.657*** 
 
MGTCHAN 0.07 -0.003 0.02 -0.001 0.078** 
 
8.971 
  
1.21 -0.085 0.596 -0.017 2.127 
GEAR 0.093 
 
OD -0.011 0.024 0.028* 0.079** 0.063* 
 
1.607 
  
-0.523 1.196 1.688 2.281 1.916 
MGTCHAN -0.119 
 
MOD -0.019 -0.032 -0.029 -0.09 0.096 
 
-0.568 
  
-0.659 -1.12 -0.384 -1.356 1.41 
Crisis 0.235 
 
MGTSHARE 0.022 -0.061* 0.021 -0.087 0.015 
 
1.110 
  
0.676 -1.695 0.624 -0.863 0.207 
ROA t-1 0.719 
 
GEAR -0.024** -0.024** 0 0.003 0.009 
 
0.640 
  
-2.526 -2.01 -0.003 0.256 1.18 
INTERCEPT -4.398*** 
 
LNDURATION -0.105 0.251** 0.057 0.223 -0.002 
 
-10.838 
  
-0.905 2.031 0.347 1.377 -0.018 
Log likelihood -278.916 
 
LNSIZE -0.018 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.024 
Pseudo R2  (%) 41.20 
  
-0.534 0.122 0.09 0.246 0.807 
Wald Chi2 186.994*** 
 
Crisis -0.034* -0.026 -0.003 -0.054 -0.056** 
N 694 
  
-1.681 -1.25 -0.211 -1.607 -2.192 
   
ROA t-1 -0.666*** -0.560*** -0.363 -0.138 -0.074 
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-3.902 -2.856 -1.325 -0.708 -0.415 
   
PE -0.482 -0.256 -0.151 0.027 0.116 
    
-1.067 -0.686 -0.596 0.044 0.315 
   
Lambda2 -0.127 -0.067 -0.065 0.039 0.071 
    
-0.836 -0.534 -0.835 0.205 0.584 
   
INTERCEPT -0.387 -0.018 0.263 -0.191 -0.179 
    
-0.293 -0.032 0.575 -0.196 -0.353 
   
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
   
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
   
R-square (%) 13.55 9.76 5.16 8.01 8.93 
   
Wald Chi2 72.581*** 48.012** 76.231*** 52.663*** 90.508*** 
      N 654 541 488 487 466 
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Table 3.10: The impact of replacing top managers on post-SMBO performance-interaction with 
previous performance 
This table presents the results of panel regressions (equation 1), after including an interactive variable 
between changing top managers and previous performance. The dependent variables are estimated as 
unadjusted abnormal performance (‘level’ model). ROAt-1*MGTCHAN is the interactive variable between 
changing the top managers (MGTCHAN) and previous performance (ROAt-1). The results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and 
omitted collinear covariates. Entry year dummies and industry dummies are included. Coefficients and z-
statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2 ) are for probability > Chi 2 . N reports the 
number of firm-year observations used in the panel regression. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS -0.018 -0.001 -0.034 -0.100* -0.021 
 
-0.71 -0.045 -1.337 -1.885 -0.263 
PED (%) 0.233** 0.067 0.103* 0.341 0.398* 
 
2.501 0.736 1.786 1.556 1.834 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.125 0.043 0.014 0.495** 0.374 
 
0.947 0.688 0.151 2.001 1.423 
MGTCHAN 0.028 -0.012 0.009 -0.008 0.139* 
 
0.674 -0.162 0.146 -0.159 1.776 
ROAt-1*MGTCHAN 0.262 0.028 0.050 0.081 -0.12 
 
0.693 0.078 0.116 0.266 -0.264 
OD -0.011 0.023 0.028 0.079** 0.087* 
 
-0.508 1.184 1.640 2.343 1.78 
MOD -0.018 -0.030 -0.025 -0.092 0.110 
 
-0.585 -1.016 -0.344 -1.428 1.212 
MGTSHARE 0.014 -0.064* 0.022 -0.089 0.119 
 
0.423 -1.806 0.664 -0.874 0.958 
GEAR -0.018** -0.021*** 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
-2.239 -2.908 0.573 0.157 0.291 
LNDURATION -0.123 0.237* 0.044 0.227 0.102 
 
-1.032 1.955 0.277 1.336 0.636 
LNSIZE 0.006 0.018 0.014 0.003 0.029 
 
0.510 0.699 0.798 0.133 1.134 
Crisis -0.015 -0.016** 0.006 -0.060** -0.091*** 
 
-1.061 -2.414 0.538 -2.434 -2.822 
ROA t-1 -0.707** -0.529** -0.353 -0.2 -0.277 
 
-2.306 -2.021 -0.775 -0.689 -0.619 
PE -0.101 -0.057 0.044 -0.093 -0.108 
 
-1.608 -1.287 0.841 -1.338 -1.320 
INTERCEPT -0.875 -0.272 0.009 -0.019 -0.206 
 
-0.877 -0.868 0.034 -0.056 -0.601 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 14.03 9.45 5.72 7.80 8.58 
Wald Chi2 58.924*** 43.486** 83.784*** 58.362*** 62.161*** 
N 654 541 488 487 466 
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Table 3.11: The impact of PE-related directors on PE-backed SMBOs’ performance-interaction 
with PE firms’ reputation 
This table presents the results of panel regressions (equation 1) for the PE-backed subsample, after including 
an interactive variable between the fraction of PE-related directors and highly-reputed PE firms. The 
dependent variables are estimated as unadjusted abnormal performance (‘level’ model). PED*Top10 is the 
interactive variable between the percentage of PE-related directors on the board (PED) and PE firms’ 
reputation (Top10). The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS 
random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Entry year dummies and 
industry dummies are included. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test 
(Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations used in the panel 
regression. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The variables are defined 
in Appendix 3.1. 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS -0.007 0.019 -0.031 -0.091 -0.033 
 
-0.153 0.744 -1.054 -1.359 -0.438 
PED (%) 0.197** 0.069 0.045 0.307 0.404* 
 
2.015 1.010 0.659 1.489 1.678 
PED (%) *Top10 -0.056 -0.381*** 0.187 -0.860*** -0.723* 
 
-0.212 -2.691 1.016 -2.63 -1.74 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.218 0.089 -0.109 0.669** 0.332 
 
1.516 1.402 -0.932 2.251 0.953 
MGTCHAN 0.059 0.029 0.048 -0.006 0.130** 
 
0.847 0.985 1.078 -0.117 2.110 
OD -0.045 0.006 0.036 0.097** 0.150** 
 
-1.198 0.476 1.425 1.996 2.414 
MOD 0.009 -0.051* 0.005 -0.042 0.084 
 
0.184 -1.936 0.038 -0.603 0.561 
MGTSHARE 0.016 -0.045 0.013 0.080 0.060 
 
0.331 -1.447 0.248 0.902 0.462 
GEAR -0.026*** -0.015*** 0.003 -0.018 0.002 
 
-2.876 -3.041 0.437 -1.398 0.104 
LNDURATION -0.181 0.150* 0.273 0.207 0.075 
 
-1.299 1.756 1.326 1.043 0.328 
LNSIZE 0.034* 0.029** 0.024 0.037 0.029 
 
1.771 2.159 1.265 1.591 1.034 
Crisis -0.042*** -0.015* -0.005 -0.125*** -0.141*** 
 
-3.159 -1.737 -0.342 -3.449 -3.523 
ROA t-1 -0.884*** -0.490*** -0.742** -0.321 -0.659 
 
-3.484 -3.391 -2.368 -1.209 -1.474 
Top10 0.130 0.048 -0.125 0.193* 0.068 
 0.875 1.262 -1.634 1.929 0.533 
INTERCEPT -1.736 -0.226 -0.314 -0.087 -0.171 
 
-1.016 -1.080 -0.924 -0.223 -0.383 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 22.22 20.79 16.47 15.47 16.88 
Wald Chi2 77.466*** 56.662*** 49.768*** 160.827*** 78.296*** 
N 404 334 300 312 299 
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Table 3.12: The impact of removing PE directors on post-SMBO performance  
This table presents the results of the impact of removing PE directors on post-SMBO performance for the 
non-PE-backed subsample, up to five years after SMBO, after including a dummy variable of the removal of 
the PE-related directors after SMBO transactions (Remove PED). The dependent variables are estimated as 
unadjusted abnormal performance measures (‘level’ model). The results are based on 99% winsorized data. 
All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted collinear 
covariates. Entry year dummies and industry dummies are included. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. 
P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2 ) are for probability >  Chi 2 . N reports the number of firm-year 
observations used in the panel model. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
64
 When we include industry dummies, Stata does not present Wald Chi2. However, with or without industry 
dummies, the results are qualitatively similar.  
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS -0.016 -0.019 -0.061 0.003 0.063 
 
-0.605 -0.766 -1.139 0.036 0.274 
Remove PED 0.038 -0.068 0.007 -0.028 0.056 
 
1.042 -1.187 0.138 -0.445 0.460 
Independent outsiders (%) -0.214 -0.046 0.286 -0.157 0.395 
 
-1.586 -0.563 1.608 -0.471 0.678 
MGTCHAN 0.009 -0.115* -0.018 0.083 0.113 
 
0.294 -1.959 -0.317 1.200 1.383 
OD 0.024 0.001 0.010 0.002 -0.110 
 
1.114 0.049 0.368 0.06 -1.121 
MOD -0.058 0.020 -0.049* -0.156 0.122 
 
-1.067 1.553 -1.846 -1.621 0.978 
MGTSHARE 0.059 -0.046 0.022 -0.311 0.282 
 
1.267 -1.615 0.487 -1.383 0.895 
GEAR -0.003 -0.018*** 0.002 0.063** -0.002 
 
-0.188 -3.45 0.314 2.442 -0.074 
LNDURATION 0.057 0.179 -0.387* 0.230 -0.163 
 
0.502 1.154 -1.685 0.828 -0.746 
LNSIZE -0.017 0.006 0.002 -0.087* -0.007 
 
-1.146 0.205 0.046 -1.883 -0.161 
Crisis 0.013 -0.020* 0.019 0.035 -0.007 
 
0.492 -1.926 0.851 1.417 -0.120 
ROA t-1 -0.271 -0.569* 0.508 0.044 -0.01 
 
-1.639 -1.96 1.296 0.202 -0.025 
INTERCEPT -0.176 -0.158 0.780* -0.182 -0.098 
 
-0.763 -0.519 1.665 -0.280 -0.136 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy NO
64
 YES YES NO YES 
R-square (%) 19.35 17.96 11.80 21.23 3.76 
Wald Chi2 38.071*** 1240.022*** 4696.099*** 108.387*** 52.451*** 
N 250 207 188 175 167 
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Table 3.13: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance -
early vs. late exit 
This table presents the results of panel regressions (equation 1) that examine the relations of changes and 
characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance for ‘early’ and ‘late’ exit subsamples of 
SMBOs, up to five years after SMBO transactions. Panel A and Panel B report the results for ‘early’ and ‘late’ 
exit subsamples respectively. The ‘early’ exit subsample includes SMBOs with a primary holding period of 
less than three years. The ‘late’ exit subsample includes SMBOs with a primary holding period equal to or 
longer than three years. The dependent variables are estimated as unadjusted abnormal performance measures. 
The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model 
with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for 
probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations used in the panel model. ***, **,* are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A: Early exit 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS -0.051 -0.077 -0.013 0.043 -0.255 
 
-0.732 -0.803 -0.118 0.333 -1.030 
PED (%) 0.153 -0.294 0.303 0.732* 0.210 
 
0.934 -0.969 0.568 1.798 0.274 
Independent outsiders (%) -0.339 0.069 0.207 2.144** 1.898* 
 
-0.969 0.149 0.372 2.309 1.840 
MGTCHAN 0.098** -0.061 0.040 0.125 0.366** 
 
2.105 -0.610 0.303 0.554 2.150 
OD 0.093*** 0.090 -0.075 0.261** 0.028 
 
2.621 0.953 -1.217 2.319 0.216 
MOD -0.003 -0.015 -0.299* 0.209 0.822*** 
 
-0.071 -0.120 -1.777 0.556 2.669 
MGTSHARE -0.062 -0.022 0.289 0.489* 0.148 
 
-0.523 -0.195 1.502 1.782 0.421 
GEAR -0.023 -0.020 0.009 -0.009 0.018 
 
-1.346 -0.977 1.259 -0.858 0.954 
ROA t-1 -0.595*** -1.205*** -0.272 -0.554 -0.603 
 
-3.151 -3.108 -0.574 -0.713 -0.843 
LNDURATION 0.412* 0.689** 0.087 1.002 -0.931 
 
1.867 2.065 0.205 0.835 -1.435 
LNSIZE -0.032* 0.062* 0.052 0.048 0.069 
 
-1.838 1.660 0.891 0.476 1.070 
Crisis 0.002 0.017 0.005 -0.061* -0.175 
 
0.047 0.408 0.119 -1.657 -1.351 
PE 0.031 -0.105 -0.034 0.199 0.141 
 
0.332 -0.866 -0.164 0.451 0.648 
INTERCEPT -0.501 -0.825 -0.364 -2.717 1.380 
 
-1.028 -1.508 -0.418 -1.252 1.022 
R-square (%) 33.56 37.70 19.94 7.27 43.43 
Wald Chi2 31.908*** 49.389*** 11.164 74.778*** 230.150*** 
N 87 83 79 73 70 
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Panel B: Late exit 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS 0.009 0.005 -0.021 0.013 0.006 
 
0.273 0.100 -0.606 0.360 0.149 
PED (%) 0.179* 0.051 0.015 0.219*** 0.137** 
 
1.778 0.442 0.254 2.730 2.161 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.321 0.001 -0.010 0.117 0.124 
 
1.247 0.010 -0.064 0.997 0.887 
MGTCHAN 0.061 -0.008 0.002 -0.029 -0.021 
 
0.650 -0.154 0.064 -1.135 -0.817 
OD 0.001 -0.008 0.051** -0.029 0.008 
 
0.025 -0.455 2.575 -1.000 0.226 
MOD -0.046 -0.025 0.085 0.018 0.099 
 
-1.341 -0.760 1.481 0.383 1.186 
MGTSHARE -0.024 -0.032 -0.048 -0.053 -0.007 
 
-0.484 -0.706 -0.845 -1.086 -0.155 
GEAR -0.018 -0.024** 0.002 0.006 0.005 
 
-1.397 -2.349 0.363 0.871 0.810 
ROA t-1 -0.595** -0.559* 0.101 -0.067 -0.186 
 
-2.097 -1.869 0.310 -0.592 -1.288 
LNDURATION -0.766 0.068 -0.096 -0.020 -0.016 
 
-1.303 0.486 -0.625 -0.213 -0.167 
LNSIZE -0.001 -0.009 -0.021 -0.015 -0.018 
 
-0.077 -0.307 -1.015 -1.540 -1.357 
Crisis -0.010 -0.021** 0.006 -0.026 -0.006 
 
-0.491 -2.042 0.308 -1.489 -0.300 
PE -0.197* -0.035 0.086 -0.052 -0.023 
 
-1.696 -0.543 1.515 -1.303 -0.512 
INTERCEPT 1.421 0.100 0.240 0.093 0.055 
 
1.510 0.388 0.929 0.461 0.283 
R-square (%) 6.85 3.89 9.40 4.37 5.54 
Wald Chi2 26.200** 20.853* 21.239* 21.647* 24.297** 
N 360 284 256 273 256 
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Table 3.14: Tested-down results 
This table reports the results of the test-down method for regressions in Panel A of Table 3.6. The dependent 
variables are estimated as unadjusted abnormal performance measures. The results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and 
omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) 
are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations used in the panel regression. ***, 
**,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
 
AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS 
   
-0.105* 
 
 
   
-1.95 
 
PED (%) 0.207** 
 
0.095* 0.303* 0.242* 
 
2.34 
 
1.9 1.69 1.72 
Independent outsiders (%) 
 
0.51** 
 
 
   
2.06 
 
MGTCHAN 
   
0.087** 
 
    
2.36 
OD 
   
0.054* 0.091*** 
 
   
1.92 2.97 
MOD 
     
 
     
MGTSHARE 
    
 
     
GEAR -0.018** -0.02*** 
   
 
-2.48 -2.89 
   
ROAt-1 -0.683*** -0.479** 
   
 
-3.02 -2.51 
   
LNDURATION 0.209* 
   
 
 
1.78 
   
LNSIZE 
     
 
     
Crisis 
 
-0.019** 
 
-0.044** -0.067*** 
 
 
-2.51 
 
-1.98 -2.94 
PE 
    
-0.086* 
 
    
-1.67 
INTERCEPT 0.142*** -0.216 0.037** 0.235*** -0.004 
 
2.8 -0.8 2.01 2.81 -0.21 
Year dummy 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R-square (%) 6.58 7.92 0.002 4.07 4.56 
Wald Chi2 37.17*** 36.45*** 3.63* 29.27*** 36.35*** 
N 668 552 491 487 466 
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Appendix 3.1: Definition of variables 
Description Variable Definition 
Performance measures 
Profitability   
Return on assets ROA Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total 
assets. AROA is abnormal ROA. 
Return on sales ROS Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total 
sales. AROS is abnormal ROS. 
Productivity 
Sales efficiency SALEMP The logarithm value of inflation adjusted sales scaled by the 
number of employees. ASALEMP is abnormal SALEMP. 
Growth  
Employment growth EMPG The difference between the number of employee in year t 
and year t-1 scaled by their average value. AEMPG is 
abnormal EMPG. 
Sales growth SALG The difference between sales in year t and year t-1, scaled by 
average sales in year t and t-1. ASALG is abnormal SALG. 
 
Board of directors and change in top management 
Board size  BS The number of directors on the relevant board in year t.   
 LNBS The natural logarithm of BS. 
Change in top 
management 
MGTCHAN A dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO and/or CFO is 
replaced within three years after the relevant SMBO 
transaction year, and 0 otherwise. 
The percentage of inside 
directors  
Insiders The number of insider directors divided by board size in year 
t. 
The percentage of PE-
related directors on the 
board 
 PED The number of outside directors who have an observable 
relationship with PE firms divided by board size  in year t.  
The percentage of 
independent outsiders 
Independent 
outsiders 
The number of independent outside directors divided by 
board size  in year t.  
   
The percentage of other 
directors 
Others The number of other directors divided by board size  in year 
t. 
Inside directors with 
independent outside 
directorships (skilled 
insiders) 
OD  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the SMBO with inside 
directors that are employed by at least one unaffiliated 
companies in year t and 0 otherwise.   
Removing PE-related 
directors from the board. 
Remove PED 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-PE-backed SMBO 
removes the PE specialists from the boards in SMBO 
transaction year and 0 otherwise.   
  
Control variables 
Management share MGTSHARE The percentage of target company’s common equity 
contributed by the management in year t. 
Leverage  GEAR The sum of long term and short term debt divided by the 
total equity in year t.. 
Busy directors 
 
MOD 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if SMBOs with inside 
directors that are employed by at least three unaffiliated 
companies in year t and 0 otherwise.   
Business service industry BSERVICES Dummy variable equals 1 for SMBOs from Business Service 
industry and 0 otherwise. 
PE backing 
 
PE 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the SMBO received PE backing 
and 0 otherwise.  
Syndicated SMBOs Club deals Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is more than one 
PE firm investing in a given SMBO, and 0 otherwise. 
175 
 
  
(Continued)   
Backed by highly- reputed 
PE firms 
Top10 A dummy variable which equals 1 if an SMBO is backed by 
PE firms that are top 10 PE firms in the reputation ranking 
list and 0 otherwise.  
Companies’ size  SIZE SMBO value in £ million. 
 LNSIZE The logarithm of SIZE. 
Financial crisis   Crisis A dummy variable which equals 1 for observations from 
2008-2010. 
Pre-SMBO performance ROA t-1 The performance ratio in the form of ROA in year preceding 
the SMBO. 
Longevity of buyouts LNDURATION The logarithm of the number of months from the SMBO date 
to the exit date, if the SMBO was exited; or the number of 
months from the SMBO date to the sample’s cut-off date 
(31/12/2010), if the SMBO was not exited. 
      Lambda Lambda1 The fitted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated by 
equation 3. 
 Lambda2 The fitted probability of having PE-related directors on the 
board, estimated by equation 5. 
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Appendix 3.2: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards and post-SMBO performance- using 
management ownership participant dummy variable 
This table reports the results of panel regression for the influence of board changes and characteristics on 
post-SMBO performance, up to five years after SMBO transactions, with a dummy variable for management 
ownership participant to proxy for managerial ownership. The dependent variables are unadjusted abnormal 
performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), 
and sales growth (ASALG). Models include entry year dummies and industry dummies. The results are based 
on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard 
error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test 
(Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N reports the number of firm-year observations used in the panel 
regression. ***, **,* are significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels respectively. The variables are defined 
in Appendix 3.1. 
 
  AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
LNBS -0.017 -0.004 -0.032 -0.102* -0.019 
 
-0.654 -0.129 -1.269 -1.906 -0.234 
PED (%) 0.233** 0.065 0.103* 0.353* 0.384* 
 
2.509 0.727 1.809 1.649 1.758 
Independent outsiders (%) 0.126 0.044 0.013 0.503** 0.352 
 
0.953 0.697 0.135 2.014 1.350 
MGTCHAN 0.059 -0.007 0.015 0.003 0.121** 
 
1.004 -0.188 0.477 0.082 2.552 
OD -0.011 0.021 0.029* 0.077** 0.091* 
 
-0.493 1.026 1.740 2.142 1.710 
MOD -0.018 -0.028 -0.028 -0.082 0.093 
 
-0.572 -0.935 -0.391 -1.384 1.054 
Management share participant -0.011 -0.032 0.044 -0.016 0.049 
 
-0.297 -0.611 0.627 -0.235 0.540 
GEAR -0.018** -0.020*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
-2.368 -2.775 0.559 0.224 0.215 
LNDURATION -0.116 0.228* 0.050 0.224 0.120 
 
-1.030 1.919 0.299 1.302 0.748 
LNSIZE 0.005 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.023 
 
0.422 0.874 0.798 0.426 0.935 
Crisis -0.015 -0.016** 0.006 -0.060** -0.091*** 
 
-1.080 -2.352 0.546 -2.398 -2.815 
ROAt-1 -0.586*** -0.512*** -0.342 -0.156 -0.343 
 
-3.667 -2.607 -1.228 -0.819 -1.147 
PE -0.106 -0.042 0.044 -0.067 -0.131* 
 
-1.539 -1.012 0.837 -0.989 -1.901 
INTERCEPT -0.889 -0.267 -0.041 -0.072 -0.196 
 
-0.880 -0.908 -0.126 -0.209 -0.517 
Year  YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES 
R-square (%) 13.96 10.15 6.03 7.72 8.60 
Wald Chi2 53.242*** 41.754** 74.426*** 54.536*** 57.129*** 
N 654 541 488 487 466 
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Appendix 3.3: Implementing dynamic GMM estimation in Stata 
Following Wintoki et al. (2012), we implement command xtabond2 to run dynamic panel GMM 
estimation. Using AROA as an example, the command is as follows:  
    xtabond2 AROA l.AROA  LNBS  PED Independent outsiders MGCCHAN  OD MOD  MGTSHARE 
GEAR LNDURATION LNSIZE Crisis ROAt-1 PE, gmm(AROA  LNBS  PED MGCCHAN OD MOD 
MGTSHARE GEAR LNDURATION LNSIZE ROAt-1 PE, lag(1 5)collapse) iv(Crisis) twostep robust 
small 
Where, l.AROA is the lagged dependent variable of AROA. The gmm(varlist) includes all 
endogenous variables and our lagged instrumental variables, while iv(varlist) includes all strictly 
exogenous variables. lag (1 5) indicates we wish to include 5 lags from the most recent lag (the first lag) 
to the most distant lag (the fifth lags). We use the “collapse” to avoid instrument proliferation. ‘‘small’’ 
requests t statistics instead of z-statistics and an F test instead of a Wald chi-squared test of overall model 
fit. 
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Appendix 3.4: Changes and characteristics of SMBO boards- median values 
This table shows changes in board size and board composition. Presented values are median values of each variable three years pre- and five years post- SMBO 
transactions. Difference values are calculated as post-SMBO median value of each variable minus its pre-SMBO median value. We used Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann 
Whitney) test for differences in median abnormal performance measures. The signs of ‘0’s are the signs of Z-score from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann Whitney) test. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. *, **, ***, are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
No. of 
observations    
Full sample    PE backing (median) 
  
Median 
 
PE 
 
Non- PE 
  
Post Pre Difference 
 
Post  Pre Difference  
 
Post  Pre Difference  
BS (N) 1832 5 5 -0 
 
5 5 +0* 
 
4 5 -1*** 
Insiders (%)  1832 80 77.78 2.22 
 
66.667 75 -8.333*** 
 
100 83.333 16.667*** 
PED (%) 1832 0 0 +0*** 
 
20 0 20*** 
 
0 0 -0*** 
Independent 
outsiders (%) 
1832 0 0 -0*** 
 
0 0 -0 
 
0 0 -0*** 
Others (%) 1832 0 0 -0***   0 0 -0*** 
 
0 0 -0*** 
179 
 
Appendix 3.5: Comparison of variables between early and late 
This table presents the differences in median values of non-dummy variables used in the regression between early and late 
subsamples. N1 of early subsample and N2 of late subsample are the numbers of firm-year observations for time-variant 
variables or the numbers of SMBOs for time-invariant variables. Presented values of dummy variables (Crisis, PE, OD, 
MOD, and MGTCHAN) are percentage values in each subsample. Significant levels are results from Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann Whitney) test and test of proportions. *, **, ***, are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Early N1 Late N2 Differences 
AROA -0.018 125 -0.023 461 0.005 
AROS -0.012 110 0.003 356 -0.015 
ASALEMP 0.002 103 0.032 325 -0.030** 
AEMPG -0.1 86 -0.033 328 -0.067 
ASALG -0.083 83 -0.042 294 -0.041 
BS (N) 6 164 5 588 1** 
PED  0.2 164 0.143 588 0.057** 
Independent outsiders  0 164 0 588 +0** 
MGTSHARE 0.525 115 0.468 469 0.057 
GEAR 0.525 97 0.926 404 -0.401*** 
ROAt-1 0.105 40 0.108 140 -0.003 
LNDURATION 1.672 41 1.724 144 -0.052** 
LNSIZE 3.628 41 3.237 144 0.391** 
Crisis (%) 0.732 41 0.618 144 0.114*** 
PE (%) 0.829 41 0.792 144 0.037 
OD (%) 0.232 164 0.172 588 0.060* 
MOD (%) 0.104 164 0.041 588 0.063*** 
MGTCHAN (%) 0.413 164 0.483 588 -0.070 
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CHAPTER 4 
SMBOS’ PERFORMANCE – INCENTIVES AND CHARACTERSTICS 
OF PE FIRMS 
4.1 Introduction 
           The traditional buyout literature documents that PE firms improve the performance 
of buyouts. PE firms conduct due diligence to select promising deals. Later, PE firms play a 
hands-on role in the target companies to enhance their performance via superior governance, 
intensive monitoring, and providing advice (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Some PE firms 
have competitive advantages due to their own experience, knowledge, and professional 
networks. The competitive advantages strengthen the PE firms’ impact on the performance 
and growth opportunities. However, empirical evidence on the performance of PE firms’ 
characteristics and reputation comes only from the datasets that treat all buyouts the same 
(e.g. Cressy et al., 2007; Acharya et al., 2013). Little is known, theoretically and empirically, 
about the impact of PE firms’ on the operating performance of different types of buyouts 
(e.g. private to private buyouts).  
           Recent evidence highlights the importance of PE funds’ longevity on their incentives 
(Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014). For instance, funds could exit the primary buyouts early, 
either to build a reputation or to beautify its investment performance for the next round of 
fundraising. Sometimes, funds with huge untapped committed capital could be compelled 
to invest in new deals when a PE fund is approaching the end of investment period. An 
SMBO is a convenient way to relieve the above-mentioned selling and buying pressures on 
PE funds (Wang 2012; Bonini, 2013). 
           All previous studies measure the PE funds’ longevity (fund pressures) on 
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performance of SMBOs based on fund data (i.e. IRR) (Arcot et al., 2014; Degeorg et al., 
2013). There is therefore a paucity of research that utilizes company level data to 
investigate this relationship. There has also been very little research on the importance of 
PE firms’ characteristics for SMBO performance.65  
           The purpose of this chapter is to fill these gaps by investigating the importance of PE 
firms’ characteristics for the SMBOs performance measured at the level of portfolio 
companies. We firstly examine potential conflicts of interest between general and limited 
partners. These agency conflicts could lead to overinvestment or adverse effects on 
investment such as investing in bad deals (Axelson et al., 2013). Second, we examine how 
differences among PE firms affect SMBO performance. For example, we expect that PE 
firms with some competitive advantages (e.g. previous experience) would bring extra 
improvement in SMBO performance. Although some studies suggest that heterogeneity 
matters in influencing the success of buyouts (e.g. De Clercq and Dimov, 2008; Bottazzi et 
al., 2008), little is known about how exactly the differences in PE firms’ characteristics 
influence target companies’ operating performance. 
           The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 proposes main 
hypotheses. This is followed by Section 4.3 that describes the data and provides summary 
statistics of our sample. Section 4.4 shows the results of post-SMBO performance. Section 
4.5 outlines the multiple regressions and reports the main empirical results. Section 4.6 
concludes. 
4.2 Hypotheses development  
4.2.1 Longevity of PE funds and performance of SMBOs 
           When a fund is approaching the end of investment period with significant uninvested 
                                                        
65
 To the best of our knowledge, Jenkinson and Sousa (2013) is the only exception. 
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funds (i.e. dry powder), general partners (GP) tend to be under pressure to invest. If they 
fail to invest, GPs would lose certain fixed fees and could be viewed as incompetent. In the 
above circumstance, SMBOs would be a more attractive investment compared to primary 
buyouts, as their searching and due diligence costs tend to be much lower (i.e. some work 
should already have been done by selling PE firms). Furthermore, SMBOs are faster and 
more convenient to complete especially when selling PE firms may be under pressure to 
exit. Concurrently, however, buying GPs could end up with lemons (i.e. bad deals) for two 
reasons. First, buying GPs would rely on the due diligence conducted by the selling PE 
firms. The reductions in the overall due diligence cost could sometimes lead to bad choices. 
Moreover, selling PE firms would have an informational advantage and may try to sell 
portfolio companies that perform badly or have no value creation potential. Thus: 
            H1a: A longer (shorter) remaining time of investment period of the buying PE fund 
generates a significantly better (worse) post-SMBO performance.  
           H1b: A longer (shorter) remaining time of investment period of the buying PE fund 
is more likely to generate a better (worse) post-SMBO performance when accompanied by 
dry powder.  
           With respect to the incentives of selling PE funds, their GPs have to collect all the 
invested capital back and receive the returns within the funds’ prescribed life. As such funds 
are reaching the end of their lives, they may be under pressure to exit some of their 
investments fairly quickly (e.g. via SMBO). Arcot et al., (2014) suggest that some good 
buyouts could be exited via SMBO fairly late. The main reason could be associated with 
lower exit costs compared to other exit routes (e.g. IPOs).
66
 Thus: 
            H1c: A longer (shorter) remaining time of fund life of the selling PE fund generates 
                                                        
66
 On the other hand, it is possible that the only investments remaining on their books are those of poor quality 
or those where substantial improvements have already been made leaving very little potential for further 
improvement. 
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a significantly worse (better) post-SMBO performance.    
4.2.2 The impact of PE firms on SMBO performance  
4.2.2.1 Industry experience 
           PE firms either diversify their investments in different industries or specialize in a 
given industry (Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993). The accruing investments in a given 
industry create more comprehensive understanding and deeper knowledge of the industry 
and form the competitive advantage of the PE firms. Gompers et al. (2008), for example, 
demonstrate that compared to general experience, industry-specific experience is more 
important for achieving investment success. This competitive advantage facilitates effective 
value creation in the target companies (Cressy, et al., 2007) and the success of investments 
(De Clercq and Dimov, 2008) by providing better expert advice, industry network contacts, 
and recruiting more competent management.  
4.2.2.2 Number of investments per executive manager 
           The number of investments managed by one executive (Elango et al., 1995) and the 
intensity of monitoring (Meuleman et al., 2009) vary across PE firms. As discussed in 
section 1.7.3, a lower number of investments per an executive manager is expected to be 
positively associated with improvements in post-SMBO profitability and growth.   
4.2.2.3 Stage specialization 
            PE firms can also differ significantly with respect to their preferences regarding the 
different development stages of target companies (e.g. Robinson, 1987; Elango et al., 
1995).
67
 Not only do different stages require different investment and governance strategies 
(Elango et al., 1995), but different PE firms are also specialized in different stages. The 
                                                        
67
 For example, early stage and late stage as in Elango et al. (1995). 
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resource-based view of competitive advantage points out that the valuable, rare, imperfect 
imitable and substitutable resources can create sustained competitive advantages due to 
their heterogeneity and immobility (e.g. Barnery, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). According to this 
view and our discussion in literature review (please see section 1.7.3), PE firms specialized 
in a particular stage can experience the process of accumulating these valuable, rare, 
imperfect imitable and substitutable resources and gain a competitive advantage related to 
this stage. This competitive advantage comes from a deeper understanding of the stage 
which should help PE firms make better investment decision and/or help them reduce the 
business risk by monitoring the target companies more efficiently (Manigart et al., 2002; 
Cressy, et al., 2007).  
           PE firms utilize their alternative specialist skills, experience, knowledge, and 
resources (competitive advantages) to exploit growth opportunities and create value in 
SMBOs (Arcot et al., 2014; Jenkinson and Sousa, 2013). More experienced PE firms with 
greater and wider resource networks may be able to figure out the opportunities, when less 
experienced PE firms cannot obtain further value creation. This supports the view that 
buying PE firms could be superior to selling PE firms in terms of one or more competitive 
advantages. Based on these advantages, buying PE firms can exploit new opportunities to 
improve performance (Heterogeneity hypothesis). Hence: 
           H2: More industry experience, fewer investments per executive, and a focus on 
buyout/acquisition stages stage investments of buying PE firms lead to better post-SMBO 
performance. 
           It is also possible that some PE firms lack competitive advantages to access 
promising buyout deals. This view is consistent with the findings that buying PE firms tend 
to be younger (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2014), less experienced (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2013), 
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and less reputable (Arcot et al., 2014). The older, more experienced or more reputable 
selling PE firms effectively create value in the primary round and exit via SMBO only 
when further improvements become costly and more difficult. The above scenario is even 
more likely in periods of cheap debt and a lack of primary buyout deals. With easier access 
to debt and fierce competition for primary buyouts, some PE firms prefer SMBOs that still 
offer some potential for improvement. 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Data and sample selection 
           We identified SMBOs from the Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) 
list. We then searched for news about the buyouts from Nexis UK, 
http://www.unquote.com/, http://www.ft.com/, http://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/, PE firms’ 
websites, target companies websites, and synopses available from Thomson One Banker. 
Usually these sources of news and synopses describe the transaction and provide names of 
buyers and sellers, especially PE firms. In this way we can obtain entry dates of primary 
buyouts, selling and/or buying PE firms, and buyout types. 
68
 
           We obtained target companies’ former and current names from the FAME database. 
We collected company accounting information by combining the information on 
transactions obtained in the previous steps and merger and acquisition synopses from 
FAME database.         
           SMBOs could be syndicated by several PE firms (club-PE deals). In such cases, 
there is a lead PE firm that launches the transaction and dominates the decision-making 
process. We assume that the lead PE firm’s behavior is consistent with that of its syndicate 
                                                        
68
 This process helps us also to exclude SMBOs that are non PE-baked in both primary and secondary stages 
due to the purpose of this chapter.   
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partners and, hence, consider the lead PE firm as the delegate of the club-PE deals. PE 
firms’ reputation scores are estimated as the average of the sum of total number of 
investments and firms’ market share in PE total equity funding.69 
           We also checked PE firms’ websites and the shareholder list from the annual returns 
of target companies to obtain the exact fund names that invest in SMBOs. We excluded 
deals in cases where we were unable to find fund names, when we examine fund 
pressures.
70
 These unspecified funds could be ‘green funds’ with an unlimited fund life.71 
They may not have the same sell pressure and buy pressure as funds with a limited lifespan. 
Second, in some cases, the lead PE firm invests in several funds, with different vintage 
years simultaneously.
72
 For instance, 3i invested in 6 funds in HSS Hire Service Group, 
where the oldest fund has a vintage year of 1989 and the youngest fund has a vintage year 
of 2003. We computed the average value of the vintage years of the funds by the same PE 
firm simultaneously in one target company as our target vintage year. The final sample 
consists of 227 UK SMBOs from 2000 to 2007, of which 169 SMBOs were sold by PE 
firms to PE firms
73
.       
           Panel A of Table 4.1 describes the SMBO sample distribution in terms of the PE 
firms involved. We listed selling and buying PE firms, sorted by the number of SMBOs. 
There are more PE firms (82) on the buying side, compared to those on the selling side (63). 
Furthermore, deals seem to be concentrated on several large PE firms on the selling side, 
while deals seem to be dispensed across more PE firms on the buying side. For instance, 3i 
sold 41 deals but only bought out 7 deals. Similarly, Bridgepoint sold 15 deals while it only 
                                                        
69
 Reputation score = ½*(number of total investments) + ½*(the market share of total equity funding in £m). 
70
 16 SMBOs in terms of selling funds and 28 SMBOs in terms of buying funds.  
71
 For instance, Royal Bank Development Capital Ltd - Unspecified Fund, Dubai International Capital - 
Unspecified Fund, Lloyds Development Capital (Hldg), Ltd. - Unspecified Fund, and Bank of Scotland 
Corporate- Unspecified Fund. 
72
  There are 11 deals in the selling side and 18 deals in the buying side with multiple funds from the same 
lead PE firm. 
73
 Please see Appendix 4.1 for sample selection filters.  
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bought out 6 deals. The results for sample distribution in terms of buyout types (Panel B) 
and fund vintage years (Panel C) suggest that MBOs account for 63.44% (144 SMBOs) of 
the total sample SMBOs, followed by IBO (27.31% / 62 SMBOs). BIMBO and MBI only 
account for small portions. The vintage year of the selling PE funds ranges from 1975 to 
2005. Most funds were raised during the 1990s-2000s period. The majority of the selling 
PE funds was originated in 1996. The vintage year of the buying PE funds ranges from 
1986 to 2007. The majority of the buying funds (82.88%) were originated in the 2000s. The 
majority of buying PE funds were raised.  
Insert Table 4.1 about here 
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics  
           Table 4.2 (Panel A) shows a summary of the characteristics of selling and buying PE 
firms and funds. With respect to the selling side, the average industry experience of lead PE 
firms up to SMBO transaction year is about 24 investments, while the median is 9 
investments. On average, each executive manages about 6 investments. The mean fund age 
of selling funds, up to the SMBO transaction year, is around 9 years. This result suggests 
that selling funds tend to be close to the end of their lives.   
           With regard to the buying side, the mean value of industry experience is 18 
investments, with a median value of 10 investments. The executive only manages about 4 
investments. The average fund age is 4 years (median is 3 years), suggesting the buying 
funds tend to be in investment period. The proxy for dry powder indicates that buying funds 
have significant capital available at the SMBO transaction years.
 74
  On average, there is 
68.10% of raised fund that is not invested by the SMBO transaction year. In addition, both 
                                                        
74
 Dry powder is estimated as one minus the percentage of the sum of invested funds up to SMBO transaction 
year in the total raised fund. In regressions, we use the logarithm of dry powder. 
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selling and buying firms have similar mean and median values of stage specialization
 75
 and 
PE independence.
76
 For example, 94.8% of selling PE firms and 88.4% of buying PE firms 
on average are specialized in buyout/acquisition stage.    
Insert Table 4.2 about here 
           We also compare the characteristics of the selling and buying PE firms and funds by 
the mean values of relevant variables (Panel B). The results are presented in Panel B. 
Buying PE firms have less industry experience, compared to selling PE firms, although the 
difference is not statistically significant. The executives from buying PE firms have 
significantly smaller loads than those from selling PE firms. As expected, the buying funds 
are much younger than the selling funds. When we compare the median values (Panel C) of 
those characteristics, the results are similar, except that buying PE firms insignificantly 
show more industry experience than selling PE firms.   
           Table 4.3 presents the main deal characteristics of our SMBO sample. The average 
holding period (duration) in the primary stage is about 61 months (about 5 years), while 
that in secondary stage is slightly shorter with about 52 months (about 4 years) (Panel A). 
The percentages of PE-backed deals in both stages are similar, with 84.6% in the primary 
stage and 89.9% in the secondary stage. In addition, about 22.3% SMBOs were invested 
through multiple investment rounds and 16% SMBOs were invested by more than one PE 
firms.      
           The summary statistics of the target company characteristics are presented in Panel 
                                                        
75
 Stage specialization is defined according to Cressy et al. (2007), we calculate the percentage of investments 
(number of companies) of lead PE firms up to 2013 in 6 stage types: seed, early-stage, expansion, later stage, 
buyout/acquisition, and other. One stage with the greatest share of investments will be the stage that the lead 
PE firm is specialized in. We then create a dummy (named as stage specialization) that equals to 1 when the 
lead PE firm is specialized in buyout/acquisition stage, and 0 otherwise. 
76
 PE independence is defined as a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the selling (buying) PE firm is 
not the affiliation of bank or insurance companies in the primary buyout (SMBO) transaction year, and 0 
otherwise. 
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B
77
. The mean and median values of size (LNSIZE) are 4.335 (about £ 21.627 million) and 
4.293 (about £ 19.634 million). Moreover, the sizes of 75% of the SMBOs in our sample 
are less than 4.675 (about £47.315 million). It is evident that the majority of SMBOs in our 
sample are small- to medium-sized companies. The mean gearing ratio (GEAR) is 1.633 
and median ratio is 0.803.  
Insert Table 4.3 about here 
4.4 Post-SMBO performance  
           Table 4.4 presents median abnormal performance measures for full sample, up to 
five post-SMBO years (Y1-5). Abnormal performance (APit) estimated as:  
   APit=Pit- E(Pit)                                                                                                    (Equation 1) 
Where, Pit is the actual performance ratio during the post-event period and E (Pit) is the 
expected performance of the SMBO during the post-event period. E(Pit) is estimated by 
  Pit-1 or Pit-1 +ΔPIit. Pit-1 is the median value of performance three years before an SMBO. 
ΔPIit is difference between the industry control group’s performance in period t and the 
industry’s median pre-SMBO performance.   
           In terms of unadjusted abnormal performance, we observe a significant decrease in 
profitability (measured by ROA) and growth after the transaction.
78
 When we adjust for 
industry performance, SMBOs underperform in productivity, while the results for other 
performance measures are similar to those from the ‘level’ model.79 The results indicate that 
industry wide factors are not the main reason for SMBO underperformance, except for 
productivity. The results show a decreasing trend in growth performance measures. Overall, 
                                                        
77
 It should be noted that LNSIZE and variables of Previous performance are time invariant, therefore Ns of 
these variables are the numbers of SMBOs. But, Crisis and GEAR are time variant, so Ns for Crisis and 
GEAR are the numbers of firm-year observations over five years. 
78
 Measured by ROS the profitability improves only in the first year. 
79
 E(Pit) is estimated as  Pit-1. 
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SMBOs underperform.    
Insert Table 4.4 about here 
4.5 The determinants of post-SMBO performance  
4.5.1 Selling and buying PE funds 
           We adopt multivariate GLS random-effects panel regression as our main method as 
previous chapters.
80
 In order to correct for the heteroskedasticity of standard errors, z-
statistics are based on robust standard errors. 
APit=𝛼+β1Buying latei+β2Dry powderi+β3Buying latei*Dry powder+γ1Xit+εit   
                                                                                                                               (Equation 2)                                                                                   
           The dependent variables (APit) are abnormal performance ratios for profitability 
(AROA, AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), and sales 
growth (ASALG). Equation (2) examines Hypothesis 1a and 1b. We create a dummy 
variable of Buying late which takes the value of 1 if the buying fund is older than 4 years in 
the transaction year.
81
 We create an interaction term, Buying late * Dry powder to capture 
the interactive effect of these two variables.  
            Xit represents a set of control variables. First, in addition to the control variables 
used in previous chapters, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether the SMBOs 
were PE-backed in the primary stage or not (Primary PE-backed). Primary PE-backed 
SMBOs might perform worse than others, because primary PE firms have already adopted 
value creation mechanisms to alleviate the agency problem. Second, we use a dummy to 
indicate whether the SMBO is backed by more than one PE firms or not (Club deals). 
                                                        
80
 We run the OLS regression model, the F tests show that OLS is not suitable for our data. Also the Breusch 
and Pagan test and the Hausman test suggest the random effect model instead of the pooled OLS and the  
fixed effect model.  
81
 We choose 4 year as cut-off because first, the investment period of PE funding usually is 4-6 years (Arot et 
al., 2014). Second, the average buying fund age is 4.3 years in our sample.  
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Previous studies suggest that syndication will have a positive impact on a target companies’ 
performance. Third, we controlled for investment round by using a dummy (Multiple 
investments). In order to control for investment risk, PE firms might divide their capital into 
several investment rounds. Once the target companies achieve the target, they will invest 
further capital. Thus, multiple investments might have positive impact on the target 
companies’ performance. Fourth, we also include a dummy to indicate whether the PE firm 
is independent from banks or insurance companies (Selling/Buying PE independent), as 
independent PE firms are under more pressure to achieve higher return requirements, and 
therefore, might enhance the performance of target companies more efficiently compared 
with others. In addition, we adopt a dummy variable (Management Participation) of 
management participation in ownership to proxy for management incentive. We also use 
the logarithm of total assets (in £thousand) one year before the transaction as a proxy for 
size (LNSIZE). Our results from the Pearson correlations (Appendix 4.2) do not show a 
significantly high correlation between our explanatory variables. Industry dummies and 
entry year dummies are also included. 
Insert Table 4.6 about here 
           Table 4.6 shows the results of equation (2). Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal 
performances and Panel B uses industry adjusted abnormal performance. In Panel A, the 
results demonstrate that buying late has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with unadjusted abnormal performance in employment growth (coefficient: -0.420, z-stat: -
2.190) and sales growth (coefficient: -0.604, z-stat: -1.990). This implies that when the 
buying funds are older than 4 years or come to the end of their investments period, SMBOs 
tend to underperform in employment growth and sales growth (H1a). The results also show 
that dry powder significantly and negatively impacts on unadjusted abnormal performance 
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in employment growth (coefficient: -0.036, z-stat: -1.734). Out of the two individual 
variables, the interaction variable of Buying late* Dry powder has a positive and significant 
relationship with the unadjusted abnormal performance in employment growth (coefficient: 
0.109, z-stat: 2.455) and sales growth (coefficient: 0.166, z-stat: 2.248). When a buying PE 
fund is close to the end of its investment period, dry powder increased by one point will 
lead to 7.3% and 7.1% increases in unadjusted abnormal performance in employment 
growth and sales growth, respectively. These results are inconsistent with our hypothesis 1b. 
However, these results are not robust to the industry adjusted abnormal performance 
measures. 
           Our regression results show that the financial crisis and gearing are negatively 
associated with post-SMBO performance. Our results demonstrate that companies with 
better pre-SMBO performance tend to perform worse in the post-SMBO period. We also 
find some evidence that syndication and management participation in ownership can help 
increase the performance of target companies.     
APit=𝛼+β1Selling latei+β2Primary durationi+β3Selling latei*Primary durationi+γ1Xit+εit                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                              (Equation 3)         
           Equation (3) tests the Hypotheses 1c. As with equation (2), we constructed a dummy 
variable (Selling late) that equals 1 if the selling PE fund age is greater than 8 years when it 
exits the target company, 0 otherwise.
82
 The primary duration (Primary duration) is 
included to investigate the influence of the primary holding period on the relationship 
between selling late and post-SMBO performance. The interaction variable (Selling late* 
Primary duration) of selling late and primary duration captures this influence. When the 
selling funds come to the end of the fund’s life, SMBOs could be forced to exit earlier and 
                                                        
82
 The fund life is 10 years on average. The average selling fund age of our sample is about 9 years. Exiting in 
year 9 or longer in the fund life should be late.  
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leave performance improvement room for the next round. Xit represents a set of control 
variables. Industry dummies and entry year dummies are included.    
Insert Table 4.7 about here 
           The results are reported in Table 4.7. We find that the coefficient on selling late is 
positive and significant at the 5% level in panel A (coefficient: 0.372, z-stat: 2.294) and 
panel B (coefficient: 0.411, z-stat: 2.199), when the dependent variable is unadjusted and 
industry adjusted abnormal performance in profitability (measured as ROA), respectively. 
The positive sign implies that when the selling PE fund is older than 8 years (which means 
close to the end of the fund life) SMBO tends to perform better in profitability (measured as 
ROA) than other SMBOs (H1c). The coefficient for the interaction term (Selling late 
*Primary duration) is negative and statistically significant in the model for ROA in both 
panel A (coefficient: -0.093, z-stat: -2.273) and panel B (coefficient: -0.099, z-stat: -2.057). 
When the selling PE fund is close to the end of the fund life, even if the primary holding 
period is long, the SMBOs still underperform in profitability (measured as ROA). In 
regressions for other performance measures, the coefficients for the interaction variable are 
no longer statistically significant.
83
 Thus, we conclude that there is evidence that selling 
pressure has an impact on post-SMBO performance, but that this impact only appears in 
profitability measured by ROA.    
4.5.2 The impact of PE Firms  
           On average, selling PE firms tend to be more experienced than buying PE firms. 
There are also more PE firms specializing in the buyout/acquisition stage. These findings 
are consistent with those reported by Jenkinson and Sousa (2013, 2014), suggesting that 
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 In panel regression, the model with ASALEMP does not include entry year dummy, because if we include 
both dummies, the Wald chi2 is missing by STATA. But including or excluding entry year dummy do not 
change the results.  
194 
 
selling PE firms tend to be older and more experienced (using different proxies), compared 
to buying PE firms.
84
 In this section, we study whether the heterogeneity of PE firms could 
explain post-SMBO performance. We use the following panel regression model: 
 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠/ 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖 +
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝐸 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑏 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 +
 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝐸 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   
(Equation 4) 
          Where, Buying industry experience, Buying investments/ executives, and Buying 
stage specialization are examined variables. The other variables on the right hand side are 
control variables which are defined in Table 4.5. Equation (4) includes all target companies 
that are backed by PE firms in secondary stage. The regression specialization includes entry 
year dummies and PE industry dummies.  
Insert Table 4.8 about here 
           Table 4.8 presents the panel regression results for the influence of buying PE firms 
characteristics on post-SMBO abnormal performance. Once again, Panel A uses unadjusted 
abnormal performances as dependent variables while Panel B uses industry adjusted 
abnormal performance. In Panel A, the results clearly indicate that the industry experience 
of buying PE firms has a significant and positive impact on the post-SMBO abnormal 
performance in growth, measured by employment growth (coefficient: 0.042; z-stat: 2.418) 
and sales growth (coefficient: 0.036; z-stat: 1.752). To be specific, a one point increase in 
the buying PE firm’s industry experience will lead to 4.2% and 3.6% increases in post-
SMBO changes in employment growth and sales growth respectively. These findings are 
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 Jenkinson and Sousa (2013) studied with 194 European SMBOs (108 UK SMBOs) from 2000 to 2007. 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2014) studied 759 European SMBOs (165 UK SMBOs) from 2000 to 2007.   
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consistent with H2. Moreover, our results show buyout stage specialization has a 
significantly negative relationship with the change in employment growth (coefficient: -
0.091; z-stat: -1.680). Meanwhile, although the results are insignificant, stage specialization 
negatively impacts on post-SMBO abnormal performance in profitability, productivity, and 
sales growth. This finding contradicts H2 and those of Cressy et al. (2007) in which buyout 
stage significantly and positively relates to post-buyout productivity. In Panel B, none of 
the coefficients associated with the buying PE firm’s characteristics is significant in 
explaining industry adjusted abnormal performance. The only exception is the coefficient 
for industry experience in the AROA model (coefficient: 0.018; z-stat: 2.477).              
           Overall, our results show weak evidence that buying PE firms’ characteristics impact 
on the post-SMBO performance (H2). Our findings imply that buying PE firms tend to 
invest in SMBOs with good potential for growth.   
4.6 Robustness checks and further analysis  
4.6.1 Post-SMBO performance and the differences in characteristics between selling 
and buying PE firms 
           We argue that post-SMBO performance could be determined by differences between 
selling and buying PE firms. Now, we look at whether changes in PE firm’s characteristics 
can explain post-SMBO performance. We do so by employing the random-effects panel 
regression, using the subsample of SMBOs that are PE-backed in both the primary and 
secondary phases. The differences in PE firm’s characteristics (Different industry 
experience and Different investments/ executives) are measured as variables of buying PE 
firm characteristics (Buying industry experience and Buying investments/ executives) minus 
the counterpart variables of selling PE firm characteristics. More industry experience and 
fewer investments per executive of buying PE firms, compared to selling PE firms, may 
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bring more resources and opportunities to improve performance. Different stage 
specialization is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the buying PE firm is buyout 
stage specialization and the selling PE firm is not, and 0 otherwise. If the selling PE firm is 
not buyout stage specialized, more value creation potential may be left for secondary round 
investors. Thus, buyout specialized buying PE firms may generate better post-SMBO 
performance. We regress the unadjusted and industry adjusted post-SMBO abnormal 
performance on the three explanatory variables and a set of control variables as equation (4).     
           In Panel A of Table 4.9, we do not find evidence that differences in industry 
experience and the number of investments per executive have a significant relationship with 
post-SMBO performance. These results are inconsistent with our H2. However, when we 
use industry adjusted post-SMBO abnormal performance as dependent variables (Panel B), 
we observe that Different industry experience and Different investments/executive have 
significantly positive and negative relationships with post-SMBO abnormal performance in 
employment growth, respectively. These results indicate that after controlling for industry 
factor, more industry experience and fewer investments per executive of buying PE firms, 
compared to selling PE firms, can improve employment growth. Interestingly, we find a 
significant and negative relationship between Different stage specialization and post-
SMBO abnormal performance in productivity (unadjusted coefficient: -0.094) and sales 
growth (unadjusted coefficient: -0.222; industry adjusted coefficient: -0.141). When 
backing PE firms change from non-buyout specialized to buyout specialized, unadjusted 
abnormal performance in productivity and sales growth will be 9.4% and 22.2% (industry 
adjusted: 14.1%) lower than those of other SMBOs, respectively.           
Insert Table 4.9 about here 
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4.6.2 Alternative measure of dry powder  
           We demonstrate dry powder alleviates the negative relationship between buying late 
and post-SMBO performance. This finding is inconsistent with the expectation that the 
greater dry powder a PE fund has, the more likely it is that a buying late PE fund will invest 
in bad SMBOs. In order to check this finding’s sensitivity, we created a dummy variable 
(Dry powder dummy) and reran equation 2. We randomly chose a 25% cut-off point. Dry 
powder dummy equals to 1 if the uninvested fund is more than 25% of committed capital 
and 0 otherwise. The results in Panel A of Table 4.10 are similar to those in Panel A of 
Table 4.6. Notably, when we use industry adjusted abnormal performance measures, we 
still observe that Buying late is negatively and significantly (coefficient: -0.320, z-stat: -
2.467) and the interaction term is positive and significant (coefficient: 0.355, z-stat: 2.614), 
related to employment growth (AEMPG), consistent with our main results. The results 
indicate that buying late pressure will cause buying PE firms to choose bad deals while 
huge dry powder can alleviate this negative relationship. 
Insert Table 4.10 about here 
4.6.3 Post-SMBO performance and buying PE firms’ characteristics (excluding unspecified 
fund data) 
           When a PE fund has unlimited life span (green fund), PE firms will not have 
pressure to invest or obtain high returns, because the fund investors might be their parent 
companies such as banks. In these cases, PE firms might have a weak influence on target 
companies’ performance. These cases may affect our results (Table 4.8). Hence, we 
restricted our sample to SMBOs invested by PE funds with a limited fund life and reran the 
equation 4.  
            The results are showed in Table 4.11. With regard to Panel A, similar to the results 
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in Table 4.8, the impact of PE firms mainly focuses on growth performance. Different from 
the results in Table 4.8, we find the coefficients on industry experience in AEMPG and 
ASALG models are significant and higher (0.061 and 0.052, respectively). Furthermore, the 
absolute values of coefficients on Buying stage specialization in models for AEMPG and 
ASALG are significant and higher (0.125 and 0.198, respectively) than those of Table 4.8. In 
addition, we find the more investments per executive, the less the abnormal performance in 
growth (measured by AEMPG). When we use industry adjusted abnormal performance as 
dependent variables (Panel B), the results still shows that industry experience and fewer 
investments per executive improve growth performance while buyout stage specialization 
reduces the growth performance. In sum, when buying funds have a limited life span, 
buying PE firms seem to take more effort to improve targets’ performance, especially 
growth performance, consistent with H2. On the other hand, the buyout stage specialization 
deteriorates the growth performance after SMBO transactions, suggesting that buyout stage 
specialization is not suitable to secondary round buyouts.    
Insert Table 4.11 about here 
4.6.4 Potential sample selection bias  
           A potential concern is whether our sample leads to a possible sample selection bias 
of PE backing. Post-SMBO performance may be driven by the buying PE firm’s ability to 
identify better companies to invest in rather than the impact of the characteristics of PE 
firms or the longevity of PE fund. Thus, we correct sample selection bias for equation 2, 3, 
and 4, by using the Heckman two-step model. 
PEi=α+β1BSERVICESi+β2LNSIZEi+β3ROAt-1i+εi                                         (Equation 5) 
           Equation 5 is Probit regression with a robust variance estimate for the probability of 
receiving PE backing. As in previous chapters, we hypothesize that the choice of a PE 
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firm’s investment in a SMBO is associated with company size (LNSIZE), pre-SMBO 
performance (ROAt-1), and primary buyout’s industry (BSERVICES). 85  Lambda is the 
estimated probability of a PE firm’s investment in an SMBO. In the second step, we include 
Lambda as an additional explanatory variable into equations 2, 3, and 4. The results are 
presented in Table 4.12
86
. The results of Probit regression (Panel A) are qualitatively similar 
to those in previous chapters. Lambda is not statistically significant in all the models, 
except for the models for AROS and ASALEMP in Panel B and the model for AROA in 
Panel C. However, the coefficients for our main explanatory variables are qualitatively 
similar to our main results. Hence, the potential sample selection biases do not affect our 
main results.   
Insert Table 4.12 about here 
4.6.5 Selling late and buying early  
           In section 4.5, we find that selling late SMBOs have better post-SMBO profitability 
performance. We also find that buying late SMBOs perform worse in terms of unadjusted 
growth performance, indicating that buying early SMBOs might perform better. These 
findings show that selling late and buying early SMBOs might have performance 
improvement potential that might be achieved easily by using traditional performance 
improvement mechanisms. In other words, the impact of buying PE firms’ characteristics 
(competitive advantages) on post-SMBO performance will be weakened.   
            In order to support this argument, we included two dummy variables (Selling late 
and Buying early) into equation 4, separately.
 87
 We create interactive terms of the two 
dummies with Buying industry experience, Buying investments/ executive, and Buying stage 
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 We use total assets instead of deal value as the proxy for size.   
86
 We use industry adjusted performance measures to test the potential sample selection bias (Appendix 4.3). 
The results are statistically similar to those of the models of industry adjusted measures without Lambda, 
though Lambda is significant in some models in Panel A and B.  
87
 Buying early is equal to 1 if buying fund age is less than 4 years and 0 otherwise.  
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specialization. The results are presented in Table 4.13. Panel A includes Selling late while 
Panel B includes Buying early. In Panel A, the interaction term of Buying industry 
experience and Selling late is significantly negative in models with dependent variables of 
AROA, ASALEMP, and AEMPG (coefficient:-0.033, -0.099, and -0.064, respectively). 
These results imply that selling late SMBOs are associated with the weaker influence of 
industry experience on post-SMBO performance in terms of profitability, productivity, and 
growth. Furthermore, Buying investments/executive*Selling late is significantly and 
positively related to post-SMBO performance in AROS (coefficient: 0.057), suggesting that 
selling late reduces the effort of executive with fewer investments. In Panel B, the results 
show that Buying industry experience*Buying early is significantly and negatively related 
to ASALEMP (coefficient: -0.197). Buying investments/ executive*Buying early is 
significantly and positively related to ASALEMP (coefficient=0.062). These results imply 
that buying early will weaken the impact of industry experience and investments/executive 
on post-SMBO performance in productivity. However, we find that the coefficient for 
Buying stage specialization *Buying early in the model for ASALEMP is significantly 
positive (coefficient: 0.337).     
           To sum up, compared to buying early, selling late is more likely to weaken the 
influence of previous industry experience and investments per executive on post-SMBO 
performance
88
. When SMBOs have performance improvement potential left by previous PE 
firms, buying PE firms seem not to take the same effort as others to improve performance, 
for instance, using their previous industry experience or executive spending more time and 
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 We also use industry adjusted abnormal performance measures (Appendix 4.4). Although the results change 
in some models, they still show some evidence that Selling late and Buying early can mitigate the impact of 
industry experience and investments/executive on post-SMBO performance. Furthermore, the industry factor 
blurs the disparity between buying early and selling late subsamples.  
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energy. These results are consistent to our main results to some extent.
89
  
Insert Table 4.13 about here 
4.7 Conclusion 
           We extend our data by collecting the information of PE firms and funds. The final 
sample consists of 227 SMBOs, with 192 backed by PE firms in the primary phase and 204 
backed by PE firms in the secondary phase. The univariate analysis for post-SMBO 
abnormal performance indicates that SMBOs underperform in terms of profitability, 
productivity, and growth. These results are consistent with those in previous chapters. We 
also find significant differences between selling and buying PE firms and funds. For 
instance, buying PE firms, on average, have fewer investments per executive and are less 
likely to be specialized in the buyout stage, compared to selling PE firms. Furthermore, 
buying PE funds are younger than selling PE firms.   
           When we use unadjusted abnormal performance as dependent variables, significantly 
negative coefficients are observed for buying late in models with growth ratios. The results 
support our H1a. The interaction term of buying late and dry powder is significant positive 
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 By contrast, companies in selling early and buying late subsamples are more likely to be bad. In their early 
periods of fund life, selling funds are not under pressure to exit their portfolio companies. Instead of exiting 
via SMBOs, they prefer IPOs or trade sales as exit routes for good companies as these two exit routes will 
bring more investment returns and a better track record. Hence, in the absence of selling pressure, SMBOs 
tend to be the last resort for bad companies. With regard to buying late SMBOs, the buying funds are 
approaching the end of their investment periods, which force them to invest the untapped capital. Under this 
pressure, they tend to ‘go for broke’ by choosing the easy access investments and spending less effort on due 
diligence. As a consequence, these buying funds are more likely to invest in bad companies. In contrast to 
good companies, for bad companies, the comparative advantages offered by buying PE firms may have a 
stronger effect on their performance.  
          Our results in terms of selling early (please see Panel A of Appendix 4.5) show evidence that 
coefficients on the interaction term of Selling early and Buying industry experience are significantly positive, 
suggesting that the industry experience of buying PE firms from selling late subsample has stronger influence 
on abnormal performance than others. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction term of Selling early 
and Buying investments/executive in model of AROS  is significantly negative, indicating that fewer 
investments per executive has stronger influence on abnormal performance than others. Likewise, in Panel B 
of Appendix 4.5, our results show that Buying industry experience and Buying investments/executive of 
buying PE firms from buying late subsample have stronger influences on ASALEMP than their counterparts. 
The results are opposite to those of selling late and buying early subsamples. This implies that performance 
improvement in bad companies in selling early and buying late subsamples rely more on the competitive 
advantages of buying PE firms than those of good companies in selling late and buying early subsamples. 
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associated with abnormal performance in growth. The result contradicts our H1b. 
Nevertheless, when we use industry adjusted abnormal performance as dependent variables, 
none of the above coefficients are statistically significant. Our results lend only weak 
evidence to hypothesis 1c. The empirical analysis hereto does not provide strong support 
for our hypotheses in terms of funds’ selling and buying pressure. This contradicts the 
results of recent working papers (Arcot et al., 2014 and Degeorge et al., 2013) that use 
financial multiples to measure performance. One explanation could be that selling and 
buying pressure have an impact on the bargaining power of PE firms while not on the 
operating performance of target companies.  
           We then examined the relationship between the characteristics of PE firms and post-
SMBO performance. Following previous studies on the heterogeneity of PE firms, we 
choose industry experience, investments per executive, and buyout/acquisition stage 
specialization as proxies for the differences of characteristics (competitive advantages) of 
PE firms. Our results show that the industry experience of buying PE firms only improve 
unadjusted performance in employment growth and sales growth (H2).   
           To check the robustness of our results, we considered different measures, subsamples, 
and methods. We first examined the impact of differences of characteristics between selling 
and buying PE firms of the same target companies on post-SMBO abnormal performance. 
Compared to selling PE firms, more industry experience and fewer investments per 
executive of buying PE firms were not found to result in better post-SMBO abnormal 
performance. Nevertheless, the buyout/acquisition stage specialization of buying PE firms 
deteriorates post-SMBO performance. We then used an alternative measure of dry powder 
and reran the regressions. The results are consistent with our main results. Thirdly, we 
restricted our sample to SMBOs invested by PE funds with limited fund life and reran the 
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relevant regressions on PE firms’ characteristics. The results are inconsistent with our main 
results. In fact, when PE firms encounter limited life, the buying PE firms tend to enhance 
the performance. The characteristics of buying PE firms, hence, show a significant 
relationship with post-SMBO abnormal performance in growth. Similarly, the 
buyout/acquisition stage specialization has a significantly negative relationship with growth, 
indicating again that buyout/acquisition stage specialization does not help SMBOs. Fourthly, 
we tested the potential sample selection bias by using the Heckman two-stage model. 
Although selection biases exist in our sample, the results are qualitatively similar to our 
main results. Finally, we investigated whether selling late and buying early have an impact 
on the relationship between the characteristics of buying PE firms and post-SMBO 
performance. Our results show that selling late is more likely to mitigate the effect of the 
characteristics of buying PE firms on post-SMBO performance.  
           There are some limitations to our study. First, due to the limitation of our database 
access, we employed the simplest way to calculate dry powder. Although there is no 
uniform definition of dry powder, our calculation method may cause some bias, as PE firms 
always vary in their tolerance of unspent committed capital. This might provide another 
explanation of the result that dry powder alleviates the negative relationship between 
buying late and post-SMBO growth performance. Second, due to the same database-related 
reason, we cannot employ other proxies for industry experience and buyout/acquisition 
stage specialization that control for PE industry factor.
90
   
        
 
 
 
 
                                                        
90
 Many studies also use the Herfindhal index to evaluate industry specialization (e.g. Cressy et al., 2007). 
We could not obtain this kind of data either.   
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Table 4.1: Sample distribution 
This table reports sample distribution. Panel A shows the list of observable selling and buying lead PE firms. 
N is the number of SMBOs in which these PE firms were involved either as sellers or buyers. ‘Unknown’ 
means the SMBO is PE-backed but we could not obtain the names of PE firms. Panel B presents the sample 
distribution in terms of buyout types. Panel C presents selling and buying funds’ distribution by vintage years.  
 
Panel A: List of selling and buying lead PE firms and number of involved SMBOs 
Selling lead PE firm N Buying lead PE firm N 
3i 41 Bank Of Scotland Corporate 14 
Bridgepoint  15 LDC 9 
LDC 13 3i 7 
ECI Partners LLP 8 ISIS Equity Partners 7 
Barclays Private Equity 7 Phoenix Equity  7 
CBPE Capital LLP 5 Bridgepoint   
HSBC Private Equity 5 Hg Capital 6 
Royal Bank Private Equity 5 Barclays Private Equity 5 
Aberdeen Asset Managers Growth 4 AAC Capital Partner 5 
Bank Of Scotland Corporate 4 NVM Private Equity 5 
Dunedin Capital  4 Graphite Capital 5 
Graphite Capital  4 HSBC Private Equity 5 
Gresham Trust 4 ABN AMRO Private Equity 4 
Permira Advisers LLP 4 August Equity LLP 4 
Cinven 3 Dubai International Capital 4 
Electra Partners LLP 3 Dunedin Capital  4 
Irrfc 3 Matrix Private Equity Partners 4 
LGV Capital 3 Change Capital Partners LLC 3 
Lyceum Capital 3 Beringea 3 
NBGI Private Equity Ltd 3 CBPE Capital LLP 3 
Royal Bank Development Capital 3 Candover  3 
Alchemy Partners 2 Charterhouse Capital  3 
August Equity LLP 2 GCP Member Ltd 3 
Barclays Ventures Ltd 2 Gresham Llp 3 
CVC Capital Partners Ltd 2 LGV 3 
Duke street 2 Vision Capital 3 
YFM Equity  2 Aberdeen Asset Managers Growth 2 
ABN AMRO Private Equity 1 Advent International  2 
Acus Management Partners Ltd 1 Barclays Ventures 2 
Advantage Capital 1 Blackstone Group LP 2 
Advent International Corp 1 Endless LLP 2 
Apax Partners 1 Electra Partners LLP 2 
BC Partners 1 Exponent Private Equity LLP 2 
Bain Capital LLC 1 GE Capital Finance 2 
Boston overseas equity 1 HarbourVest Partners LLC 2 
Candover  1 Lion Capital  2 
Carlyle Group 1 NBGI Private Equity Ltd 2 
Charterhouse 1 Spirit Capital Partners LLP 2 
Clayton Dubilier & Rice LLC 1 TA Associates 2 
Elderstreet Investments Ltd 1 Arion banki hf. 1 
Exponent Private Equity LLP 1 ECI Partners 1 
GCP Member Ltd 1 RJD Partners 1 
Hermes Gpe Llp 1 Albany Venture Managers Ltd 1 
Hg Capital 1 Altor Equity Partners AB 1 
ISIS Equity Partners PLC 1 American Capital Ltd 1 
Inflexion PLC 1 Arle Capital LLP 1 
Intermediate Capital 1 BC Partners 1 
J.F. Lehman & Company 1 Bain Capital Inc 1 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 1 Baird Capital 1 
Jordan Co LLC 1 Boundary Capital  1 
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Panel B: Sample distribution in terms of buyout types91 
Buyout type No. of SMBOs As % of sample  
BIMBO 9 3.96 
IBO 62 27.31 
MBI 12 5.29 
MBO 144 63.44 
Total 227 100 
 
                                                        
91
 BIMBO is a combination of buy-in and a buy-out; IBO is a buyout in which PE firms are only investors; 
MBI is a management buy-in buyout; MBO is a management-led buyout. 
(Continued)    
Klesch Capital Partners 1 Bridges Community Ventures Ltd 1 
Lion Capital LLP 1 Carlyle Group 1 
Matrix Private Equity Partners 1 Cognetas 1 
Mezzanine Management Finanz und 
Unterneh 1 Dawnay Day Principal Investments 1 
Milestone Capital Partners LLP 1 Derwent London PLC 1 
Nomura International PLC 1 Duke Street  1 
PHOENIX EQUITY 1 EM Warburg Pincus & Co Inc 1 
Parkmead Group PLC 1 Enterprise Finance Europe 1 
Rollins Specialty Group, Inc. 1 Elderstreet Investments 1 
Silverfleet Capital LLP 1 European Capital Ventures PLC 1 
Sovereign Capital Ltd 1 Henderson Private Equity 1 
TA Associates 1 Hermes Gpe Llp 1 
Welsh Carson Anderson & Stowe 1 Hotbed 1 
  Hutton Collins Partners 1 
  Intermediate Capital Group PLC 1 
  Investcorp Bank BSC 1 
  ISB CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 1 
  Kelso Place Asset Management LLP 1 
  Langholm Capital LLP 1 
  Lyceum Capital 1 
  Oak Hill Capital Partners 1 
  Och-Ziff Capital Management 1 
  Octopus Ventures Ltd 1 
  PAI Partners 1 
  Pi Capital 1 
  Rhone Capital 1 
  Royal Bank Development Capital 1 
  Royal London Private Equity Ltd 1 
  Rutland Partners LLP 2 
  Saints Chamonix 1 
  SCF Partners LP 1 
  Shackleton Ventures 1 
    
Number of PE firms 63 Number of PE firms 82 
Number of SMBOs 192 Number of  SMBOs 198 
Unknown of selling PE firms 0 Unknown of buying PE firms 6 
Total number of PE-backed primary 
buyouts 192 Total number of PE-backed SMBOs 204 
As % of sample SMBOs 84.6 As % of sample SMBOs  89.9 
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Panel C: Fund distribution by vintage year 
Selling PE fund Buying PE fund 
Vintage year Freq. Percent Cum. Vintage year Freq. Percent Cum. 
1975 2 1.32 1.32     
1982 7 4.64 5.96     
1986 1 0.66 6.62 1986 1 0.68 0.68 
1987 4 2.65 9.27 1987 0 0 0.68 
1988 2 1.32 10.6 1988 0 0 0.68 
1989 5 3.31 13.91 1989 3 2.05 2.74 
1990 4 2.65 16.56 1990 0 0 2.74 
1991 1 0.66 17.22 1991 1 0.68 3.42 
1992 3 1.99 19.21 1992 1 0.68 4.11 
1993 6 3.97 23.18 1993 1 0.68 4.79 
1994 11 7.28 30.46 1994 2 1.37 6.16 
1995 0 0 30.46 1995 0 0 6.16 
1996 25 16.56 47.02 1996 1 0.68 6.85 
1997 21 13.91 60.93 1997 0 0 6.85 
1998 15 9.93 70.86 1998 8 5.48 12.33 
1999 5 3.31 74.17 1999 7 4.79 17.12 
2000 19 12.58 86.75 2000 23 15.75 32.88 
2001 9 5.96 92.72 2001 24 16.44 49.32 
2002 4 2.65 95.36 2002 13 8.9 58.22 
2003 4 2.65 98.01 2003 19 13.01 71.23 
2004 2 1.32 99.34 2004 10 6.85 78.08 
2005 1 0.66 100 2005 18 12.33 90.41 
    2006 8 5.48 95.89 
    2007 6 4.11 100 
Total 151 100  Total 146 100  
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Table 4.2: PE firms and funds - summary statistics  
This table shows the results of the summary statistics of the variables. Panel A presents the summary statistics 
of characteristics of the selling and buying PE firms and funds. Panel B and Panel C contain comparison 
results of characteristics of selling and buying PE firms and funds. Values in columns of selling side and 
buying side are mean values in Panel B and median values in Panel C which are the same as those in Panel A. 
Difference is calculated as the mean value (median values) of the selling side minus that of the buying side. 
For the analysis, we used logarithms of industry experience and dry powder. P-values are results of unpaired 
unequal t test for Panel B and Wilcoxon signed-rank test for Panel C. N is the number of SMBOs. Definitions 
of all variables are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of selling and buying PE firms and funds 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
Selling side  Industry experience 191 23.670 40.053 3 9 26 
 Investments/executive 187 5.739 8.965 2.047 4.057 7.667 
 Stage specialization 186 0.948 0.388 1 1 1 
 Fund age 187 9.027 5.254 6 8 11 
 PE independent 191 0.675 0.469 0 1 1 
Buying side Industry experience 191 18.414 29.199 2 10 21 
 Investments/executive 186 3.643 2.446 1.633 2.861 5.043 
 Stage specialization 187 0.884 0.358 1 1 1 
 Fund age 186 4.301 4.436 1 3 6 
 PE independent 191 0.681 0.467 0 1 1 
 Dry powder 182 68.100 29.957 46.4 73.55 100 
 
 
Table B:  Comparison of characteristics of selling and buying PE firms and funds (mean value) 
 Selling side  Buying side Difference P-value 
Industry experience 23.670 18.414 5.256 0.143 
Investments/executive 5.739 3.643 2.096 0.002 
Stage specialization 0.948 0.884 0.064 0.023 
Fund age 9.027 4.301 4.726 0.000 
PE independent 0.675 0.681 -0.006 0.913 
 
Table C:  Comparison of characteristics of selling and buying PE firms and funds (median value) 
 Selling side  Buying side Difference P-value 
Industry experience 9 10 -1 0.372 
Investments/executive 4.057 2.861 1.196 0.000 
Stage specialization 1 1 0 0.000 
Fund age 8 3 5 0.000 
PE independent 1 1 0 0.813 
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Table 4.3 Deal characteristics 
This table shows the summary statistics of deal characteristics of the sample SMBOs. Panel A is the deal 
characteristics at primary and secondary buyout stages, respectively. Panel B exhibits the characteristics of 
target companies.  N is the number of SMBOs. But, N for Crisis and GEAR is firm-year observations. The 
definitions of all variables are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Panel A: Primary and secondary stages 
 
 
Panel B: Target company’s characteristics  
 N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
ROAt-1 214 0.130 0.120 0.063 0.118 0.186 
ROSt-1 203 0.077 0.175 0.045 0.090 0.144 
SALEMPt-1 195 2.096 0.352 1.879 2.063 2.238 
EMPGt-1 179 0.057 0.257 -0.010 0.055 0.139 
SALGt-1 182 0.134 0.338 0.013 0.112 0.228 
Crisis 1135 0.629 0.483 0 1 1 
LNSIZE 227 4.335 0.568 3.983 4.293 4.675 
GEAR 576 1.633 2.069 0.255 0.803 2.297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 
Primary stage Primary Duration 215 60.870 32.944 38 54 77 
 Primary PE-backed 227 0.846 0.362 1 1 1 
Secondary stage Secondary Duration  227 51.784 21.419 38 50 63 
 Secondary PE-backed 227 0.899 0.302 1 1 1 
 Investment round 197 0.223 0.418 0 0 0 
 Club PE 200 0.160 0.368 0 0 0 
 Management participation 227 0.727 0.447 0 1 1 
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Table 4.4: Summary results for the post-SMBO performance 
This table presents median abnormal performance measures for the full sample, up to five post-SMBO years 
(Y 1-5). Abnormal performance ( 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡) is calculated as: 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) . where, 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the actual 
performance in year t after SMBO transactions while 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡)  is the expected performance of the target 
company in year t after SMBO transactions. It is estimated by two models: 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, and 𝐸(𝑃𝑖𝑡) =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡; where, the former is ‘level’ model using unadjusted benchmark and the latter is ‘change’ model 
using industry adjusted benchmark. All results are based on 99% winsorized data. We employed the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test (median=0, vs. median≠0) to test the significance of the abnormal performance. ***, **, *, 
indicate significance of the test at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. The total number of 
observations and number of observations with positive values are reported in brackets. Definitions of 
abnormal performance measures are presented in Appendix 2.1.  
 
  Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Profitability  Benchmarks      
AROA E(Pit) = Pit-1  -0.007 -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.061*** 
  (193: 92) (170:66) (124:42) (77:27) (38:11) 
 E(Pit) = Pit-1 + ΔPIit -0.005 -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.078*** -0.072** 
  (184:89) (166:64) (120:39) (72:17) (34:12) 
AROS E(Pit) = Pit-1  0.017** 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.021 
  (155:90) (138:70) (102:48) (56:28) (32:11) 
 E(Pit) = Pit-1 + ΔPIit 0.011 -0.001 -0.011* -0.003 -0.026 
  (148:84) (133:65) (98:42) (51:25) (27:10) 
Productivity       
ASALEMP E(Pit) = Pit-1  0.047*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.025 -0.023 
  (153:111) (132:86) (94:57) (58:39) (27:11) 
 E(Pit) = Pit-1 + ΔPIit -0.018 -0.029** -0.055*** -0.039 -0.126* 
  (135:59) (113:42) (83:27) (43:18) (14:3) 
Growth       
AEMG E(Pit) = Pit-1  -0.004 -0.022** -0.057*** -0.038 -0.033 
  (152:75) (133:52) (101:31) (53:18) (26:10) 
 E(Pit) = Pit-1 + ΔPIit -0.016 -0.036** -0.063*** -0.056* -0.006 
  (127:58) (111:43) (83:21) (41:16) (17:8) 
ASALG E(Pit) = Pit-1  -0.005 -0.050*** -0.071*** -0.107** -0.201*** 
  (139:69) (123:50) (91:33) (42:13) (20:2) 
 E(Pit) = Pit-1 + ΔPIit 0.010 -0.010 -0.046* -0.063 -0.122** 
  (135:69) (121:58) (89:37) (42:18) (20:6) 
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Table 4.5: Definitions of variables 
This table presents the definitions of all variables used in our regressions, excluding the performance 
measures which are the same as in previous chapters. 
 
PE Firm characteristics:  
Industry experience: following Clercq and Dimov (2008), we measured the PE experience for each SMBO by 
counting the number of initial investments (investee companies) made by the lead PE firms in the same 
industry as the target company prior to the transaction year. For the regression, we will use the logarithm of 
Industry experience.  
Investments/executive: the total number of investments managed by a lead PE firm divided by the number of 
investment executives employed by the PE firm up to 2013.  
Stage specialization: according to Cressy et al. (2007), we calculated the percentage of investments (number 
of companies) of lead PE firms up to 2013 in 6 stage types: seed, early-stage, expansion, later stage, 
buyout/acquisition, and other
92
. One stage with the greatest share of investments will be the stage that the lead 
PE firm is specialized in. We then created a dummy (Stage specialization) that equals 1 when the lead PE firm 
is specialized in buyout/acquisition stage, and 0 otherwise.  
Different industry experience: the logarithm of buying PE firm’s industry experience minus the logarithm of 
selling PE firm’s industry experience. 
Different investments/executive: buying PE firm’s investments/executive minus selling PE firm’s 
investments/executives. 
Different stage specialization: a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the buying PE firm is specialized in 
buyout/acquisition stage and the selling PE firm is not, and 0 otherwise. 
PE fund characteristics: 
Fund age: the difference between the vintage year and the SMBO transaction year.  
Selling late: dummy variable that equals 1 if the selling PE fund age is greater than 8 years and 0 otherwise.  
Buying late: dummy variable that equals 1 if the buying PE fund age is greater than 4 years and 0 otherwise 
Dry powder: one minus the percentage of the sum of invested funds up to SMBO transaction year in the total 
raised fund. When regression, we will use the logarithm of dry powder. 
Dry powder dummy: a dummy that equals 1 if dry powder is greater than 25% and 0 otherwise. 
Deal Characteristics:  
Primary (secondary) PE-backed: dummy variable that takes 1 if the target company is PE-backed in the 
primary (secondary) stage. 
Club deals: dummy variable that equals 1 if there is more than one PE firm investing in the SMBO, and 0 
otherwise.  
Multiple investment: dummy variable that equals 1 if there is more than one investment round during the 
SMBO period and 0 otherwise.   
Selling (Buying) PE Independent: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the Selling (Buying) PE 
firm is not an affiliate of the bank or insurance companies in the primary buyout (SMBO) transaction year, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Primary/secondary duration: the number of months of the buyout holding period from entry date to exit date. 
For the regression, we will use the logarithm of duration. 
Management participation: dummy variable that equals 1 if the target company’s management contributes to 
the equity in secondary stage and 0 otherwise. 
Other control variables: 
93
  
                                                        
92
 According to Private Equity Glossary of Thomson One Banker, these six types are defined as follows: seed 
means these companies “have not yet fully established commercial operations, and may also involve 
continued research and product development” (Thomson One Banker, 2008); companies in early stage 
requires “product development and initial marketing, manufacturing and sales activities” (ibid); companies in 
expansion stage require “additional capital to expand production to increase revenue” (ibid) for venture 
capital investment and “use equity usually to expand operations on a national or international stage, possibly 
through acquisitions of smaller or similarly sized companies, or increased production” (ibid) for buyout 
investment; later stage refers to the stage in which companies “have an already established product or service 
that has already generated revenue, but may not be making a profit” (ibid); companies in buyout/acquisition 
stage are controlled or fully possessed by PE firms, an operating company, or conglomerate; others refers to 
none of the above stages apply.       
93
 In order to maintain the number of observations, we use alternative measures for some control variables, 
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(Continued) 
GEAR: The sum of long term and shot term debt divided by the total equity. 
Previous performance: the performance ratios (ROAt-1, ROSt-1, SALEMPt-1, EMPGt-1, and SALGt-1) in 
year preceding the SMBO. 
Crisis: A dummy variable which equals 1 if the year coincides with the years of financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. The calendar years of 2008, 2009, and 2010 are defined as financial crisis years. 
LNSIZE: The logarithm of total asset (in £ thousand) in one year before transaction. 
Lambda : The fitted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated by equation 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
including previous performance and size.    
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Table 4.6: Post-SMBO performance and buying late 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying late 
on post-SMBO performance, from year 1 to year 5 after SMBO transactions. The dependent variables are 
abnormal performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth 
(AEMPG), and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performance while Panel B uses 
industry adjusted abnormal performance. Models in both Panel A and Panel B include entry year dummies 
and industry dummies. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated with 
robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for 
the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N is the number of firm-year observations used in each 
model. ***, **,* indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % respectively. Definitions of all variables 
are in Table 4.5.      
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying late -0.044 -0.046 -0.008 -0.420** -0.604** 
 -0.572 -0.483 -0.037 -2.190 -1.990 
Dry powder -0.006 -0.003 -0.022 -0.036* -0.095 
 -0.445 -0.178 -0.461 -1.734 -1.517 
Buying late* Dry powder 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.109** 0.166** 
 0.769 0.831 0.306 2.455 2.248 
Primary PE-backed 0.069*** 0.045 -0.084 0.014 0.113 
 2.883 1.386 -1.318 0.237 1.364 
Club deals 0.026 0.083** -0.052 0.022 0.021 
 1.111 2.191 -0.888 0.339 0.288 
Multiple investment 0.002 -0.038 0.010 0.052 -0.013 
 0.104 -1.205 0.288 0.924 -0.194 
Buying PE independent 0.022 0.017 -0.022 -0.036 0.023 
 0.928 0.674 -0.482 -0.624 0.267 
LNSIZE -0.006 0.033 0.051 0.073 0.056 
 -0.238 0.902 0.667 1.609 0.676 
Secondary duration -0.013 0.065 -0.024 -0.029 -0.161 
 -0.226 0.944 -0.135 -0.267 -0.771 
Crisis -0.039*** -0.006 -0.013 -0.070 -0.139** 
 -2.770 -0.326 -0.696 -1.406 -2.559 
Management 
participation 0.032 0.017 -0.024 0.073* 0.041 
 1.335 0.479 -0.377 1.682 0.499 
GEAR -0.012*** -0.018** 0.001 -0.006 0.007 
 -2.696 -2.479 0.250 -0.506 0.471 
Previous performance -0.580*** -0.131 -0.114 -0.455*** -0.515*** 
 -4.428 -0.577 -0.925 -2.946 -3.470 
Intercept 0.118 -0.098 0.304 -0.046 0.426 
 0.617 -0.417 0.475 -0.144 0.599 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 36.97 23.22 8.54 27.65 30.64 
Wald chi2 132.977*** 74.294*** 32.944 199.919*** 148.117*** 
N  317 265 231 263 247 
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying late -0.034 -0.067 -0.108 -0.224 -0.173 
 -0.085 -0.812 -0.435 -1.057 -0.563 
Dry powder -0.091 -0.006 -0.028 -0.027 0.012 
 -1.150 -0.322 -0.626 -0.879 0.206 
Buying late* Dry powder -0.032 0.024 0.041 0.062 0.074 
 -0.338 1.239 0.694 1.157 0.941 
Primary PE-backed 0.063 0.044 -0.018 -0.061 0.116 
 1.020 1.360 -0.236 -1.465 1.413 
Club deals 0.068 0.070* -0.008 -0.006 0.029 
 1.069 1.768 -0.089 -0.175 0.366 
Multiple investment 0.103 -0.043 -0.068 0.072 -0.007 
 0.842 -1.277 -0.869 1.519 -0.094 
Buying PE independent 0.073 0.012 0.038 -0.152** -0.019 
 0.592 0.507 0.540 -2.177 -0.197 
LNSIZE 0.051 0.009 0.120 0.039 0.074 
 0.753 0.269 1.264 0.911 0.876 
Secondary duration -0.444 0.013 -0.102 -0.252* -0.385 
 -1.537 0.156 -0.502 -1.859 -1.532 
Crisis -0.038** -0.004 -0.035* -0.088 -0.098 
 -2.332 -0.231 -1.858 -1.496 -1.614 
Management participation 0.029 0.000 0.084 0.089* 0.061 
 0.425 0.010 0.925 1.904 0.711 
GEAR -0.026** -0.017** 0.008 -0.014 0.008 
 -2.388 -2.340 0.866 -1.271 0.585 
Previous performance -1.030*** -0.247 -0.087 -0.275** -0.487*** 
 -2.932 -1.010 -0.696 -2.054 -3.198 
Intercept -1.177 -0.029 -0.397 0.767** 0.044 
 -0.752 -0.109 -0.479 2.072 0.059 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes NO Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 24.67** 19.53 12.63 22.31 40.04 
Wald chi2 40.332** 163.322*** 41.156*** 252.681*** 218.020*** 
N  305 253 224 208 239 
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Table 4.7: Post-SMBO performance and selling late 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of selling late 
on post-SMBO performance, from year 1 to year 5 after transactions. The dependent variables are abnormal 
performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), 
and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performance while Panel B uses industry 
adjusted abnormal performance. Models in Panel A include entry year dummies and industry dummies. 
Models in panel B only include entry year dummies. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All 
parameters are estimated with a robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-
statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N is the number of 
firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Selling late 0.372** -2.763 -0.154 -0.053 -0.604 
 2.294 -0.944 -0.381 -0.159 -1.439 
Primary duration 0.030 -0.083 0.071 -0.002 0.065 
 0.924 -0.541 1.027 -0.035 0.948 
Primary duration* Selling late -0.093** 0.619 0.008 0.021 0.144 
 -2.273 0.933 0.071 0.243 1.413 
LNSIZE -0.013 -0.273 0.023 0.003 -0.043 
 -0.577 -0.966 0.247 0.059 -0.647 
Secondary duration -0.106* 0.561 -0.053 -0.342** -0.028 
 -1.808 0.944 -0.226 -2.004 -0.132 
Crisis 0.001 0.133 0.026 -0.041 -0.116 
 0.037 1.368 1.130 -0.715 -1.635 
Secondary PE-backed -0.023 -0.037 0.012 0.033 0.066 
 -0.529 -0.265 0.109 0.633 0.847 
Management participation 0.025 -0.116 0.022 -0.014 -0.012 
 0.951 -0.744 0.365 -0.280 -0.194 
GEAR -0.011* -0.064 0.004 0.008 -0.001 
 -1.905 -1.561 1.019 0.566 -0.051 
Previous performance -0.459** -0.423 -0.203* -0.463*** -0.488*** 
 -2.376 -0.745 -2.024 -3.642 -3.944 
Intercept 0.287* 1.830 0.424 0.700* 0.262 
 1.739 1.192 0.875 1.883 0.606 
Year dummy Yes Yes NO
94
 Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 22.48 9.22 8.20 18.22 19.47 
Wald chi2 254.273*** 196.948*** 33.503*** 178.040*** 218.115*** 
N  330 277 255 265 255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
94
 We excluded the entry year dummies in this model, as Stata reports Wald chi2 and its p-value are missing. 
Excluding or including year dummies does not change the results. In Panel B, we excluded industry dummies 
for the same reason.  
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Selling late 0.411** 0.261 0.359 -0.078 -0.350 
 2.199 1.404 0.998 -0.247 -0.765 
Primary duration 0.032 0.023 0.121 0.014 0.023 
 0.798 0.668 1.624 0.193 0.269 
Primary duration* Selling late -0.099** -0.063 -0.117 0.018 0.085 
 -2.057 -1.269 -1.160 0.215 0.746 
LNSIZE -0.013 -0.005 0.045 -0.003 -0.029 
 -0.550 -0.140 0.533 -0.069 -0.384 
Secondary duration -0.219** 0.019 -0.251 -0.313 -0.300 
 -2.629 0.266 -0.929 -1.381 -1.050 
Crisis 0.027 0.021 -0.006 -0.095 -0.025 
 0.984 0.961 -0.250 -1.559 -0.419 
Secondary PE-backed 0.004 -0.014 -0.066 -0.005 0.044 
 0.076 -0.494 -0.591 -0.087 0.452 
Management participation 0.010 -0.049 -0.003 0.017 -0.018 
 0.358 -1.563 -0.059 0.315 -0.200 
GEAR -0.010 -0.017** 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
 -1.467 -2.208 0.679 -0.272 -0.137 
Previous performance -0.469** -0.242* -0.196* -0.546*** -0.581*** 
 -2.325 -1.937 -1.768 -5.190 -3.489 
Intercept 0.386** -0.003 0.216 0.798* 0.580 
 2.151 -0.016 0.349 1.744 1.061 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes NO 
R square (%) 17.99 14.98 6.94 12.69 14.83 
Wald chi2 84.673*** 505.015*** 12.370 489.320*** 21.090** 
N  310 261 221 212 244 
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Table 4.8: Post-SMBO performance and buying PE firms’ characteristics 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying PE 
firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance, from year 1 to year 5 after SMBO transactions. The 
dependent variables are abnormal performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), 
employment growth (AEMPG), and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performance 
while Panel B uses industry adjusted abnormal performance. Models in both Panel A and Panel B include 
entry year dummies and industry dummies. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are 
estimated with a robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-statistics are 
reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N is the number of firm-year 
observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % respectively.  
Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.032 0.006 -0.023 0.042** 0.036* 
 1.147 0.640 -1.008 2.418 1.752 
Buying investments/executive -0.006 -0.001 0.025** -0.010 -0.014 
 -0.284 -0.191 2.126 -0.990 -1.065 
Buying stage specialization -0.011 -0.030 -0.032 -0.091* -0.117 
 -0.123 -1.028 -0.444 -1.680 -1.400 
Primary PE-backed 0.071 0.025 -0.031 -0.031 0.042 
 1.431 1.092 -0.502 -0.641 0.575 
Club deals 0.030 0.040 -0.046 -0.016 -0.025 
 0.630 1.377 -0.789 -0.289 -0.425 
Multiple investment 0.068 -0.026 -0.088 0.075* 0.015 
 0.819 -1.269 -1.528 1.731 0.278 
Buying PE independent 0.065 0.006 0.004 -0.051 0.034 
 0.659 0.372 0.084 -1.401 0.669 
LNSIZE 0.010 0.007 0.129* 0.024 0.027 
 0.166 0.310 1.705 0.471 0.411 
Secondary duration -0.303 0.027 -0.009 0.007 -0.108 
 -1.190 0.560 -0.062 0.054 -0.659 
Crisis -0.046*** -0.012 -0.005 -0.020 -0.112** 
 -3.515 -0.945 -0.285 -0.332 -2.336 
Management participation 0.062 0.022 0.023 0.037 0.042 
 1.427 1.006 0.329 0.941 0.620 
GEAR -0.026*** -0.014*** 0.004 -0.004 0.015 
 -3.078 -3.141 0.855 -0.426 1.211 
Previous performance -0.606* -0.202*** -0.072 -0.541*** -0.583*** 
 -1.709 -2.664 -0.860 -3.315 -3.590 
Intercept -1.178 0.059 -0.334 -0.012 0.158 
 -0.874 0.435 -0.569 -0.038 0.332 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 18.13 21.17 14.45 23.78 28.02 
Wald chi2 63.151*** 93.634*** 32.197 196.004*** 108.720*** 
N  415 350 324 332 314 
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.018** 0.004 -0.034 0.029 0.029 
 2.477 0.442 -1.425 1.614 1.199 
Buying investments/executive -0.002 0.001 0.020 -0.014 -0.019 
 -0.365 0.338 1.498 -1.243 -1.334 
Buying stage specialization 0.034 -0.034 0.034 -0.021 -0.137 
 1.281 -1.062 0.457 -0.377 -1.460 
Primary PE-backed 0.056** 0.016 -0.032 -0.098** 0.041 
 2.499 0.747 -0.482 -2.545 0.577 
Club deals 0.013 0.014 -0.034 -0.033 0.013 
 0.581 0.479 -0.498 -0.913 0.194 
Multiple investment -0.004 -0.024 -0.057 0.056 0.048 
 -0.182 -1.236 -0.913 1.468 0.838 
Buying PE independent -0.016 0.010 0.054 -0.071* 0.039 
 -0.716 0.563 1.013 -1.792 0.711 
LNSIZE -0.022 0.016 0.120 0.028 0.025 
 -1.139 0.644 1.493 0.542 0.373 
Secondary duration -0.070 -0.014 -0.131 -0.036 -0.339* 
 -1.345 -0.257 -0.813 -0.233 -1.684 
Crisis -0.028** -0.012 -0.030* -0.032 -0.067 
 -2.162 -1.106 -1.853 -0.458 -1.269 
Management participation 0.031 0.007 0.017 0.042 0.039 
 1.559 0.337 0.251 1.083 0.543 
GEAR -0.019*** -0.011*** 0.008 -0.007 0.017 
 -4.535 -2.682 1.059 -0.752 1.455 
Previous performance -0.619*** -0.163** -0.025 -0.330** -0.574*** 
 -4.770 -2.354 -0.309 -2.177 -3.679 
Intercept 0.221 0.041 -0.524 0.264 0.227 
 1.406 0.272 -0.802 0.766 0.448 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
R square (%) 34.78 19.08 12.21 16.71 37.85 
Wald chi2 184.079*** 92.572*** 226.259*** 208.152*** 254.877*** 
N  401 329 284 277 306 
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Table 4.9: Post-SMBO performance and difference in PE firms’ characteristics 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of difference 
in PE firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance, from year 1 to year 5 after SMBO transactions. 
Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performance while Panel B uses industry adjusted abnormal performance. 
Models include entry year dummies and industry dummies. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All 
parameters are estimated with a robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-
statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N is the number of 
firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Different industry experience 0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.021 -0.000 
 0.186 0.112 -0.455 1.389 -0.022 
Different investments/executive -0.000 -0.000 0.012 -0.015 0.007 
 -0.012 -0.093 1.431 -1.623 0.733 
Different stage specialization -0.010 -0.048 -0.094* -0.028 -0.222* 
 -0.169 -1.253 -1.838 -0.444 -1.682 
Club deals 0.051* 0.079** -0.026 0.033 0.057 
 1.761 1.981 -0.549 0.568 1.064 
Multiple investment -0.001 -0.052** -0.020 0.072 -0.025 
 -0.041 -2.380 -0.512 1.553 -0.467 
Buying PE independent 0.013 -0.002 0.021 -0.037 -0.014 
 0.446 -0.107 0.512 -0.744 -0.299 
LNSIZE 0.015 0.006 0.084* 0.041 -0.003 
 0.516 0.245 1.865 0.785 -0.041 
Secondary duration -0.100 0.005 0.027 -0.148 -0.250 
 -1.574 0.103 0.240 -0.878 -1.499 
Crisis -0.022* -0.006 0.010 0.020 -0.060 
 -1.829 -0.361 0.500 0.237 -1.342 
Management participation 0.038 0.014 -0.033 0.023 -0.011 
 1.502 0.598 -0.737 0.463 -0.225 
GEAR -0.020 -0.015*** 0.005 -0.007 0.017 
 -3.622 -2.967 0.846 -0.642 1.556 
Previous performance -0.390*** -0.251*** -0.031 -0.522 -0.304** 
 -2.753 -3.660 -0.476 -3.518*** -2.084 
Intercept 0.141 0.122 -0.167 0.041 0.763* 
 0.596 0.689 -0.455 0.100 1.711 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes NO 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 24.44 28.46 23.35 21.86 16.15 
Wald chi2 97.430*** 2276.972*** 47.338*** 205.579*** 112.742*** 
N 320 274 243 257 249 
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Different industry experience 0.043 0.002 -0.008 0.026* -0.003 
 1.163 0.074 -0.610 1.726 -0.101 
Different investments/executive -0.039 0.000 0.013* -0.017** -0.007 
 -1.169 0.014 1.879 -2.074 -0.549 
Different stage specialization 0.033 0.010 -0.031 -0.039 -0.141* 
 0.570 0.143 -0.663 -0.903 -1.776 
Club deals -0.040 0.159 -0.053 0.004 0.086 
 -0.569 1.604 -0.943 0.065 1.008 
Multiple investment 0.083 -0.154** -0.014 0.085** 0.022 
 0.666 -2.090 -0.367 2.075 0.335 
Buying PE independent 0.135 0.020 0.007 -0.062 0.085 
 0.803 0.518 0.184 -1.193 1.193 
LNSIZE 0.102 -0.005 0.065 0.022 0.021 
 0.862 -0.078 1.475 0.453 0.353 
Secondary duration -0.389* 0.008 -0.054 -0.094 -0.213 
 -1.790 0.044 -0.435 -0.347 -0.940 
Crisis -0.012 0.026 -0.016 -0.006 -0.081 
 -0.782 0.608 -0.927 -0.064 -1.160 
Management participation 0.053 -0.021 -0.045 0.061 -0.009 
 1.011 -0.362 -1.056 1.293 -0.130 
GEAR -0.034*** -0.028** 0.006 -0.011 0.020** 
 -3.132 -2.118 0.948 -0.971 1.967 
Previous performance -0.954** -0.905*** -0.020 -0.589*** -0.270* 
 -2.480 -2.774 -0.381 -5.431 -1.940 
Intercept -1.975 0.245 -0.103 0.025 -0.085 
 -0.978 0.569 -0.311 0.043 -0.174 
Year dummy Yes Yes NO Yes YES 
R square (%) 23.14 20.58 16.12 16.65 16.22 
Wald chi2 31.663** 31.684** 18.686* 87.289*** 66.297*** 
N 306 255 219 217 241 
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Table 4.10: Post-SMBO performance and buying late (dry powder dummy) 
This table reports the results of GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying late on 
post-SMBO abnormal performance, from year 1 to year 5 after SMBO transactions. Dry powder dummy is a 
dummy that equals 1 if dry powder is greater than 25% and 0 otherwise. Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal 
performance while Panel B uses industry adjusted abnormal performance. Models in both Panel A and Panel 
B include entry year dummies and industry dummies. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All 
parameters are estimated with a robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-
statistics are reported. N is the number of firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % respectively.  Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying late 0.141 -0.863 -0.174 -0.239* -0.409* 
 0.574 -1.096 -0.777 -1.690 -1.948 
Dry powder dummy -0.266 -0.827* -0.233 -0.169*** -0.445** 
 -1.436 -1.656 -1.607 -2.815 -2.544 
Buying late* Dry powder 
dummy 
-0.270 1.015 0.212 0.243* 0.471** 
 -0.859 1.211 0.893 1.797 2.206 
Primary PE-backed 0.050 0.316 -0.033 0.004 0.091 
 0.782 1.215 -0.511 0.071 1.075 
Club deals 0.041 0.532** -0.002 0.021 0.025 
 0.738 1.974 -0.032 0.325 0.357 
Multiple investment 0.135 -0.206 -0.070 0.071 0.017 
 1.227 -0.584 -1.089 1.353 0.267 
Buying PE independent 0.031 -0.348 -0.001 -0.034 0.032 
 0.398 -0.663 -0.013 -0.642 0.382 
LNSIZE 0.015 -0.004 0.116 0.035 0.009 
 0.233 -0.008 1.216 0.740 0.116 
Secondary duration -0.514 0.321 0.006 -0.121 -0.315 
 -1.393 0.584 0.026 -1.019 -1.466 
Crisis -0.048*** 0.048 -0.007 -0.074 -0.141*** 
 -3.152 0.946 -0.389 -1.461 -2.609 
Management participation 0.089 0.422 0.097 0.070 0.055 
 1.242 1.124 0.956 1.464 0.666 
GEAR -0.022** -0.096* 0.001 -0.002 0.010 
 -2.168 -1.662 0.127 -0.207 0.725 
Previous performance -0.579 -1.133 -0.166 -0.490*** -0.561*** 
 -1.525 -1.100 -1.453 -3.036 -3.697 
Intercept -0.661 0.835 0.207 0.256 0.883 
 -0.583 0.340 0.303 0.751 1.312 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 20.98 14.92 14.29 25.66 30.53 
Wald chi2 40.015* 38.674* 38.973* 198.851*** 102.196*** 
N 319 267 248 265 249 
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Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying late -0.001 -0.030 -0.114 -0.320** -0.050 
 -0.021 -0.466 -0.701 -2.467 -0.239 
Dry powder dummy -0.039 -0.048 -0.215* -0.171* -0.115 
 -0.897 -1.356 -1.837 -1.697 -0.725 
Buying late* Dry powder 
dummy -0.010 0.055 0.162 0.355** 0.144 
 -0.153 0.775 0.908 2.614 0.652 
Primary PE-backed 0.054** 0.041 -0.035 -0.065 0.112 
 2.455 1.267 -0.465 -1.447 1.287 
Club deals 0.032 0.070* -0.001 0.015 0.039 
 1.224 1.762 -0.015 0.342 0.471 
Multiple investment 0.001 -0.036 -0.055 0.058 0.025 
 0.055 -1.124 -0.794 1.254 0.362 
Buying PE independent 0.002 0.010 0.043 -0.115* -0.025 
 0.063 0.419 0.626 -1.878 -0.267 
LNSIZE 0.003 0.001 0.109 0.047 0.018 
 0.119 0.019 1.266 1.200 0.213 
Secondary duration -0.075 -0.008 -0.163 -0.248* -0.511* 
 -1.101 -0.097 -0.786 -1.689 -1.849 
Crisis -0.032** -0.004 -0.035* -0.090 -0.098 
 -2.082 -0.236 -1.872 -1.499 -1.618 
Management participation 0.043* -0.002 0.090 0.080* 0.048 
 1.680 -0.051 0.963 1.723 0.565 
GEAR -0.015*** -0.017** 0.009 -0.009 0.009 
 -3.201 -2.353 0.912 -0.770 0.646 
Previous performance -0.589*** -0.238 -0.089 -0.285** -0.532*** 
 -4.207 -0.986 -0.790 -2.089 -3.415 
Intercept 0.186 0.064 -0.159 0.810** 0.572 
 0.948 0.258 -0.216 2.198 0.763 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes NO NO Yes Yes 
R square (%) 36.96 18.72 15.59 22.66 37.68 
Wald chi2 125.633*** 126.737*** 35.202** 374.560*** 147.492*** 
N 307 255 226 210 241 
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Table 4.11: Post-SMBO performance and buying PE firms’ characteristics (restricted to delete 
unspecified fund data) 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying PE 
firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance by using a subsample that excludes unspecified funds. 
Panel A uses unadjusted abnormal performance measures as dependent variables while Panel B uses industry 
adjusted abnormal performance measures as dependent variables. Models in both Panel A and Panel B include 
entry year dummies and industry dummies. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are 
estimated with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. 
N is the number of firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the significance level at 1%, 
5%, and 10 % respectively. Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
 
Panel A: Unadjusted abnormal performance 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.014 -0.012 -0.053* 0.061*** 0.052* 
 1.447 -0.931 -1.727 2.681 1.788 
Buying 
investments/executive -0.002 0.006 0.032** -0.023* -0.026 
 -0.259 0.829 2.184 -1.691 -1.464 
Buying stage specialization 0.047* -0.066 0.040 -0.125* -0.198** 
 1.772 -1.599 0.499 -1.812 -2.090 
Primary PE-backed 0.090*** 0.023 -0.024 -0.014 0.058 
 2.931 0.786 -0.338 -0.243 0.696 
Club deals 0.024 0.038 -0.002 -0.021 -0.035 
 0.897 1.076 -0.035 -0.391 -0.536 
Multiple investment 0.001 -0.024 -0.073 0.080 -0.016 
 0.044 -0.920 -1.187 1.538 -0.244 
Buying PE independent -0.004 0.045 0.024 -0.070 -0.014 
 -0.146 1.572 0.400 -1.531 -0.178 
LNSIZE -0.040 0.071* 0.173* -0.013 -0.008 
 -1.303 1.813 1.777 -0.239 -0.088 
Secondary duration 0.001 0.011 -0.030 -0.035 -0.110 
 0.016 0.178 -0.145 -0.312 -0.547 
Crisis -0.041*** -0.008 -0.013 -0.076 -0.140*** 
 -2.880 -0.648 -0.700 -1.574 -2.600 
Management participation 0.049* -0.025 0.022 0.083* 0.077 
 1.852 -0.722 0.258 1.818 0.910 
GEAR -0.012*** -0.010* -0.001 -0.002 0.012 
 -2.561 -1.889 -0.161 -0.233 0.826 
Previous performance -0.770*** -0.156 -0.076 -0.540*** -0.578*** 
 -5.305 -0.916 -0.628 -3.117 -3.420 
Intercept 0.277 -0.123 -0.413 0.212 0.442 
 1.576 -0.562 -0.580 0.637 0.772 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 40.37 22.42 12.91 28.26 29.38 
Wald chi2 257.271*** 72.542*** 34.567 278.127*** 89.194*** 
N 324 269 242 268 255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
Panel B: Industry adjusted abnormal performance 
industry AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.033 -0.013 -0.015 0.052*** 0.051 
 0.698 -0.849 -0.761 3.123 1.519 
Buying 
investments/executive -0.017 0.007 0.013 -0.039*** -0.034* 
 -0.522 1.136 1.233 -3.399 -1.785 
Buying stage specialization -0.022 -0.023 0.017 -0.088 -0.239** 
 -0.205 -0.439 0.232 -1.589 -2.142 
Primary PE-backed 0.076 0.026 -0.055 -0.124** 0.048 
 1.178 0.833 -0.969 -2.558 0.592 
Club deals 0.016 0.029 -0.038 -0.047 -0.003 
 0.259 0.749 -0.846 -1.443 -0.044 
Multiple investment 0.082 -0.027 -0.016 0.091** 0.017 
 0.669 -0.940 -0.393 2.105 0.243 
Buying PE independent 0.087 0.042 -0.039 -0.122** -0.029 
 0.624 1.308 -1.059 -2.391 -0.358 
LNSIZE 0.034 0.053 0.088* -0.014 -0.010 
 0.567 1.272 1.685 -0.378 -0.109 
Secondary duration -0.317 -0.038 -0.092 -0.086 -0.357 
 -1.462 -0.490 -0.632 -0.574 -1.420 
Crisis -0.038** -0.008 -0.032* -0.097* -0.096 
 -2.368 -0.617 -1.908 -1.661 -1.622 
Management participation 0.055 -0.034 0.030 0.126*** 0.091 
 1.177 -1.068 0.538 2.989 1.077 
GEAR -0.025** -0.010* -0.001 -0.007 0.014 
 -2.474 -1.910 -0.268 -0.751 0.967 
Previous performance -1.173*** -0.277 -0.122 -0.211** -0.574*** 
 -2.868 -1.431 -1.445 -2.321 -3.505 
Intercept -1.689 -0.106 0.157 0.675** 0.580 
 -0.966 -0.444 0.472 2.065 0.915 
Year dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes NO Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 24.06 15.27 12.15 25.15 39.18 
Wald chi2 52.566*** 35.088** 81.873*** 205.838*** 234.851*** 
N 312 257 224 213 247 
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Table 4.12: Sample selection bias 
This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the influence of the 
longevity of PE funds and the PE firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance, up to five years after 
SMBO transactions. The Probit regression with robust variance estimate is for the probability of receiving PE 
backing by the sample SMBOs. This model converged after three iterations. The Panel regression is for the 
influence of the longevity of PE funds and the PE firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance. The 
dependent variables (AROA, AROS, ASALEMP, AEMPG, and ASALG) are estimated as unadjusted abnormal 
performance (‘level’ model). Lambda is the fitted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated from the 
Probit model. All the results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are 
estimated by a GLS random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Entry 
year dummies and industry dummies are included. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the 
Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for profitability > Chi 2. N reports the number of observations in the probit model 
and number of firm-year observations in the panel model respectively. ***, **,* are significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5. 
 
Panel A: Probit regression 
Independent variables Coefficient 
BSERVICES -0.119* 
LNSIZE 0.432*** 
ROAt-1 1.545*** 
Intercept -1.462*** 
Log likelihood -1112.3658 
Pseudo R (%) 5.36 
Wald chi2 76.83*** 
N 1875 
 
Panel B: Buying fund 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying late -0.041 -0.091 -0.392 -0.442** -0.719** 
 -0.528 -0.971 -1.967 -2.189 -2.571 
Dry powder -0.006 -0.009 -0.065 -0.038* -0.112* 
 -0.408 -0.480 -1.738 -1.805 -1.962 
Buying late* Dry powder 0.013 0.030 0.103 0.113** 0.196*** 
 0.720 1.338 2.092 2.432 2.738 
Primary PE-backed 0.063*** 0.064* -0.017 0.017 0.157* 
 2.876 1.896 -0.297 0.281 1.759 
Club deals 0.027 0.085** 0.017 0.024 0.031 
 1.168 2.348 0.321 0.358 0.425 
Multiple investment 0.002 -0.033 -0.018 0.051 -0.013 
 0.086 -1.086 -0.395 0.901 -0.195 
Buying PE independent 0.024 0.016 0.010 -0.039 0.015 
 1.079 0.622 0.235 -0.672 0.179 
LNSIZE -0.085 0.122** 0.289** 0.104 0.198* 
 -0.584 2.227 3.299 1.498 1.819 
Secondary duration -0.004 0.098 0.227 -0.012 -0.078 
 -0.068 1.511 1.721 -0.113 -0.434 
Crisis -0.039*** -0.005 -0.018 -0.071 -0.138** 
 -2.773 -0.282 -1.165 -1.425 -2.547 
Management participation 0.031 0.007 0.080 0.070 0.019 
 1.291 0.210 1.518 1.627 0.240 
GEAR -0.012*** -0.017** 0.001 -0.006 0.006 
 -2.707 -2.443 0.343 -0.533 0.469 
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(Continued)      
Previous performance -0.873* 0.069 -0.179 -0.451*** -0.510*** 
 -1.655 0.280 -1.633 -2.945 -3.943 
Lambda -0.398 0.539** 1.015** 0.195 0.943 
 -0.559 2.235 2.563 0.784 1.616 
Intercept 0.672 -0.769** -1.326 -0.283 -0.716 
 0.655 -2.032 -2.158 -0.642 -0.869 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 37.11 24.50 15.82 27.74 31.81 
Wald chi2 125.395*** 58.619*** 90.452** 205.880*** 145.463*** 
N  317 265 231 263 247 
 
Panel C: Selling fund 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Selling late 0.324* -2.647 -0.149 -0.061 -0.613 
 
1.904 -0.984 -0.344 -0.183 -1.426 
Primary duration 0.027 -0.074 0.051 -0.002 0.064 
 
0.827 -0.508 0.696 -0.031 0.928 
Primary duration* Selling 
late 
-0.081* 0.584 0.012 0.023 0.145 
 
-1.877 0.978 0.104 0.263 1.386 
LNSIZE 0.202* -0.373 -0.011 -0.008 -0.076 
 
1.867 -0.730 -0.083 -0.118 -0.925 
Secondary duration -0.117** 0.564 0.090 -0.345* -0.044 
 
-2.014 0.989 0.445 -1.951 -0.200 
Crisis 0.002 0.129 0.022 -0.041 -0.116 
 
0.098 1.393 0.939 -0.718 -1.634 
Secondary PE-Backed -0.014 -0.051 0.036 0.028 0.048 
 
-0.333 -0.372 0.353 0.509 0.645 
Management participation 0.030 -0.113 0.001 -0.015 -0.012 
 1.141 -0.734 0.009 -0.284 -0.194 
GEAR -0.012** -0.065 0.002 0.009 -0.002 
 
-1.997 -1.472 0.327 0.571 -0.142 
Previous performance 0.325 -0.621 -0.100 -0.465*** -0.467*** 
 0.716 -0.642 -1.043 -3.599 -3.558 
Lambda 0.973* -0.575 -0.227 -0.064 -0.270 
 1.957 -0.383 -0.622 -0.274 -0.740 
Intercept -1.180* 2.477 0.281 0.781 0.582 
 
-1.674 0.821 0.374 1.540 0.918 
Year dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 23.02 9.54 8.09 18.06 19.22 
Wald chi2 258.904*** 838.334*** 20.590 170.377*** 208.161*** 
N  327 274 239 262 252 
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Panel D: Buying PE firms 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.030 -0.038 0.001 0.046** 0.051** 
 1.135 -0.619 0.091 2.571 2.096 
Buying investments/executive -0.006 0.008 0.011 -0.012 -0.019 
 -0.279 0.214 1.449 -1.162 -1.444 
Buying stage specialization -0.023 0.258 0.043 -0.075 -0.076 
 -0.254 1.261 0.785 -1.304 -0.850 
Primary PE backed 0.059 0.285 -0.036 -0.027 0.069 
 1.173 1.119 -0.764 -0.538 0.913 
Club deals 0.031 0.453** -0.035 -0.015 -0.024 
 0.666 2.003 -0.817 -0.281 -0.417 
Multiple investment 0.065 -0.126 -0.033 0.076* 0.018 
 0.781 -0.471 -1.005 1.742 0.325 
Buying PE independent 0.070 -0.303 0.004 -0.055 0.022 
 0.704 -0.998 0.137 -1.546 0.418 
LNSIZE -0.140 0.075 0.156** 0.052 0.099 
 -0.338 0.130 2.546 0.878 1.247 
Secondary duration -0.293 0.486 0.065 0.026 -0.040 
 -1.114 1.074 0.690 0.205 -0.257 
Crisis -0.046*** 0.061 -0.014 -0.019 -0.110** 
 -3.512 1.170 -1.125 -0.316 -2.297 
Management participation 0.060 0.228 0.020 0.035 0.035 
 1.341 0.878 0.520 0.877 0.516 
GEAR -0.026*** -0.110*** 0.001 -0.005 0.013 
 -3.074 -2.230 0.288 -0.542 1.118 
Previous performance -1.170 -1.329*** -0.057 -0.539*** -0.575*** 
 -0.695 -1.755 -0.951 -3.340 -3.761 
Lambda -0.771 0.678 0.442 0.207 0.576 
 -0.393 0.431 1.439 1.076 1.296 
Intercept -0.086 -1.077 -0.831 -0.275 -0.595 
 -0.025 -0.301 -1.646 -0.698 -0.881 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 18.22 14.17 17.87 23.92 28.49 
Wald chi2 67.613*** 79.579*** 51.698*** 205.236*** 104.477*** 
N 415 350 312 332 314 
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Table 4.13: Selling late and buying early 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying PE 
firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance with Selling late/ Buying early dummies and their 
interaction terms with buying PE firms’ characteristics. The dependent variables are unadjusted abnormal 
performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), 
and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A includes Selling late dummy while Panel B includes Buying early dummy. 
Entry year dummies and industry dummies are included. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All 
parameters are estimated with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-
statistics are reported. N is the number of firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % respectively.  Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
Panel A: Selling late 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.016 -0.017 -0.003 0.066*** 0.067** 
 
1.388 -0.591 -0.104 3.088 2.153 
Buying investments/executive 0.005 0.021 0.006 -0.059*** -0.051*** 
 
0.528 1.123 0.393 -3.591 -2.812 
Buying stage specialization 0.023 -0.096 -0.051 -0.080 -0.173 
 0.709 -0.995 -0.515 -0.925 -1.471 
Selling late 0.142** -0.025 0.084 0.174 0.120 
 2.301 -0.113 0.551 1.224 0.433 
Buying industry experience* 
Selling late -0.033* -0.066 -0.099** -0.064* -0.079 
 
-1.665 -1.005 -2.147 -1.774 -1.453 
Buying 
investments/executive* 
Selling late -0.008 0.057* 0.047 0.043 0.038 
 
-0.591 1.917 1.191 1.617 0.963 
Buying stage specialization * 
Selling late -0.050 0.050 0.019 -0.126 -0.026 
 -1.144 0.239 0.118 -1.059 -0.127 
Club deals 0.033 0.195** -0.066 0.042*** 0.030 
 
1.209 2.005 -1.181 0.794 0.575 
Multiple investment -0.008 -0.138* 0.024 0.151 0.043 
 
-0.324 -1.757 0.601 2.950 0.762 
Buying PE independent 0.012 0.045 -0.004 -0.051 -0.054 
 
0.346 0.757 -0.065 -0.834 -0.572 
LNSIZE 0.026 0.097 0.177*** 0.001 -0.053 
 
0.872 1.158 3.116 0.024 -0.602 
Secondary duration -0.015 -0.031 0.243 -0.063 0.038 
 
-0.255 -0.215 1.543 -0.416 0.182 
Crisis -0.018 0.037 0.008 -0.071 -0.125** 
 
-1.308 0.703 0.367 -1.031 -2.023 
Management participation 0.049* -0.070 -0.043 0.117*** 0.085 
 
1.787 -0.776 -0.801 3.150 1.527 
GEAR -0.016*** -0.029** -0.001 -0.010 0.008 
 
-2.891 -1.968 -0.286 -0.850 0.717 
Previous performance -0.504*** 0.145 -0.118* -0.414*** -0.381** 
 
-3.517 0.212 -1.807 -4.386 -2.222 
Intercept 0.047 0.112 -0.910* 0.340 0.620 
 
0.259 0.214 -2.037 0.873 1.239 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes NO 
Industry dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
R square (%) 33.84 25.55 31.35 34.17 24.24 
Wald chi2 4187.808*** 406.255*** 46.470*** 953.678*** 79.480*** 
N 240 205 180 197 193 
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Panel B: Buying early 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.039** 0.024 0.115** 0.106** 0.073 
 2.013 0.891 2.166 1.999 0.866 
Buying investments/executive -0.009 0.003 -0.008 -0.029** -0.016 
 -1.114 0.240 -0.311 -1.583 -0.588 
Buying stage specialization 0.035 -0.127 -0.249* -0.297 -0.307 
 0.898 -1.307 -1.657 -2.056 -1.402 
Buying early -0.012 0.025 -0.101 -0.091 -0.063 
 -0.192 0.295 -0.488 -0.650 -0.269 
Buying industry experience 
*buying early -0.032 -0.040 -0.197*** -0.052 -0.022 
 -1.581 -1.303 -3.153 -0.967 -0.252 
Buying investments / executive 
*buying early 0.011 0.006 0.062* 0.008 -0.013 
 1.135 0.408 1.943 0.418 -0.345 
Buying stage specialization 
*buying early 0.015 0.062 0.337** 0.257 0.178 
 0.268 0.602 2.040 1.567 0.721 
Primary PE backed 0.086*** 0.006 -0.097 -0.018 0.076 
 2.676 0.168 -1.209 -0.283 0.824 
Club deals 0.022 0.034 -0.035 -0.028 -0.044 
 0.807 0.978 -0.535 -0.494 -0.658 
Multiple investment 0.003 -0.027 -0.098 0.072 -0.018 
 0.115 -0.980 -1.535 1.348 -0.251 
Buying PE independent -0.002 0.042 -0.021 -0.078 -0.002 
 -0.077 1.250 -0.248 -1.585 -0.018 
LNSIZE -0.037 0.078 0.181* -0.024 -0.012 
 -1.200 2.092 1.883 -0.459 -0.128 
Secondary duration 0.003 0.027 -0.003 -0.016 -0.121 
 0.050 0.434 -0.013 -0.148 -0.575 
Crisis -0.042*** -0.009 -0.013 -0.077 -0.142** 
 -2.874 -0.656 -0.681 -1.542 -2.541 
Management participation 0.046* -0.022 0.019 0.085* 0.071 
 1.708 -0.649 0.231 1.709 0.790 
GEAR -0.013*** -0.010* -0.002 -0.002 0.012 
 -2.637 -1.895 -0.408 -0.158 0.882 
Previous performance -0.750*** -0.137 -0.055 -0.530*** -0.558*** 
 -5.213 -0.761 -0.510 -3.034 -3.185 
Intercept 0.235 -0.217 -0.572 0.282 0.465 
 1.239 -0.976 -0.653 0.769 0.647 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 41.01 27.31 24.51 29.19 30.63 
Wald chi2 346.088*** 61.752*** 53.608*** 233.507*** 121.839*** 
N 317 263 237 265 249 
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Appendix 4.1: Sample selection 
This table presents the sample selection process. The original population was obtained from CMBOR. We 
started our sample filter from collecting accounting information which has been finished in Chapter 2. Then 
we excluded SMBO cases that do not have PE backing in both primary and secondary phases by using various 
data sources, for example, synopses available from Thomson One Banker and PE firm websites. Our final 
sample was obtained after we excluded SMBOs for which we could not collect the detailed information of 
their backing PE firms. Finally, in order to investigate the influence of the longevity of PE funds on the 
performance of SMBOs, we established a subsample that does not include the SMBOs without exact fund 
names (“Unspecified funds”). 
 
Population: CMBOR 2000-2007  612 
   -Less: SMBOs from Financial industry; SMBOs with missing accounting information from 
FAME database.   
-121 
   -Less: SMBOs are not backed by either selling or buying PE firms. -218 
   -Less: SMBOs with missing detailed information of PE firms. -46 
Equals: Final sample  227 
   -Less: SMBOs without exact fund names  -41 
Equals:  Subsample for examining the relationship between the longevity of PE funds 
and performance of SMBOs 
186 
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Appendix 4.2: Pearson correlation 
This table shows Pearson correlation results of our variables. Panel A is for variables of selling fund and firms, while Panel B is for those of buying funds and firms.   
Panel A: Selling fund and selling PE firms 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ARROA(1) 1 
              ARROS(2) 0.292 1 
             
 
0.000 
              ASALEMP(3) 0.182 0.271 1 
            
 
0.000 0.000 
             AREMPG(4) 0.086 0.301 0.146 1 
           
 
0.070 0.000 0.005 
            ARSALG(5) 0.199 0.374 0.386 0.672 1 
          
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           Selling late(6) 0.015 -0.097 -0.105 0.050 -0.016 1 
         
 
0.745 0.052 0.043 0.335 0.767 
          Primary duration(7) -0.010 -0.038 -0.088 -0.008 0.025 0.395 1 
        
 
0.813 0.424 0.067 0.863 0.623 0.000 
         Selling industry 
experience (8) 0.037 0.018 0.091 0.075 0.140 0.039 -0.002 1 
       
 
0.401 0.722 0.075 0.142 0.009 0.229 0.942 
        Selling investments / 
executive (9) 0.032 0.117 0.073 0.040 -0.015 0.071 0.109 0.516 1 
      
 
0.477 0.019 0.154 0.441 0.784 0.032 0.001 0.000 
       Selling stage  
specialization (10) 0.004 0.220 0.023 0.087 0.108 -0.031 0.100 0.012 0.035 1 
     
 
0.921 0.000 0.655 0.086 0.040 0.345 0.002 0.722 0.293 
      LNSIZE(11) -0.009 0.047 0.047 0.123 0.200 -0.038 0.103 0.146 -0.187 0.088 1 
    
 
0.818 0.303 0.309 0.008 0.000 0.244 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 
     Secondary duration(12) -0.130 0.031 0.122 -0.035 -0.080 -0.051 -0.013 0.060 0.104 0.004 -0.074 1 
   
 
0.001 0.503 0.009 0.454 0.103 0.117 0.682 0.066 0.001 0.906 0.013 
    Crisis(13) 0.002 0.124 -0.094 0.046 0.078 0.125 -0.021 0.047 -0.173 -0.121 -0.012 -0.149 1 
  
 
0.954 0.006 0.044 0.322 0.111 0.000 0.507 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.694 0.000 
   Secondary PE-backed (14) -0.052 -0.047 0.060 0.033 0.056 0.101 -0.003 0.037 -0.088 -0.014 0.208 -0.043 0.081 1 
 
 
0.204 0.300 0.198 0.473 0.252 0.002 0.932 0.252 0.007 0.658 0.000 0.151 0.007 
  Management 
participation(15) 0.071 0.099 0.040 -0.010 -0.038 0.003 0.058 -0.095 0.104 0.059 -0.217 0.062 -0.172 -0.173 1 
 
0.081 0.029 0.389 0.831 0.439 0.932 0.060 0.003 0.001 0.068 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 
 GEAR(16) -0.028 -0.170 0.037 -0.041 -0.014 -0.018 0.065 0.059 0.037 0.031 0.066 -0.053 -0.089 -0.028 0.015 
  0.533 0.000 0.460 0.410 0.785 0.691 0.130 0.198 0.420 0.489 0.116 0.205 0.034 0.505 0.728 
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Panel B: Buying fund and buying PE firms 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17)  (18)  
ARROA(1) 1 
                 ARROS(2) 0.292 1 
                
 
0.000 
                 ASALEMP(3) 0.182 0.271 1 
               
 
0.000 0.000 
                AREMPG(4) 0.086 0.301 0.146 1 
              
 
0.070 0.000 0.005 
               ARSALG(5) 0.199 0.374 0.386 0.672 1 
             
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
              Buying late(6) 0.010 0.077 0.045 0.038 0.054 1 
            
 
0.831 0.123 0.380 0.458 0.319 
             Dry powder (7) -0.004 -0.071 -0.026 0.075 0.055 -0.289 1 
           
 
0.938 0.164 0.619 0.145 0.315 0.000 
            Buying industry experience 
(8) 0.014 -0.098 -0.034 0.088 0.045 0.244 0.004 1 
          
 
0.762 0.047 0.499 0.080 0.403 0.000 0.894 
           Buying 
investments/executive(9) -0.006 -0.057 0.085 0.031 -0.094 0.215 0.021 0.552 1 
         
 
0.891 0.254 0.098 0.546 0.080 0.000 0.538 0.000 
          Buying stage specialization 
(10) -0.021 -0.017 -0.015 -0.061 -0.048 -0.160 0.030 0.035 -0.093 1 
        
 
0.625 0.721 0.766 0.216 0.361 0.000 0.365 0.285 0.005 
         Primary PE-backed(11) 0.022 0.090 -0.026 0.052 0.158 0.038 -0.043 -0.004 -0.078 -0.044 1 
       
 
0.594 0.049 0.580 0.264 0.001 0.247 0.200 0.892 0.017 0.166 
        Club deals (12) -0.045 0.026 0.009 0.058 0.040 -0.123 0.096 0.056 -0.068 -0.147 -0.079 1 
      
 
0.269 0.569 0.844 0.215 0.421 0.000 0.004 0.083 0.040 0.000 0.008 
       Multiple investment(13) 0.028 -0.068 -0.072 -0.029 -0.008 -0.086 0.095 0.094 0.016 0.042 0.055 0.162 1 
     
 
0.496 0.136 0.121 0.539 0.876 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.637 0.185 0.064 0.000 
      Buying PE independent(14) -0.013 -0.023 0.002 -0.012 0.058 0.156 -0.111 0.079 0.253 0.037 -0.044 0.019 0.004 1 
    
 
0.744 0.614 0.960 0.792 0.235 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.244 0.140 0.514 0.882 
     LNSIZE(15) -0.009 0.047 0.047 0.123 0.200 -0.034 0.004 0.074 -0.141 -0.101 0.225 0.137 0.165 -0.026 1 
   
 
0.818 0.303 0.309 0.008 0.000 0.303 0.912 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.392 
    Secondary duration(16) -0.130 0.031 0.122 -0.035 -0.080 0.136 -0.184 -0.045 0.131 -0.025 0.014 -0.046 -0.036 0.108 -0.074 1 
  
 
0.001 0.503 0.009 0.454 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.429 0.628 0.123 0.223 0.000 0.013 
   Crisis(17) 0.002 0.124 -0.094 0.046 0.078 0.064 0.007 0.077 -0.063 -0.046 0.011 0.013 0.067 -0.032 -0.012 -0.149 1 
 
 
0.954 0.006 0.044 0.322 0.111 0.050 0.828 0.018 0.053 0.147 0.723 0.656 0.023 0.276 0.694 0.000 
  Management 
participation(18) 0.071 0.099 0.040 -0.010 -0.038 0.069 -0.044 -0.016 0.187 0.040 -0.070 -0.044 -0.100 0.171 -0.217 0.062 -0.172 1 
 
0.081 0.029 0.389 0.831 0.439 0.035 0.185 0.619 0.000 0.214 0.018 0.137 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 
 GEAR(19) -0.028 -0.170 0.037 -0.041 -0.014 0.046 -0.024 0.079 0.035 0.078 0.048 -0.048 0.024 -0.060 0.066 -0.053 -0.089 0.015 
  0.533 0.000 0.460 0.410 0.785 0.330 0.607 0.085 0.448 0.085 0.247 0.248 0.567 0.152 0.116 0.205 0.034 0.728 
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Appendix 4.3: Sample selection bias with industry adjusted performance measures 
This table reports the results of the panel regression corrected for sample selection bias for the influence of the 
longevity of PE funds and the PE firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance, up to five years after 
SMBO transactions. The Panel regression is for the influence of the longevity of PE funds and the PE firms’ 
characteristics on post-SMBO performance. The dependent variables (AROA, AROS, ASALEMP, AEMPG, and 
ASALG) are estimated as industry adjusted abnormal performance (‘change’ model). Lambda is the fitted 
probability of receiving PE backing, estimated from the Probit model in Panel A of Table 4.12. All the results 
are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters of panel regressions are estimated by a GLS random-effects 
model with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Entry year dummies and industry dummies 
are included. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2 ) are for 
probability > Chi 2 . N reports the number of observations in the Probit model and number of firm-year 
observations in the panel model respectively. ***, **,* are significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5. 
 
Panel A: Buying fund  
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying late -0.057 -0.016 -0.199 -0.220 -0.256 
 -0.138 -0.218 -0.918 -1.027 -0.818 
Dry powder -0.096 0.007 -0.046 -0.033 0.000 
 -1.159 0.427 -1.118 -0.994 -0.002 
Buying late* Dry powder -0.026 0.016 0.068 0.063 0.094 
 -0.275 0.837 1.231 1.189 1.155 
Primary PE-backed 0.037 0.057 0.037 -0.064 0.146* 
 0.551 1.624 0.437 -1.519 1.648 
Club deals 0.068 0.068* -0.014 -0.014 0.038 
 1.051 1.918 -0.175 -0.347 0.476 
Multiple investment 0.106 -0.041 -0.050 0.078 -0.006 
 0.848 -1.195 -0.678 1.583 -0.078 
Buying PE independent 0.082 0.006 -0.009 -0.153** -0.017 
 0.656 0.222 -0.157 -2.202 -0.176 
LNSIZE -0.303 0.136** 0.320** 0.000 0.180 
 -0.753 2.317 2.195 -0.008 1.485 
Secondary duration -0.393 0.116 0.057 -0.283 -0.290 
 -1.480 1.501 0.320 -2.120 -1.219 
Crisis -0.039** 0.002 -0.031* -0.086 -0.098 
 -2.332 0.107 -1.678 -1.466 -1.615 
Management participation 0.015 -0.010 0.052 0.091** 0.038 
 0.203 -0.280 0.787 1.990 0.435 
GEAR -0.026** -0.020*** 0.006 -0.014 0.008 
 -2.387 -2.829 0.810 -1.318 0.605 
Previous performance -2.351 0.107 -0.198* -0.258** -0.483*** 
 -1.418 0.442 -1.959 -1.983 -3.455 
Lambda -1.728 0.618** 1.379** -0.254 0.696 
 -0.876 2.383 2.360 -0.911 1.070 
Intercept 1.269 -0.946** -1.596 1.145** -0.900 
 0.412 -2.229 -1.591 2.126 -0.850 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes NO Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 24.65 20.65 11.83 22.56 40.02 
Wald chi2 40.651* 48.907*** 26.339** 189.667*** 241.211*** 
N  305 253 219 208 239 
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Panel B: Selling fund  
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Selling late 0.414** 0.237 0.141 -0.079 -0.353 
 
2.243 1.257 0.443 -0.245 -0.795 
Primary duration 0.033 0.018 0.078 0.014 0.024 
 
0.826 0.514 1.133 0.186 0.285 
Primary duration* Selling 
late 
-0.100** -0.056 -0.054 0.018 0.088 
 
-2.097 -1.119 -0.627 0.215 0.789 
LNSIZE -0.028 0.054 0.003 -0.005 -0.104 
 
-0.329 1.124 0.031 -0.080 -1.097 
Secondary duration -0.217*** 0.042 0.012 -0.314 -0.370 
 
-2.639 0.570 0.065 -1.377 -1.280 
Crisis 0.027 0.024 -0.006 -0.095 -0.027 
 
0.982 1.078 -0.231 -1.555 -0.457 
Secondary PE-Backed 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.015 
 
0.064 -0.050 -0.028 -0.087 0.157 
Management participation 0.010 -0.047 -0.008 0.016 -0.015 
 0.355 -1.611 -0.143 0.310 -0.168 
GEAR -0.010 -0.016** 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 
-1.429 -2.115 0.689 -0.262 -0.209 
Previous performance -0.519 -0.139 -0.068 -0.546*** -0.566*** 
 -1.254 -0.957 -0.855 -5.070 -3.457 
Lambda -0.064 0.320** -0.218 -0.015 -0.540 
 -0.169 2.059 -0.732 -0.065 -1.549 
Intercept 0.483 -0.465 -0.107 0.817 1.284* 
 
0.799 -1.460 -0.161 1.479 1.929 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes NO 
R square (%) 17.99 16.57 9.00 12.67 15.51 
Wald chi2 83.697*** 998.425*** 13.381 489.860*** 29.850** 
N  310 261 221 212 244 
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Panel C: Buying firms 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.017** 0.008 -0.018 0.030 0.037 
 2.265 0.831 -0.910 1.592 1.336 
Buying investments/executive -0.002 0.000 0.014 -0.014 -0.023 
 -0.364 0.074 1.137 -1.270 -1.507 
Buying stage specialization 0.025 -0.025 0.052 -0.017 -0.109 
 0.909 -0.790 0.723 -0.280 -1.099 
Primary PE backed 0.047* 0.024 -0.005 -0.096** 0.058 
 1.978 1.022 -0.075 -2.444 0.800 
Club deals 0.013 0.015 -0.020 -0.031 0.015 
 0.603 0.532 -0.284 -0.842 0.220 
Multiple investment -0.005 -0.022 -0.055 0.056 0.050 
 -0.264 -1.130 -0.894 1.456 0.886 
Buying PE independent -0.012 0.009 0.039 -0.071* 0.034 
 -0.600 0.495 0.764 -1.829 0.627 
LNSIZE -0.135 0.044 0.209* 0.035 0.072 
 -1.066 1.096 1.881 0.613 0.884 
Secondary duration -0.057 0.008 -0.018 -0.030 -0.283 
 -1.094 0.146 -0.120 -0.200 -1.427 
Crisis -0.029** -0.012 -0.030* -0.032 -0.066 
 -2.177 -1.086 -1.837 -0.450 -1.256 
Management participation 0.029 0.004 0.027 0.040 0.031 
 1.439 0.198 0.404 1.056 0.434 
GEAR -0.019*** -0.011*** 0.007 -0.007 0.016 
 -4.525 -2.707 0.984 -0.769 1.388 
Previous performance -1.045** -0.125 -0.067 -0.331** -0.567*** 
 -2.200 -1.526 -0.864 -2.160 -3.785 
Lambda -0.576 0.193 0.642 0.055 0.375 
 -0.881 1.066 1.383 0.242 0.781 
Intercept 1.027 -0.234 -1.423 0.190 -0.301 
 1.099 -0.738 -1.543 0.455 -0.395 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
R square (%) 35.09 19.58 13.88 16.72*** 37.73 
Wald chi2 229.001*** 89.844*** 237.270*** 210.657 266.588*** 
N 401 329 284 277 306 
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Appendix 4.4: Selling late and buying early with industry adjusted performance measures 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying PE 
firms’ characteristics on post-SMBO performance with Selling late/ Buying early dummies and their 
interaction terms with buying PE firms’ characteristics. The dependent variables are industry adjusted 
abnormal performance in profitability (AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth 
(AEMPG), and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A includes Selling late dummy while Panel B includes Buying 
early dummy. Entry year dummies and industry dummies are included. The results are based on 99% 
winsorized data. All parameters are estimated with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. 
Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test (Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N 
is the number of firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* indicate the significance level at 1%, 
5%, and 10 % respectively.  Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5.      
Panel A: Selling late 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.012 -0.034 -0.009 0.054* 0.051 
 
0.886 -0.850 -0.288 1.964 1.281 
Buying investments/executive 0.013 0.027 0.004 -0.062*** -0.048** 
 
1.140 1.327 0.262 -3.833 -2.297 
Buying stage specialization 0.041 -0.053 -0.069 -0.015 -0.152 
 0.962 -0.437 -0.826 -0.249 -1.009 
Selling late 0.104 0.161 0.247 0.222 0.071 
 1.240 0.493 1.274 1.322 0.224 
Buying industry experience* Selling late -0.017 -0.114 -0.120*** -0.031 -0.028 
 
-0.718 -1.320 -2.944 -0.592 -0.429 
Buying investments/executive* Selling 
late 
-0.016 0.097** 0.048 0.025 -0.011 
 
-1.058 2.213 1.557 0.706 -0.197 
Buying stage specialization * Selling late -0.022 -0.135 -0.094 -0.204* 0.053 
 -0.367 -0.508 -0.526 -1.791 0.231 
Club deals 0.031 0.225** -0.047 0.017 0.114 
 
1.065 2.204 -0.756 0.287 1.347 
Multiple investment -0.038 -0.170** 0.020 0.159*** 0.047 
 
-1.246 -2.127 0.479 2.629 0.650 
Buying PE independent -0.006 0.030 -0.007 -0.058 0.043 
 
-0.172 0.507 -0.123 -0.905 0.396 
LNSIZE 0.009 0.126 0.237*** -0.010 -0.078 
 
0.267 1.499 4.190 -0.185 -0.765 
Secondary duration -0.080 -0.099 0.279* -0.173 -0.375 
 
-1.177 -0.548 1.814 -0.762 -1.336 
Crisis -0.012 0.040 -0.022 -0.114 -0.104 
 
-0.783 0.743 -0.977 -1.397 -1.400 
Management participation 0.023 -0.054 0.016 0.169*** 0.052 
 
0.752 -0.515 0.272 2.982 0.910 
GEAR 
-
0.020*** 
-0.031* -0.001 -0.010 0.011 
 
-2.924 -1.942 -0.216 -0.659 0.863 
Previous performance 
-
0.618*** 
0.124 -0.120** -0.315* -0.329* 
 
-3.752 0.156 -2.102 -1.849 -1.701 
Intercept 0.266 0.087 -1.934*** 0.726 1.433** 
 
1.303 0.147 -3.597 1.630 2.322 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes NO 
Industry dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
R square (%) 30.06 25.55 34.74 34.17 31.46 
Wald chi2 - - 69.400*** - - 
N 227 193 168 161 185 
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Panel B: Buying early 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.289 0.046 0.083 0.077* 0.081 
 1.402 1.350 1.625 1.874 0.832 
Buying investments/executive -0.117 0.003 -0.013 -0.041** 0.001 
 -1.275 0.134 -0.450 -2.527 0.026 
Buying stage specialization -0.571 -0.175 -0.180 -0.158 -0.301 
 -1.250 -1.384 -0.896 -1.499 -1.199 
Buying early -0.228 0.016 -0.196 -0.080 0.113 
 -0.806 0.095 -0.917 -0.824 0.455 
Buying industry experience 
*buying early 
-0.314 -0.088** -0.140** -0.029 -0.042 
 -1.498 -2.160 -2.386 -0.681 -0.424 
Buying investments / executive 
*buying early 
0.148 0.028 0.052 0.001 -0.045 
 1.500 1.277 1.536 0.036 -1.139 
Buying stage specialization 
*buying early 
0.613 0.112 0.265 0.151 0.126 
 1.334 0.658 1.204 1.323 0.441 
Primary PE backed -0.035 0.044 -0.068 -0.128** 0.080 
 -0.330 0.734 -0.751 -2.459 0.864 
Club deals -0.008 0.095 -0.068 -0.052 0.001 
 -0.123 1.406 -0.978 -1.421 0.010 
Multiple investment 0.040 -0.135* -0.084 0.093** 0.015 
 0.392 -1.840 -1.052 2.188 0.204 
Buying PE independent 0.038 0.029 -0.065 -0.146** 0.004 
 0.346 0.455 -0.854 -2.460 0.035 
LNSIZE 0.041 0.043 0.129 -0.021 0.000 
 0.665 0.514 1.422 -0.534 -0.005 
Secondary duration -0.182 -0.103 -0.148 -0.079 -0.323 
 -1.066 -0.552 -0.708 -0.543 -1.207 
Crisis -0.038** 0.017 -0.031 -0.098 -0.100 
 -2.298 0.463 -1.634 -1.596 -1.619 
Management participation 0.058 -0.036 0.022 0.119*** 0.076 
 0.984 -0.536 0.236 2.662 0.842 
GEAR -0.022** -0.027* 0.005 -0.009 0.014 
 -2.344 -1.804 0.575 -0.775 1.029 
Previous performance -1.233*** -0.121 -0.128 -0.179** -0.524*** 
 -2.659 -0.190 -1.119 -2.523 -3.059 
Intercept -1.709 0.070 0.254 0.764** 0.371 
 -1.056 0.121 0.385 2.199 0.488 
Year dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes NO Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 26.66 15.06 16.64 26.21 41.25 
Wald chi2 50.277*** 46.429*** 111.412*** 294.218*** 263.184*** 
N 306 251 221 210 241 
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Appendix 4.5: Selling early and buying late 
This table reports the results of the GLS random-effects panel regression to examine the impact of buying PE firms’ 
characteristics on post-SMBO performance with Selling early/ Buying late dummies and their interaction terms with 
buying PE firms’ characteristics. The dependent variables are unadjusted abnormal performance in profitability 
(AROA and AROS), productivity (ASALEMP), employment growth (AEMPG), and sales growth (ASALG). Panel A 
includes Selling early dummy while Panel B includes Buying late dummy. Entry year dummies and industry 
dummies are included. The results are based on 99% winsorized data. All parameters are estimated with robust 
standard error and omitted collinear covariates. Coefficients and z-statistics are reported. P-values for the Wald test 
(Wald Chi 2) are for probability > Chi 2. N is the number of firm-year observations used in each model. ***, **,* 
indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10 % respectively.  Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.5. 
Panel A: Selling early 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience -0.016 -0.084 -0.103** 0.003 -0.013 
 
-1.080 -1.280 -2.502 0.077 -0.279 
Buying investments/executive -0.002 0.078** 0.054* -0.017 -0.013 
 
-0.247 2.327 1.647 -0.747 -0.345 
Buying stage specialization -0.027 -0.046 -0.031 -0.206** -0.199 
 -0.981 -0.242 -0.239 -2.211 -1.219 
Selling early -0.142** 0.025 -0.094 -0.174 -0.120 
 -2.301 0.113 -0.611 -1.224 -0.433 
Buying industry experience* 
Selling early  0.033* 0.066 0.101** 0.064* 0.079 
 
1.665 1.005 2.158 1.774 1.453 
Buying 
investments/executive* 
Selling early 0.008 -0.057* -0.044 -0.043 -0.038 
 
0.591 -1.917 -1.115 -1.617 -0.963 
Buying stage specialization * 
Selling early 0.050 -0.050 -0.017 0.126 0.026 
 1.144 -0.239 -0.108 1.059 0.127 
Club deals 0.033 0.195** -0.068 0.042 0.030 
 
1.209 2.005 -1.185 0.794 0.575 
Multiple investment -0.008 -0.138* 0.016 0.151*** 0.043 
 
-0.324 -1.757 0.418 2.950 0.762 
Buying PE independent 0.012 0.045 -0.008 -0.051 -0.054 
 
0.346 0.757 -0.149 -0.834 -0.572 
LNSIZE 0.026 0.097 0.171*** 0.001 -0.053 
 
0.872 1.158 3.002 0.024 -0.602 
Secondary duration -0.015 -0.031 0.238 -0.063 0.038 
 
-0.255 -0.215 1.492 -0.416 0.182 
Crisis -0.018 0.037 0.008 -0.071 -0.125** 
 
-1.308 0.703 0.369 -1.031 -2.023 
Management participation 0.049* -0.070 -0.047 0.117*** 0.085 
 
1.787 -0.776 -0.879 3.150 1.527 
GEAR -0.016*** -0.029* -0.001 -0.010 0.008 
 
-2.891 -1.968 -0.286 -0.850 0.717 
Previous performance -0.504*** 0.145 -0.126* -0.414*** -0.381** 
 
-3.517 0.212 -1.835 -4.386 -2.222 
Intercept 0.190 0.087 -0.775 0.514 0.741 
 
1.017 0.145 -1.607 1.223 1.313 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes NO 
Industry dummy Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
R square (%) 33.84 25.55 30.72 34.17 24.24 
Wald chi2 4187.808*** 406.255*** 44.664*** 953.678*** 79.480*** 
N 240 205 182 197 193 
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Panel B: Buying late 
 AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG 
Buying industry experience 0.007 -0.017 -0.082** 0.054** 0.051 
 0.656 -1.185 -2.422 2.352 1.628 
Buying investments/executive 0.002 0.009 0.054*** -0.021 -0.028 
 0.287 1.037 2.988 -1.345 -1.183 
Buying stage specialization 0.050 -0.065* 0.088 -0.040 -0.130 
 1.191 -1.776 0.984 -0.528 -1.383 
Buying late 0.012 -0.025 0.101 0.091 0.063 
 0.192 -0.295 0.488 0.650 0.269 
Buying industry experience 
*buying late 0.032 0.040 0.197*** 0.052 0.022 
 1.581 1.303 3.153 0.967 0.252 
Buying investments / executive 
*buying late -0.011 -0.006 -0.062* -0.008 0.013 
 -1.135 -0.408 -1.943 -0.418 0.345 
Buying stage specialization 
*buying late -0.015 -0.062 -0.337** -0.257 -0.178 
 -0.268 -0.602 -2.040 -1.567 -0.721 
Primary PE backed 0.086*** 0.006 -0.097 -0.018 0.076 
 2.676 0.168 -1.209 -0.283 0.824 
Club deals 0.022 0.034 -0.035 -0.028 -0.044 
 0.807 0.978 -0.535 -0.494 -0.658 
Multiple investment 0.003 -0.027 -0.098 0.072 -0.018 
 0.115 -0.980 -1.535 1.348 -0.251 
Buying PE independent -0.002 0.042 -0.021 -0.078 -0.002 
 -0.077 1.250 -0.248 -1.585 -0.018 
LNSIZE -0.037 0.078** 0.181* -0.024 -0.012 
 -1.200 2.092 1.883 -0.459 -0.128 
Secondary duration 0.003 0.027 -0.003 -0.016 -0.121 
 0.050 0.434 -0.013 -0.148 -0.575 
Crisis -0.042*** -0.009 -0.013 -0.077 -0.142** 
 -2.874 -0.656 -0.681 -1.542 -2.541 
Management participation 0.046* -0.022 0.019 0.085* 0.071 
 1.708 -0.649 0.231 1.709 0.790 
GEAR -0.013*** -0.010* -0.002 -0.002 0.012 
 -2.637 -1.895 -0.408 -0.158 0.882 
Previous performance -0.750*** -0.137 -0.055 -0.530*** -0.558*** 
 -5.213 -0.761 -0.510 -3.034 -3.185 
Intercept 0.224 -0.192 -0.674 0.191 0.402 
 1.319 -0.922 -0.928 0.598 0.691 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R square (%) 41.01 27.31 24.51 29.19 30.63 
Wald chi2 346.088*** 61.752*** 53.608*** 233.507*** 121.839*** 
N 317 263 237 265 249 
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CONCLUSION 
           This thesis has empirically examined operating performance up to five years after 
SMBO transactions and its relationships with leverage and managerial ownership, with a 
relatively comprehensive dataset of UK SMBOs completed during 2000 and 2007, in an 
attempt to draw a picture of how SMBOs affect the operating performance of target 
companies and improve our current understanding of the recent SMBO surge. Our dataset 
also allows us, for the first time, to fully investigate the transformation of the board of 
directors after SMBO transactions and its influence on post-SMBO operating performance, 
revealing new insights into the role of the board of directors in private companies (e.g. 
buyouts) and how SMBOs overcome the corporate governance challenges. Besides, this 
thesis, as the first study, examines the impact of the longevity of PE funds (fund pressures) 
and the variance among PE firms (competitive advantages) on post-SMBO operating 
performance, shedding some light on PE firms’ investment behavior and their performance 
in terms of competitive advantage.  
           In Chapter 2, we firstly examined the post-SMBO operating performance in terms of 
profitability (ROA and ROS), productivity (sales per employee), and growth (employment 
growth and sales growth) from the first year to the fifth year after SMBO transactions. Then, 
we used leverage and managerial ownership as explanatory variables to examine their 
respective impact on post-SMBO operating performance in a panel data analysis.   
           The results from the univariate analysis demonstrate a significant reduction in 
profitability and growth for both unadjusted and industry adjusted measures after SMBO 
transactions. Moreover, the industry adjusted measures show worse performance than 
unadjusted measures. With reference to productivity, although the unadjusted measure 
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evidences significant improvement, the industry adjusted measure shows significant 
decreases during the SMBO phase. These results are robust to alternative profitability 
measures and matching methods for the benchmark. For instance, we collected a control 
group of primary private–to-private MBOs and used the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
method to match the treat group and control group. It is found that SMBOs underperform 
their matched counterparts of primary private-to-private MBOs in profitability, productivity, 
and growth, further confirming our main results. Notably, our results show a decreasing 
trend in profitability, productivity, and growth from the first to the fifth post-SMBO year. 
These results regarding the whole sample conclusively suggest that SMBOs underperform 
after transactions, consistent with our buying time hypothesis and some previous studies 
(e.g. Jelic and Wright, 2011). The univariate analyses on post-SMBO operating 
performance in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, with reference to different sample sizes, also 
obtained the similar results.   
           Furthermore, we considered the heterogeneity of SMBOs and divided the entire 
sample into subsamples in terms of PE backing, exit routes, and the holding period in 
primary buyouts, in order to obtain deeper insights into post-SMBO operating performance. 
By comparing the median value of operating performance across these subsamples, it is 
firstly found that compared to SMBOs exited through tertiary MBOs, SMBOs that are 
exited through going public and trade sales perform better during the secondary round. 
Second, however, we find mixed evidence on the prediction of superior performance of PE-
backed SMBOs compared to their non-PE-backed counterparts. Particularly, we find that 
PE-backed SMBOs only outperform non-PE-backed SMBOs in productivity and growth a 
certain number of years after SMBOs. Third, although it is inconclusive, the results show 
that ‘early’ exited SMBOs seem to have better post-SMBO operating performance than the 
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‘late’ exited SMBOs. These empirical results indicate that although SMBOs underperform 
after transactions based on whole sample, there are still possibilities for some SMBOs to 
perform better than others, and not all SMBOs are bad deals.    
           The results for the impact of leverage and managerial ownership do not support our 
hypotheses. We even find that leverage (measured by debt coverage) is significantly and 
negatively related to post-SMBO operating performance in terms of profitability and 
productivity, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are very small. The results are 
robust to different leverage measures and regression models. It is inconsistent with prior 
studies on primary buyouts and indicates that high leverage is a one-off value creation 
mechanism. Once the high leverage has been used in the primary round, it will not benefit 
the target companies in the secondary round; rather the opposite, it will increase the failure 
risk of the target companies. Surprisingly, we do not find any convincing evidence on the 
impact of managerial ownership on post-SMBO performance, which is also inconsistent 
with prior studies. The results indicate to some extent that the management holding 
ownership for the incentive alignment in the secondary round cannot motivate the 
management to obtain the same achievement as in primary round in terms of the operating 
performance. Because both leverage and managerial ownership are used to solve the agency 
problems, the results also suggest the invalidity of agency theory that explains value 
creation in SMBOs.  
           This chapter contributes to the small but growing literature on SMBOs by using the 
most comprehensive UK SMBO dataset to date. Unlike the prior studies that focus on the 
motivations of SMBOs and returns of this kind of investment, or only investigate short term 
post-SMBO profitability and long term post-SMBO operating performance in the early 
2000s, this study has fully examined the long run post-SMBO operating performance in 
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profitability, productivity, and growth of UK SMBOs from 2000 to 2007, together with the 
determinants of these performance. Besides, previous studies on SMBOs only investigate 
PE-backed SMBOs, while, as other types of buyouts, SMBOs also include non-PE-backed 
deals. Hence, we contribute to the current state of research by dividing our sample into PE-
backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs and examining the operating performance and 
determinants separately. 
           Furthermore, we offer the first empirical evidence on whether the typical corporate 
governance mechanisms of buyouts, leverage and managerial ownership, in buyout 
organization can drive the performance in the second buyout round in a panel dataset. The 
governance efforts of leverage and managerial ownership are brought into buyout literature 
by Jensen (1986) in public-to-private (PTP) circumstances, supported by a glut of empirical 
studies by still using PTP samples. However, along with the development of PE and buyout 
markets, the composition of buyouts have changed dramatically with PTP deals only 
accounting for 6.7% of the total amount of LBOs between 1980 and 2007 (Strömberg, 
2008). Therefore, the notion of the positive influence of leverage and managerial ownership 
on post-buyout operating performance is confounded. Our findings in Chapter 2 contribute 
to further understanding the effects of leverage and managerial ownership in value creation, 
especially operating performance improvement.  
           Chapter 3 investigated changes in the board of directors from the primary stage to 
the secondary stage and examined the relationship between the new board compositions 
and the post-SMBO operating performance, using the data of 262 UK SMBOs completed 
from 2000 to 2007. 
           The univariate analysis of the comparison of the board composition before and after 
SMBO transactions evidences that SMBOs on average have a higher fraction of PE-related 
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directors and a lower fraction of independent outside directors than their primary stage 
counterparts. Furthermore, PE-backed SMBOs on average experience significant increases 
in board size and the fraction of PE-related directors, while the fraction of inside directors 
after transactions decreases. In contrast, non-PE-backed SMBOs on average experience 
significant decreases in board size, the fraction of PE-related directors, and the fraction of 
independent outside directors, but significant increase in the fraction of inside directors 
after transactions. In other words, compared to non-PE-backed SMBOs, PE-backed 
SMBOs tend to increase the board size, nominate fewer inside directors, and be more likely 
to replace top managers (CEO/CFO) and have skilled insiders on the board in the secondary 
stage. These findings show a significant transformation of board composition of the target 
companies after SMBO transactions and the PE-backed SMBOs in particular are actively 
injected with fresh and diverse blood.    
           Our main multivariate results in Chapter 3 show strong evidence that the more PE-
related directors on the board, the better SMBO perform in profitability, productivity, and 
sales growth, suggesting that PE firms taking seats on the board is still an important 
mechanism of performance improvement. This is because new PE-related directors possess 
various idiosyncratic skills, experience, and capabilities to exploit the growth opportunities 
and boost the operating performance. More PE-related directors mean more resources 
available. Alternatively, some SMBOs of our sample were non-PE-backed in the primary 
round, so the high fraction of PE-related directors in the secondary round contributes to the 
elimination of agency problems. As a consequence, SMBOs with more PE-related directors 
perform better, especially in terms of profitability. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). Moreover, recruiting skilled inside directors is 
also one of the main mechanisms to improve post-SMBO performance, especially 
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regarding employment growth and sales growth. Unlike PE-related directors, skilled inside 
directors not only possess idiosyncratic knowledge, skills, and networks, but they also have 
comprehensive information about the target companies and are motivated to utilize their 
competitive advantages to exploit growth opportunities. In addition, changing top managers 
only improves the post-SMBO operating performance in sales growth. Nevertheless, we do 
not observe consistent evidence on the significant influence of board size and the fraction 
of independent outside directors. On the whole, the results imply that appointing PE-related 
directors and/or skilled inside directors are efficient ways to enhance target company 
performance in SMBOs, in comparison with other ways, for example, changing top 
managements and appointing independent outside directors.      
           To more deeply understand the influence of board compositions, we conducted some 
further analyses concerning some special circumstances. Our results reveal some evidence 
that the high reputation of PE firms alleviates the relationship between the fraction of PE-
related directors and post-SMBO performance, indicating that highly-reputed PE firms tend 
not to use taking seats as a way to create value and might choose a good deal to invest in 
instead. We also find that changing top managers, recruiting independent outside directors, 
and having skilled insiders improve post-SMBOs performance in the subsample of SMBOs 
exited early by primary PE firms/ managers. In contrast, increasing the number of PE-
related directors is the only way to improve post-SMBO performance in the subsample of 
SMBOs exited late by primary PE firms/ managers. When the SMBOs still have potential 
to improve performance, PE firms prefer to adopt alternative ways to enhance the boards’ 
efficiency, rather than taking seats on the board with their own people, in attempt to control 
the costs. Oppositely, when there is little room for SMBOs to obtain improvement, PE firms 
will take more seats on the boards to avoid the failure of their investments.  
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           Our findings extend the current literature on the board of directors in buyout and 
even in private companies. The current literature on the board of directors is mainly for 
public companies. Moreover, the few studies on buyout’s board are almost all to examine 
its monitoring function that engages in eliminating agency problems. Nevertheless, agency 
problems are not the main problems in SMBOs. How to improve the corporate governance 
and obtain operational gains in SMBOs becomes the biggest challenge.  
           Grounded in strategic entrepreneurship theory and the theory of the board of 
directors, we argue for the importance of the advisory function of the board of directors on 
generating strategies to create wealth in SMBOs. In Chapter 3, we found that the board 
composition in SMBOs, PE-backed SMBOs in particular, tends to enhance its advisory 
function. And the respective new board composition mainly contributes to the post-SMBO 
operating performance in growth which we use for strategic entrepreneurship theory. This 
chapter, therefore, provides new insights on the board of directors, even the corporate 
governance, in buyouts and private companies.   
           The review of the literature on the motivations of SMBOs suggests that buying and 
selling fund pressures motivate selling PE firms to exit their deals via SMBOs while buying 
PE firms are keen to invest their untapped capitals in SMBs. It also suggests that the variety 
of PE firms also propels SMBO deals. However, no studies have been conducted to provide 
evidence on how these incentives impact on post-SMBO performance, except for Jenkinson 
and Sousa (2013). Chapter 4 aims to fill this gap by investigating whether the longevity of 
PE funds (fund pressures) from both the buying and selling sides affects the PE firms’ 
decisions on investing good or bad deals in terms of post-SMBO operating performance 
and whether the characteristics of PE firms (competitive advantages) have an influence on 
post-SMBO operating performance.    
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           Our results show that when the buying PE fund comes to the end of its investing 
period, SMBOs underperform in terms of employment growth and sales growth. However, 
this result is driven by the industry factor. Moreover, our results document some evidence 
that when the selling PE fund is approaching the end of the fund life, SMBOs perform 
better in profitability. We also find that the positive relationship between the length of the 
remaining time until the end of the fund life of the selling PE fund and the post-SMBO 
operating performance in profitability is stronger when the selling PE fund exits early, 
suggesting the performance improvement potential left by selling PE firms. These results 
are consistent with, but not strongly supportive of, our hypotheses to some extent. We 
suggest that the fund pressures mainly affect the bargaining power of PE firms when 
negotiating the deal prices while not the real quality of their investments. Particularly, 
buying PE firms under buying pressures does not chase bad deals, in despite of it being 
more likely to pay a higher price. They actually screen the deals to invest in good deals.           
           To investigate the influence of the characteristics of the buying PE firms on post-
SMBO performance, we use industry experience, the number of investments per executive, 
and buyout/acquisition stage specialization as proxies for the characteristics (competitive 
advantages) of PE firms. Our findings provide evidence that more industry experience and 
a lesser number of investments per executive of buying PE firms lead to better post-SMBO 
performance in terms of productivity and growth of both employment and sales. However, 
these results are driven by industry factors. These results are robust when we correct for 
sample selection bias. Our main results prefer that buying PE firms tend to invest in good 
deals with growth potential instead of making efforts by themselves to improve the 
performance of target companies. This also supports to the strategic entrepreneurship theory 
to some extent, as all the improvements are concentrated in employment growth and sales 
247 
 
growth.   
            Moreover, we find that when SMBOs have performance improvement potential, the 
impact of buying PE firms’ characteristics on SMBOs’ operating performance is weakened.   
            However, when we restricted our sample to SMBOs that are backed by PE funds 
with a limited fund life, the characteristics of buying PE firms appear to have significant 
relationships with post-SMBO performance in terms of productive and growth ratios. These 
results support the heterogeneity hypothesis and indicate that buying PE firms actually do 
have incentive to exploit opportunities to improve SMBOs’ performance, especially 
productivity and growth performance, provided that there are potential fund pressures. 
           Chapter 4 first contributes to the growing literature on the heterogeneity (various 
competitive advantages) of PE firms. The current studies suggest that the heterogeneity 
matters in influencing on the success of buyout transactions, while little is known about its 
influences on the target companies’ operating performance. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is only one study (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2013) examining the relationship between the 
respective experience of the selling and buying PE firms and post-SMBO profitability. 
From this perspective, Chapter 4 not only provides some evidence on whether the 
competitive advantages of buying PE firms improve growth performance after SMBOs, and 
provides new insights on strategic entrepreneurship theory on SMBOs, but also to some 
extent explains the conflicting behaviors of buying PE firms when using their competitive 
advantages to spur the performance improvement.   
          Moreover, our result contributes to the small but growing literature on the agency 
conflicts between the general partner and the limited partner. Under these agency conflicts 
PE firms might overinvest or adversely invest in bad deals, in order to seek their own 
benefits. SMBOs provide an opportunity to examine whether agency conflicts between the 
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general partner and the limited partner affect PE firms decision on making investments. 
However, previous studies mainly use fund level data. Chapter 4 investigates these agency 
conflicts from the company level by investigating whether under fund pressures, PE firms 
will choose to invest in easily accessible but bad deals.  
           Finally, this thesis is one of the few studies that adopt alternative theory (strategic 
entrepreneurship theory) rather than agency theory to explain the entrepreneur activities in 
buyouts and the first study that uses strategic entrepreneurship theory to explain post-
SMBO operating performance. Through examining companies’ growth and the 
determinants thereof, which is supported by strategic entrepreneurship theory, we find that 
although typical SMBOs underperform after SMBO transactions, better growth 
performance can still be achieved by enhancing the advisory function of the board of 
directors (e.g. having more PE-related directors and skilled inside directors on the board) 
and, or to some extent, by buying PE firms with competitive advantages. This is because all 
these determinants bring in new and unique resources, knowledge, experience, and skills 
into the target companies and help the creation of new strategies. This thesis, hence, 
extends the theory background in the buyout literature. 
           It is worthy of presenting several limitations of this thesis, other than the limitations 
we present in Chapter 3 and 4. First, the three empirical chapters use accounting data. Our 
results might be subject to potential managerial manipulation of the reported accounting 
data, as private companies are not required to report their accounting information to the 
public. Second, the results and conclusions of the empirical methodology could be sensitive 
to the choice of model specifications and variable measures. Although the GLS random-
effects panel regression used in this thesis is always not supported by empirical and 
econometrical researchers, the nature of our dataset, misspecification tests, and post-
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estimation tests suggest that this is the best estimation methods currently for our research. 
Third, as we manually collect the most of our independent variables, these variables may 
subject to measurement errors. But we believe the effects of these potential errors have 
been minimized. Fourth, we only consider the endogeneity relationship between the board 
size and post-SMBO operating performance. Other governance mechanisms, such as 
managerial ownership, or board compositions (e.g. skilled inside directors), might also be 
endogenous. However, we do not address these issues here due to a lack of relevant data. 
Finally, we treat incentive alignments as a whole through managerial ownership. 
Accordingly, incentive alignments come from various sources.  
           The new phenomenon of growing SMBOs creates many promising research ideas 
for the researchers. Although there are some studies on SMBOs, our study still could be 
extended in several ways in terms of data coverage, research method, and research topics. 
We so propose these promising ideas for future research as follows.  
          First, in this thesis, we collected data during period from 2000 to 2007, in an attempt 
to obtain enough long term post-SMBO operating performance data. As a consequence, all 
the SMBOs were completed before the recent financial crisis. The current study makes an 
important conclusion that the current SMBO wave was driven by the ‘hot’ credit market 
and ‘cold’ equity market during this period. However, after the financial crisis, when the 
equity market recovered, while credit market cooled down, the number of SMBOs still has 
been growing fast. We do not know the motivations, the fund performance, and post-SMBO 
operating performance of the SMBOs completed after financial crisis, after 2010. We 
suggest that, based on our current research, the target companies might have value creation 
potentials, especially growth potentials, to attract the buyout investors. Further research is 
required to include data after 2010.   
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          Second, we observe the crucial role of the board of directors in improving the 
strategy and growth performance of the target companies in SMBOs and highlight the 
importance of PE-related directors and skilled inside directors. Nevertheless, due to issues 
of data availability, we do not know exactly the background or expertise abilities of these 
directors and how they use their expertise to facilitate the operational strategies in SMBOs. 
Because the board of directors is a breakthrough of overcoming the challenge of corporate 
governance in SMBOs, we suggest further research to closely investigate the expertise and 
behaviors of these directors by case study, interviews, or questionnaires that are commonly 
employed by the management literature.  
           Third, this thesis adopts employment growth and sales growth as measures for 
entrepreneurial activities. Data on innovations, research and development, the market 
segments expansion, or subsidiary may provide more and deeper insights on whether 
SMBOs focus on their long run strategic expansion instead of profitability gains by 
eliminating the agency issues. 
           Fourth, when we examined the continuous effects of the incentive alignment in 
SMBOs, according to the literature, we used managerial ownership as a signal and whole 
proxy. However, the case study conducted by Achleitner et al. (2012b) and the theoretical 
studies of Elitzur et al. (1998) suggests that there are various purposes motivating 
management to invest in SMBOs/MBOs and aligning/disposing their incentives with the 
other stakeholders. More detailed data on these purposes could offer new insights of the 
effects of incentive alignment in SMBOs and even the longevity of the superior governance 
of buyouts. 
           Fifth, our findings show a significant negative impact of leverage on post-buyout 
operating performance, profitability in particular. A question arises why bankers or loan 
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providers still offer huge debt to support SMBOs, because low operating performance 
means high failure risk of the companies and the high risk of their loans. The literature 
suggests that the confidence of bankers in companies that have already been bought out and 
the high debt capacity of target companies could be the reasons of their continuous 
investments in SMBOs. Further research could investigate the real reasons from the aspects 
of banker or loan providers.    
       Finally, we investigated the post-SMBO performance from the PE firms’ 
perspectives. It will be interesting to investigate the motivation of the portfolio managers on 
SMBOs and the relationships between their background and the investment returns or target 
companies’ performance.  
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